Costly Airbus paint flaw goes wider than the Gulf
reuters.com
reuters.com
> When Airbus 15 years ago launched the A350, it chose to follow Boeing's new 787 in using carbon-fibre instead of metal.
> Experts say the lighter jets consume less fuel but are harder to deck out in a way that makes paint stick.
> The new jets also need a layer of metallic mesh to dissipate lightning strikes because carbon-fibre is not conductive.
> Finally, unlike metal, carbon does not expand and shrink as temperatures change. Yet paint does, resulting in a tug of war between plane and paint that can cause peeling over time.
> Problems reported by Qatar Airways and some - though far from all - other A350 operators suggest this is happening earlier than expected, two people familiar with the design said.
> The problem may have been compounded by the paint's especially weak adhesion to titanium rivets, they added.
I wonder how dissimilar the paint and/or painting process is to the 787. Perhaps it will one day suffer the same issues.
> Airbus is also not alone in facing problems. Boeing has had paint issues and a phenomenon known as rivet rash, or flecks of missing paint, on its competing 787s.
Whatever happened to the customer is always right?
Guess it is easier to victim blame when you operate in essence a duopoly. Competition is critical to solve these issues in the long run.
Enough people worked retail to know that's a lie.
But yes, this is the sort of thing Airbus should have responded better to, even if it was without any real promise of making things right (i.e., "We are investigating fully as to what has happened here and will seek to make things right if we find this in any way weakens the structural stability of our planes, known the world over as some of the (insert whatever marketing speak)")
The customer not being right.
That never made it to Europe to begin with.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boein...
I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised procedure memory items.
And Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes.
> In vivid detail, the documentary pieces together what Boeing knew about the potential for disaster with the 737 Max and when the company knew it. Pasternak says in the film that in 2012, a “Boeing test pilot was flying the MAX in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an activation of MCAS, and that resulted in what he described as a catastrophic event. It showed that if that had been in real life, he [could] have lost the airplane. They realize from that moment on, even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to MCAS.”
> Yet internal communications explored in the film show that Boeing was determined to maintain the status quo: avoiding potential scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration that would add costs; keeping new simulator training for pilots to a minimum; and even requesting that MCAS be removed from pilot training manuals.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing...
That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed.
The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column deflection. That obviously won’t work for the intended purpose of MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to excessive pitch up).
The checklist item for runaway trim is not “stop stab trim by deflecting control column” but rather “stop stab trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches”. Pilots who used the “deflect control column” technique contrary to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That’s pretty far from “0% pilot contribution” to the mishap IMO.
A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept, communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo. Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no good handoff around prior issues etc.
I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane in its entire envelope?
This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience etc) which was not really appropriate here.
At 240 hours, I couldn’t be trusted with a Bonanza.
1,500 is pretty dang high. Persoanlly, 500 - 1000 wouldn't be unreasonable in my view.
Major airlines might still be at 3,000+ hours.
Remember, it used to be in the US you could also fly as a FO with a commercial pilots license at 250 hours!
FAA Commercial Pilot is 250 (50 of which need to be in powered airplane). https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/active-pilots/safet...
50 hours behind the actual yoke? 200 lives 30,000 feet in the air?
Overseas, some of the cadet / local pilot programs - you get pretty low time and/or connected pilots into the seat.
"The committee noted that these deficiencies had been identified previously in training and reemerged during the accident flight. When the MCAS activated, it took the first officer four minutes to locate the proper checklist because he wasn’t familiar with required memory items. During training, the same pilot had shown unfamiliarity with Boeing and airline standard operating procedures and had weak aircraft handling skills, the report revealed. His training record reflected numerous deficiencies, including “major problems” controlling the aircraft."
There is a reason Boeing initially said there might have been some pilot factors. They look at that memory item checklist, and think, trim problem, stab cutout memory item.
In the US they have Capt Sully (glider / fighter pilots, lots of experience, with a strong FO) gliding a plane with two engines out to a safe landing. So human in the loop kind of works in the US. Could you program a computer for that? Probably, but not there yet.
That said, I still blame Boeing to a large degree. If you are going to sell new planes to countries that have this type of system, you must design the plane for purpose. Ie, low time pilots who struggle / are connected / can't be fired etc - you don't then design the plane assuming the human in the loop will have hand flying ability to step in. That was pure greed, roll out this type of plane in the US / EU / UK etc. Good maintenance, good safety reporting systems (ASAP etc) work out the kinks, then go overseas.
First Max 8 to Malindo air!!? Really??
They really need to get to airbus and beyond envelope protection etc in these markets.
I'm also curious about checkrides overseas. Stuff like engine out on takeoff etc is just hammered into folks in the US.
Boeing then issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive to ALL 737MAX PILOTS:
"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."
https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
which the EA pilots did not follow.
They were this close to saving the airplane, had ID’d the issue, patched it, largely recovered control, and lost the airplane subsequent to that.
(This is not meant to denigrate the crew. They were dealt a bad hand, including continuous stick shaker activation which surely added to confusion and likely led them to leave the thrust at max. Additionally, they were getting split airspeed and FD command bars for the crew. It’s frustrating how tantalizingly close they were to saving it even with those hurdles.)
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20190310-...
I worry that this obsession with fixing only the hardware is the industry trying to sweep the training factors under the rug in hope that the current trend towards accidents being a result of serious training deficiencies will remain widely unnoticed.
Perhaps, but the Frontline episode didn't play like an industry point of view. It was pretty anti-industry.
Aviation Week is more of a pro-industry publication, and their coverage of the MAX seemed pretty even-handed to me.
Cars are designed for people who don't read the manual. Airplanes cannot be that way, but I get the feeling that non-aviation people expect this to be possible. An airplane cannot just pull over and call AAA.
Control Column - Hold Firmly
Autopilot - Disengage. Do NOT re-engage. Control pitch attitude manually with column and electric trim.
If runaway continues, stab trim cutout (both) to cutout.
http://www.b737.org.uk/images/runawaystab2000.jpg
The new procedure is not that much different.
With PK-LQP - previous flight it took 6 minutes for them to get to this procedure - and it was suggestion of a dead-heading pilot. This resolved things. Despite going through this exact issue on previous flight, the next flight takes off, same issue develops because of underlying maintenance issue, they were dealing with this for 8 minutes, 28 activations of incorrect trim but with a fatal outcome.
Yes, MCAS was a bad design, yes it increased risk. I'm not sure it was a "nothing could be done" type situation. Better maintenance? Better communication between flights? Stab trim cutout earlier if you don't like how the automatic trim is working?
Airbus has historically pushed more automation / flight protection. My own suspicion is Boeing will go that way as well, ie, human in loop model they had (where human fixes the computer going crazy) just doesn't work well especially for folks flying these big jets without much earlier GA / manual flying time.
For example, in the US, a pilot would have done lots of manual flying on small planes first, and so might be a bit less automation dependent and better able to take over when computers go crazy. Also more hours before you fly the big jets (think 1,500 hours flight time). Usually a 4 year degree.
Overseas, you can come off the street and be flying a jet with 200 - 240 hours of time including sim time? That is a TON less flying time, probably very very little manual stick and rudder flying. A fair number of saves in the US have come from folks with great stick and rudder flying experience, even things like glider experience you just don't have overseas.
There usually is something called differences training for variants like this. Wouldn't cover MCAS, and is usually brief, but not normally zero. I'm surprised they did zero differences training if that was the case - that is very unusual. You've got to do normally at least an hour or two. A new variant is not unheard off, 737 probably has something like 12 variants under one type certificate. I would check your source there that no differences training came up.
It's a bad habit to split the world into US/overseas. Canada and Western Europe are clearly much closer to the US than Indonesia and Pakistan, and Eastern Europe / CIS states have a history of ex-military/experienced pilots too.
I used to watch Frontline regularly. Although they had an obvious left wing bias, I thought they made good faith efforts to present the facts.
No more. I no longer watch Frontline nor consider them a reliable source of news.
BTW, the "Aviation Disasters" did an episode on the 737MAX that was pretty decent (although a bit shallow due to time constraints), so it is possible to do a good story on it. Recommended.
1. poor MCAS design
2. poor maintenance
3. pilots not following runaway trim emergency procedures
The media pretty much never mentions (3).
Note that 3 flights experienced the MCAS malfunction. 1 applied runaway trim emergency procedures, continued with the flight, and landed safely.
https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
2018 - 035 - PK-LQP Final Report http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20...
Of course: 1. The MAX can't be a new type, it would have to be clean-sheet at that point just from all the grandfathered items. 2. That view grossly oversimplifies how type ratings work for pilots. 3. MCAS exists to conform to the FARs (control force curves), not some "make it fly like a 737NG" thing.
Remember the coverage around Toyota’s stuck accelerators, or the woman who suffered third degree burns from McDonald’s coffee?
Marshall Field, the man who coined that phrase, went out of business. His department store got eaten by Macy's.
Marshall Field's, the company founded by the man who coined that phrase and which used it as a slogan and marketing campaign for decades, went out of business. It eventually got eaten by Macy's.
Happy?
Have you ever met a customer?
Much easier to water down the issue and turn it to a mutual blame game.
The lesson the public repeatedly teaches to MBA types is that the narrative matters more than reality. It makes complete business sense to blame the customer.
The full quote is: "In matters of taste, the customer is always right."
These are serious issues with massive costs and liabilities. We don't resort to platitudes at that scale.
'Who is Right' should be as objective as we can feasibly determine and it may be complicated.
Blaming climate was more a way to tell other customers "we thing you will not have this problem"
After seeing the images, that's no ruse. And that appears to be a bit more than "cosmetic".
It looks like conductivity is also desired, to some degree, to help the metal surfaces dissipate lightning.
That's basically a walk in the park compared to anything that needs to deal with unearthly temperatures and harsh chemicals at the same time. Furthermore, air (and airborne water) isn't very abrasive which helps a lot even if you do go through it at hundreds of miles per hour.
You can more or less think most modern paint as a plastic coating. High speed air with the occasional water droplet or Canadaian goose, easy. Abrasives, hydrocarbons, high temperatures, not so easy.
But in the modern age, if you need a metal mesh around a carbon fiber fuselage then not painting the airplane is probably not an option. Sad.
It wasn't quite that simple. I believe the 'bare metal' finish actually had a layer of protective varnish painted on, to protect the metal from oxidation (anyone who has handled bare aluminum can tell you that it develops a layer of oxide very quickly). In addition to that, the panels had to be specially chosen and very carefully handled, as small blemishes were very obvious.
https://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_05/texto...
> The decision to paint or polish the metal surfaces of airplanes is based on marketing, economic, and environmental considerations. Although the net operating cost of polished airplanes is slightly more than that of painted airplanes, no compelling reason generally exists to choose one type of livery over the other.
This is also why there's a very strong industry preference for airframes that are 'tried and true' - e.g. 737 variants up until the MAX, A320 and A330, etc.
That would mean all ‘in service’ aircraft would be based on 50+ year old designs. That clearly is undesirable, if only because it would be too expensive.
So, instead, one uses models for the effects of aging, for example by repeatedly freezing and heating parts while they also are being stressed physically and are under intense UV lighting. Those models can be wrong, but if you’re using new tech, you can’t afford to wait with selling airplanes until you know they are right.
(Of course, this isn’t limited to the aircraft industry; it happens in all engineering. For example, hard disk manufacturers don’t run new hard disk technology for decades to measure its MTBF, either)
Sometimes, such models need major adjustment, as happened with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet.
Curious in responses from that perspective. Are airframes that much more complicated? Or just better due to advances in aerodynamic understanding, but not much more complicated?
And same question for engines. Are modern high-bypass turbofans more complex?
I’m going to contradict my original question to some degree by stating that I know that air travel is safer than ever.
My question is more just wondering out loud if there is a point where we rely on “solved” problems so much that we start to lose comprehension of the factors that are involved. It feels like the MCAS was an example.
Agree that you can never “know” how an airframe will age until you build it and doesn’t seem like this is as critical as MCAS issue but it could be that we have to wait 15 years to find out.
MCAS would have not been an issue is any one of the layers above engineering had questioned the decision to avoid training requirements (e.g. Boeing management, FAA management).
Unfortunately, systems are so complex now that it was possible to summarize the details in a way that hid the necessary information. And when it went up further, even more summarization.
It feels like this wouldn't have been as easy with simpler, older systems. I mean, presumably a manager could look at a biplane and say "Hey, that doesn't have enough thrust to weight."
But mistakes (such as the rectangular window problem with the de Havilland Comet, and more recently, the attempt to keep the same type certification for a completely redesigned airframe) do happen and when they do, unfortunately, the results can be terrible.
"Qatar Airways grounds 13 Airbus A350s as fuselage degrading"
Any commercial pilots here willing to share their experience with this sort of thing? In the US, the FAA gives the pilot command over the flight, but I imagine companies take a dim view of pilots canceling flights over certain maintenance issues.
When you call it cosmetics, you're likening that to eye shadow or lipstick.
No engineer would care to be named as the source of that idiotic statmeent.
https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-removed-lightning-str...
"Boeing removed a feature that protects its 787 planes during lightning strikes as a cost-cutting measure, even after FAA experts objected"
Mind you, that is 2019, after the 737 MAX crashes, it is like the 787 department just didn't get the memo. Or may be there weren't any memo inside Boeing.
Talk about parties with vested interest in a “nothing to see here, keep moving” conclusion. The only opinion that actually matters here is that of the regulators.
I'm quite scared of modern journalism and how facts can be used to manipulate and mislead people.
It's called "The Great Boeing 787"
Detachment of airflow across the whole wing would require a lot of damage, normal inspection would result in such a plane to be grounded well ahead of that happening.