The quality of these professional pilots is really disturbing. Why would they pull up more when the plane is already in a stall? I'm pretty sure they teach in lesson 2 or 3 of flight school how to recover from stalls by pulling down on the stick.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-13-buffalo-c...
It's like long division in multivar class. Some people can do it again given time but most people wouldn't be able to divide 1345 into 26 right off the bat.
To me, it seems ridiculous that pilots are unable to remember this stuff. Really. To recover from a stall, you ease down on the stick and alternatively apply power. Barring a deep-stall condition, it's really that simple. They even teach you that the most basic error in a stall condition is to pull back on the stick in a panic-stricken attempt at forcing the plane to gain altitude. I'm stupefied at these reports.
The systems were "reporting" alternating stall and overspeed warnings. So you have one system telling you to pull up to slow down and then another saying you are about to stall, the stall readings are invalid...the computer gives up and says you're on your own.
BTW, the AOA screen is not even visible, it's buried in a submenu of the main screen.
There were even situations where pushing forward was the wrong thing to do (although no longer, thank goodness). The 727 could enter a situation where the elevator itself was stalled from the main wing stall.
Modern heavies are about systems management and cockpit procedures. As someone below points out, if one system is telling you to pull up from overspeed, and another is telling you to push forward from stall, which do you believe? And, more importantly, how quickly can you trouble-shoot to find the correct action?