Why Google+ Gets a “+1″ for Browser Security
barracudalabs.com
barracudalabs.com
Not only is it not the default, but it's hard to keep enabled for a good chunk of users. If you try to go to an app page[1], for example, you will be informed that SSL cannot be used. To continue, you need to disable SSL not only on pages that app uses, but the entire site. It doesn't get re-enabled when you leave the app.
[1] I don't know that this is true for all app pages, but it's definitely true for at least one of the most popular apps on Facebook.
Additionally, the button disables SSL forever, rather than just while you're using the broken app.
The developer console on Facebook says this will be the case on October 1.
I hear a lot of stuff discussed in this article and in the discussions about HN-HTTPS (http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2909102) which is all new to me.
http://www.isecpartners.com/storage/white-papers/web-session...
Unfortunately it's not true. For instance, G+ does not use X-Content-Security-Policy (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CSP/Specification) and uses X-XSS-Protection instead, which is a solution not exactly designed properly. (Noscript is a slightly better implementation, but since its client side, no dice)
You can also check this at Wekbit: https://bugs.webkit.org/buglist.cgi?keywords=XSSAuditor&...
Many G website just disable that filter afaik because sometimes it can be misused by the attacker.
I suppose that Chrome will eventually support X-Content-Security-Policy or something similar and then G sites will switch to that.
As for CSP support in Chrome, it's currently available if you set a vendor-specific header. (That's the normal way to handle an experimental standard that's still in flux.) My personal opinion on CSP is that it's a bit of an overly complicated mess. We didn't plan to implement it in Chrome/WebKit until very recently, mainly because Mozilla got some major sites on board. In the end, we decided users would be better served by CSP (warts and all) than by any attempts at yet another standard.
Agree, though that Fb could be working harder on this!
Now then again SPDY is indeed fast and encrypted
This is also interesting:
Also, it isn't encrypted. So there's that too.
That would be a plausible explanation for the fact that they use a user-agent based whitelisting. If one's protections rely on client-side features, it's a bit more understandable (though I still find it a bit weak) to try to enforce use of a browser that implements them.
tl;dr: If you think you're secure because Facebook says HTTPS, you're completely wrong. If I'm on your network, I can inject javascript just as happily as if facebook were loading over http.
This has been reported and ignored, as one might guess.
I'd also love to debug your report getting ignored - do you know where you submitted it? We take white hat reports pretty seriously and I know I've seen a number of them resolved in less than a day after being reported. Check out https://www.facebook.com/whitehat to report stuff in the future (we'll even pay a bounty of $500 for most properly-disclosed security bugs: https://www.facebook.com/whitehat/bounty/).
Also, I'm curious where you reported this before? If there's an issue causing security bug reports to get dropped, that's something I want to fix ASAP. Thanks!
I honestly don't remember where I reported this before, it was not at the link you've offered above. I've got that bookmarked now. Like I said, if I have someone to contact or the whitehat link you mentioned, I will be sure to get a more detailed list of what happens when it occurs again.
Thanks.