Hackers are stealing data today so quantum computers can crack it in a decade
technologyreview.com
technologyreview.com
"Using today's technology," Avi shot back. "that is true. But what about quantum computers? And what if new mathematical techniques are developed that can simplify the factoring of large numbers?"
"How long do you want these messages to remain secret?" Randy asked, in his last message before leaving San Francisco. "Five years? Ten years? Twenty five years?"
After he got to the hotel this afternoon, Randy decrypted and read Avi's answer. It is still hanging in front of his eyes, like the afterimage of a strobe:
I want them to remain secret for as long as men are capable of evil.*
What a tasteful reference on HN. Love that book.
Here is another quote about metis, which I reread every time I need inspiration: https://markpasc.org/blog/gems/athena.html
https://gcn.com/articles/2013/06/10/nsa-bumblehive-data-cent...
That said it is slightly harder now most email isnt flying around in clear text just waiting to be scopped up.
Others could be more traditional, like a dragnet that infiltrates common applications or exploits, then hunts for IAM credentials or a DB server.
Users checking tokens with public endpoints into repositories is also very common.
Also, the term is post-quantum cryptography. I don't think it can be declared quantum-safe or quantum-proof just yet.
They're probably targeting communications, like those diplomatic cables Manning leaked. I'd assume top secret "design secrets" aren't transmitted. My understanding of spying is it's typically focused on gleaning information from sources a laymen would consider boring and/or useless. For instance, the NSA worked until 1980 to decrypt certain Soviet messages sent between 1942 and 1945 that re-used one-time pad pages:
I don't think that's quite accurate. The Wikipedia article makes it sounds like the issue was more that they didn't want to give their adversary access to their encryption technology. In this context, OTP has the advantage of being both secure and not secret.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad#Historical_uses
> The hotline between Moscow and Washington D.C., established in 1963 after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, used teleprinters protected by a commercial one-time tape system. Each country prepared the keying tapes used to encode its messages and delivered them via their embassy in the other country. A unique advantage of the OTP in this case was that neither country had to reveal more sensitive encryption methods to the other.
'Q'-you-you.
https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2016/public-key-post-quantum-cryp...
That's from 2016. It's wise to impute shady motives to US government encryption efforts in light of probable DES skulduggery, the Clipper chip, Dual_EC_DRBG, and all the Snowden-era revelations about "implants" and NSA intercepting and modifying hardware.
Huh? Didn't DES use NSA-provided unexplained magic numbers that many people were highly skeptical of, but actually made it more secure against an attack that was not publicly known?
For attack: custody is never provable in crypto, as in you can prove you own an account but you cant prove nobody else does. so a hacker can use that to their advantage. They can also delay rotation by carefully picking their targets and amounts, as all the victims will be victim blamed and not believed for a very long time so a quantum computer hack could exist for a long time unless a large theft was done. Its tricky because many power users will report unexpected thefts and the rumors will start quickly.
We are talking about deriving private keys from an address hash, which is already still improbable with quantum logic
There is also the idea of changing a signed transaction in flight before confirmation, which is the most probable
Or attempting to alter the state of a smart contract, which is less probable and needs consensus
there are just already lower tech ways to make billions getting other people’s crypto, and turning that into cash easily, assuming you even want state money
its just not worth it for the “aha! see only I could make this bet so accurately” gloat, right now
I would expect we will more likely have an error-correcting quantum machine sooner than the aforementioned. Given the pace Google et al are making.
We already have a quantum approach to solved ECC over finite fields, Shor's.