> 1) Less monitoring on private messages
The Facebook leaker is explicitly arguing against this though. She cites Facebook’s push for end-to-end encryption of private messages as a problem.
The Facebook leaker is explicitly arguing against this though. She cites Facebook’s push for end-to-end encryption of private messages as a problem.
As for the whistleblower, I'm very skeptical of her — to be a tech PM against encryption, and somehow linking e2e encryption to making the platform less safe, is dubious at best. Removing misinformation and calls to violence on the Facebook platform doesn't need to include monitoring private messages.
The idea that she's been a PM at large tech companies for 15 years and doesn't understand that Facebook monitoring messages will mean China can monitor those messages is almost too suspicious to believe.
Re misinformation: why would misinformation not simply happen in e2e group chats like it is already happening in e.g. Brazil or India? What’s the difference between posting to a group of friends on Facebook vs sharing a group message to those friends?
I do think messages should be encrypted but the trade off isn’t as straightforward as you make it sound.
Not parent, but I think the idea is that if BigCo does business in CountryA , then CountryA's government invariably forces BigCo to spy on their users who are residents.
Obviously compromising the user's device is a workaround open to governments but hard to achieve in bulk.
> Strangely, the example she gave suggested that Facebook needs to have looser encryption in order to somehow protect Uyghurs in China from government attempts to implant spyware onto their phones. [1]
And Facebook responded, sticking up for e2e encryption:
> A Facebook spokesperson responded to The Telegraph with what we all should realize at this point is the responsible approach to encryption: "The reason we believe in end-to-end encryption is precisely so that we can keep people safe, including from foreign interference and surveillance as well as hackers and criminals." There is no such thing as encryption back doors that only the "right" people can access. If they exist, they can eventually be found or accessed by others. [1]
[1] https://reason.com/2021/10/25/whistleblower-absurdly-attacks...
One doesn’t have to agree 100% with an ally.
Because they're also lobbying for other things you care about. And those things are more likely to be passed into law than the E2E encryption pieces.
Taking a puritanical view on an issue is a high-risk high-reward gambit. Nine out of ten times, it ejects you from the room. One out of ten times, you will organize sufficiently to make it a wedge issue (e.g. the NRA on guns, NIMBYs, et cetera).
To the extent Haugen disagrees, she's not on "our side."
It's not reasonable to outlaw the tools needed to exercise a fundamental right. Not OK for the 1st, not OK for the 2nd, and not OK for the 4th. Encryption was already an old technology at the time of the Constitution's authorship. If they had wanted to regulate or outlaw it, they were free to say so. They didn't.
...so if they had wanted to guarantee a right to it, they were free to say so.
But they didn't.
Despite clearly contemplating privacy.
Depending on how terrible the bad ideas are that they're pushing, they may not be an ally at all in fact. A multi-purpose trojan horse may be more accurate.
In this case, promoting the abolition of end to end encryption is quite heinous. She's providing the authoritarians a potent argument that isn't yet well established in the public mind (we have to be able to see all of your data so we can keep you safe from the Chinese trying to see all of your data).