UK spies incited mass murder of Indonesia’s communists
theguardian.com
theguardian.com
The article doesn't say how many generals Indonesia had before the attempted coup. Obviously seven fewer after the attempted coup. I wonder what the surviving generals thought of the recent murders of their colleagues?
The article is written as though the surviving generals sat around afterwards waiting for Britain to incite them to mount a response. That seems unlikely. It would be more usual for the surviving generals to take the murders of their colleagues personally and to attempt a response on a kill-or-be-killed basis, without waiting for British incitement to rouse them to action.
Hmm, not a fan of how they completely
a) minimise the terror perpetrated on civilians by Indonesian infiltrators during Sukarno's Konfrontasi
b) deny the Indonesians' agency, it's rather colonial to think that the anti-communist purges were predicated on British agitprop, when in reality the military and Islamists were highly fearful of PKI, especially when Sukarno wanted to arm them as an almost Red Guard style militia.
I mean, I know it's The Guardian, but they're normally better than this.
The British played second fiddle to the Americans in killing more than 3 million Indonesians to overthrow Sukarno.
It is considered a success in the CIA and was called the Jakarta Method. The successful playbook was then exported to other areas and regions like Africa, Asia and Latin America.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Method
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Indonesia
CIA failed coup attempt of 1958 Following President Eisenhower's September 25, 1957 order to the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government, Soviet intelligence learned of the plans almost instantly, publicizing the "American Plot to Overthrow Sukarno" three days later in an Indian newspaper, Blitz, which Soviet intelligence controlled. Despite Soviet awareness, the CIA began planning the coup, and set up operational bases primarily in the Philippines. The CIA then employed veteran Filipino CIA paramilitary officers to make contact with Indonesian military forces on Sumatra and Sulawesi. Working in tandem with the Pentagon, deliveries of weapons packages were prepared for distribution to rebel military forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA also financed rebel forces with radio stations that issued anti-Sukarno broadcasts in an act of psychological warfare.[10] The American involvement, which was meant to remain a secret, was discovered when a United States air man was shot down. After the pilot was shut down, communist activists used Western intervention as a main point in his speech for communism rule.[12] The next political campaigns to occur would incite a great propaganda war to gain citizen support.
In an effort to try to justify the interference by the United States, the CIA stated that in the time leading up to the coup, Indonesian economic development was severely impacted by the government's failure to unify the country. As a result, the outlying island population, which was responsible for most of the country's exports and tax revenues, became discontent with receiving little in return for their large contributions. In addition, the government began to nationalize foreign-owned plantations and mines, investing in the industries of rubber, copra, and tin, however the facilities were noted to be ill-maintained, which ultimately harmed Indonesia's economy under Sukarno. The islands began to set up semi-autonomous governments until a rebellion finally broke out a year later, staggering production and devastating government revenues due to the loss of exports. Progress was set forth and it was expected that the population would not have famine issues. These economic sanctions eventually became a strategy for throughout their campaign for a free government, albeit these measures proved to be costly in the end.[13]
Back in the United States, at an OCB (Operations Coordination Board) Luncheon on January 8, 1958, the memorandum for the record states: "Mr. Dulles gave a brief report on the latest developments in Indonesia. He referred particularly to indications that the Bandung Council proposes to establish a Free Government of Indonesia, and said that while he believes a move of this sort would be premature, there is little we can or should do to try and stop it. It was agreed it would be unwise to supply arms so long as the possibility exists that the government might become communist dominated."[14]
Nevertheless, the dissidents of Sumatra were anticipated to issue a demand for the establishment of an anti-communist government on February 7, 1958, threatening that any denial of this demand would lead to a rival regime. Noting the dissidents deep distrust of Sukarno, prior proposals for compromise coming from the Djuanda Cabinet were rejected outright. Dissidents supported the Indonesian diplomatic missions in various countries including Singapore, South Vietnam, Malaya, and Italy. Given their resistance to prior proposals, an intelligence memo indicated that the rival regime was poised to proceed regardless of Sukarno's response. As such, these negotiations were viewed as Sukarno's stalling tactic in order to avoid the formation of the rival regime.[15]
While the dissidents were poised to take action regardless of Sukarno's response to their demand, they still feared military attacks from Djakarta in the form of airstrikes. In addition, Djakarta was allegedly maneuvering to split the dissidents, specifically the group under South Sumatran commander Barlian. Propaganda to dispel the dissident movement was also alleged to have been in existence in an intelligence memo, as both Indonesia and the Soviet Union were branding the dissidents' movement as a U.S. plot to fragment and enslave the nation.[16]
On February 21, 1958, the Indonesian military obliterated the radio stations in Sumatra via bombings and established a naval blockade along the coast. Not only did the CIA underestimate the Indonesian Army, but the agency apparently failed to realize that many of the top commanders within the Indonesian Army were fiercely anti-communist, having been trained in the United States, even calling themselves "the sons of Eisenhower." This misstep led to American-aligned Indonesian military forces fighting American-aligned rebel forces. Finally, in a desperate last ditch, CIA pilots began bombing Indonesia's outer islands on April 19, 1958, striking military and civilian targets, killing hundreds of civilians and fomenting much anger among the Indonesian populace. Eisenhower had ordered that no Americans be involved in such missions, yet CIA Director Dulles ignored this order from the president. On May 18, 1958, Al Pope, an American citizen and CIA bomber, was downed over eastern Indonesia, revealing U.S. involvement. The 1958 CIA covert coup thus ended as a complete and transparent failure.[17] The failed coup would become one of the biggest failures in the history of the CIA; the CIA's inability to compete with Soviet covert-intelligence proved costly in this instance, and would prove costly in many other CIA operations against the Soviets.
On February 9, 1958, rebel Colonel Maludin Simbolon issued an ultimatum in the name of a provincial government, the Dewan Banteng or Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, calling for the formation of a new central government. On February 15 Dewan Banteng became part of a wider Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI or "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia") that included rebels led by other dissident colonels in East and South Sumatra and in North Sulawesi.[18]
Sukarno aggressively opposed the rebels; he called upon his loyal army commander, General Abdul Haris Nasution, to destroy the rebel forces. By February 21 forces loyal to Sukarno had been airlifted to Sumatra and began the attack. The rebel headquarters was in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia.[18]
In April and May 1958 CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport (CAT) operated B-26 aircraft from Manado, North Sulawesi to support Permesta rebels.
Military loyal to the central government of Sukarno launched airborne and seaborne invasions of the rebel strongholds Padang and Manado. By the end of 1958, the rebels were militarily defeated. The last remaining rebel guerilla bands surrendered by August 1961.[11]
In a memorandum dated May 2, 1958, the board of national estimates outlined the position of the Indonesian Communist Party, (PKI). Due to PKI support of Sukarno, the influence of Sukarno's government was significantly influential and powerful. The PKI controlled several pro-government groups, expanded influence in rural areas, and possessed significant military strength. The opposition movement provided a reason for the PKI to strengthen ties and gain influence over Sukarno, thereby bolstering Sukarno's efforts against the opposition, and increasing the schism between Sukarno and western interests.[19]
Fragmentation of non-communist groups also played a role in strengthening Sukarno. Indonesian political groups were very diverse. The non-communist Indonesian political groups were organized according to faith, gender, education, culture, and occupation.[20]
The memorandum from May 2, 1958 points to the weakening of the Masjumi, a non-communist political party, which served as a powerful force to prevent Sukarno from connecting with the PKI. Due to the Masjumi's fragmentation, notes the memo, its former strength or unity was not anticipated to return post-revolution.[18]
Lastly, the May 2, 1958 memorandum points to the failure of Western support and inability to compromise on the West Irian issue. The lack of western compromise, the memo alleges, allowed exploitation of this issue for the benefit of the PKI. Further, the memorandum stated that following a revolution, Indonesia would view US support and motives with great suspicion, creating greater opportunities for the PKI and global communist interests.[18]