A study of data collection by Android devices
lwn.net
lwn.net
"On all of the other handsets the Google Play Services and Google Play store system apps send a considerable volume of data to Google, the content of which is unclear, not publicly documented and Google confirm there is no opt out from this data collection. LineageOS collects no data beyond this data collected by Google and so is perhaps the next most private choice after /e/OS."
So the problem is Play Services and the Play store. Note that /e/OS uses MicroG[0] to replace Play Services so you can still use the many Android apps that require it. It's a really cool project and I think it's amazing how someone is like "Damn, I need a Google account for this app? I'll just write my own account manager to replace Google's!". Really that's the spirit of open source, and I hope more people become empowered to be able to solve problems that way in the future.
I think you can also use MicroG rather than OpenGapps on LineageOS, though I haven't tried and haven't read anything about it. Does anyone have some info about this setup?
[0] https://edevelopers-blog.medium.com/microg-what-you-need-to-...
Yes, you can use MicroG with LineageOS. If this totally solved the privacy issue, e/OS would be pointless.
GApps is a big upper level privacy problem that microG can solve but this is not the only issue. By default, AOSP itself also sends personally identifying info to Google servers through low level system calls. The e/OS fork is needed in order to remove this.
Can you explain more about this? What kind of information is sent? And does LineageOS not disable this?
Personal opinion but the LineageOS project seems more concerned with security than privacy. The idea of Google hijacking your privacy for profit doesn't seem to really bother them too much. Their web site and wiki repeatedly address security but rarely privacy.
As for explaining further, I will defer to the document below from the e foundation.
https://e.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/e-state-of-d...
MicroG is a bit more complicated to install since it requires package signature spoofing, which official lineage builds don't enable since it's seen as a security vulnerability.
https://www.tcd.ie/news_events/articles/study-reveals-scale-...
And this is the paper it talks about (PDF):
https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/Android_privacy_report.pd...
"Key findings from the study:
- With the exception of e/OS, all of the handset manufacturers examined collect a list of all the apps installed on a handset. This is potentially sensitive information since it can reveal user interests, e.g., a mental health app, a Muslim prayer app, a gay dating app, a Republican news app. There is no opt out from this data collection.
- The Xiaomi handset sends details of all the app screens viewed by a user to Xiaomi, including when and how long each app is used. This reveals, for example, the timing and duration of phone calls. The effect is akin to the use of cookies to track people’s activity as they move between web pages. This data appears to be sent outside Europe to Singapore.
- On the Huawei handset the Swiftkey keyboard sends details of app usage over time to Microsoft. This reveals, for example, when a user is writing a text, using the search bar, searching for contacts.
- Samsung, Xiaomi, Realme and Google collect long-lived device identifiers, e.g., the hardware serial number, alongside user-resettable advertising identifiers. This means that when a user resets an advertising identifier the new identifier value can be trivially re-linked back to the same device, potentially undermining the use of user-resettable advertising identifiers.
- Third-party system apps, e.g., from Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn and Facebook, are pre-installed on most of the handsets and silently collect data, with no opt out.
- There may exist a data ecosystem where data collected from a handset by different companies is shared/linked. Notably, the privacy focused e/OS variant of Android was observed to transmit essentially no data."
/e/OS is no exception. I looked at the requests made by its "Apps" app. Every time it checks for updates, it tells the server what applications you have installed. These requests are made with a User-Agent header revealing your device model, build ID and Android version. Installed languages are also sent via the Accept-Language header. And there is no option to disable update checks; the closest you can get is to set the interval to monthly.
Contrast that with F-Droid, which downloads the package index in advance (like apt does), so it doesn't need to send the server a list of installed apps in order to check for updates.
I can see the data with that setup, but it's way too much to parse by a (single) human. I'll collect just the URLs for now, to at least update my PiHole config to block what isn't needed for Windows Update.
Of course they do. That's the whole reason they're selling high-capacity hardware for cheap, they more than make up for their foregone profits from user data and third party partnerships.
That's why you should always flash a custom ROM whenever you buy a "value for money" Android phone; never stay on the vendor's OS. Thankfully, except Samsung and Huawei, most other Android device manufacturers aren't actively working on locking down their firmware against customization and appear tolerant as of yet. You can even choose not to install Google services on your phone, although it would make using it normally a hassle.
Having read the report, I can't find any smoking guns about _uses_ of the data. But we really don't know at this point.
We do know ... or a least we should.
Google has said it receives tens of thousands of "geofence" and "keyword" warrants each year looking to identify anyone within a certain geographic area at a particular time or anyone who searched for a particular keyword.
There are 3 pertinent points here:
1) Google can absolutely identify you personally; otherwise, the warrants would be useless.
2) The authorities are searching info from your phone without probable cause (aka "fishing").
3) Innocent people have been convicted for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.
People do it as well, they gather tons of statistics on themselves like how many steps they've walked and how many glasses of water they've had and how many hours they've slept, which for the most part is completely non-actionable information and your body is much better at telling you if you are feeling well rested than your spreadsheet is. You get a pretty graph for sure, but it ultimately doesn't say anything you didn't already know.
I guess you could convince yourself this is science, but in science the hypothesis precedes the experiment. If you gather tons of arbitrary data and go digging for correlations, you will find them, but anything interesting you find is most likely going to be spurious relationships and other statistical aberrations.
It's data dredging, not science.
> Key findings from the study:
>
> With the exception of e/OS, all of the handset manufacturers examined collect a list of all the apps installed on a handset. This is potentially sensitive information since it can reveal user interests, e.g., a mental health app, a Muslim prayer app, a gay dating app, a Republican news app. There is no opt out from this data collection.
This happens when looking for updates anyway
> The Xiaomi handset sends details of all the app screens viewed by a user to Xiaomi, including when and how long each app is used. This reveals, for example, the timing and duration of phone calls. The effect is akin to the use of cookies to track people’s activity as they move between web pages. This data appears to be sent outside Europe to Singapore.
Can this be "standard" app analytics. Not saying its okay, but this is the norm these days.
> On the Huawei handset the Swiftkey keyboard sends details of app usage over time to Microsoft. This reveals, for example, when a user is writing a text, using the search bar, searching for contacts.
Your custom wordlist is on the cloud with them, so they can see much more than that.
> Samsung, Xiaomi, Realme and Google collect long-lived device identifiers, e.g., the hardware serial number, alongside user-resettable advertising identifiers. This means that when a user resets an advertising identifier the new identifier value can be trivially re-linked back to the same device, potentially undermining the use of user-resettable advertising identifiers.
This is probably a major GDPR issue.
Edit: could also be for guarantee reasons. The big question is if this is ever used for advertising.
> Third-party system apps, e.g., from Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn and Facebook, are pre-installed on most of the handsets and silently collect data, with no opt out.
This is horrible!! I specifically avoid using any Facebook services and we all know about their shadow profiles for users who don't own a FB account.
(But what kind of data have the apps access to? In theory they are never used and have no privileges?)
> There may exist a data ecosystem where data collected from a handset by different companies is shared/linked. Notably, the privacy focused e/OS variant of Android was observed to transmit essentially no data.
We need more openness here.
My bad for not checking the lineageos compatibility list before buying an unsupported device.
Global MIUI 12.5.3 on a note 8 pro.
Norm as in normal, but I'd not say norm as in what most people expect and would accept if they knew.
And norms change, let's not accept a "normal" as the de facto "this is how it should be" but instead work towards a better norm.
That's the hard part, the easy part of how to do this is left as an exercise for the reader.
But it doesn't have to. My Debian system does not send a list of installed packages in order to get updates. It queries the list of available ones.
I would still expect to have opt out of "looking for updates". Especially since this study suggests that this data is not collected by Play Store (Google) only, but also by the device manufacturer (possibly by their own store app which nobody really uses)