Closing The Portal App
blog.pushbullet.com
blog.pushbullet.com
No local access kills Google Cast competitors as well as things like this (Nearby Share competitor), Android SMS limitations nearly killed most Android Messenger competitors, removing clipboard access forced people to use one of 2 decent Android keyboards to get clipboard sync back (one of which is conveniently enough developed by Google)...
I have not seen one single instance of Google killing some functionality for security that wouldn't have been easily implemented with permissions instead and that wasn't clearly designed to stomp out competition.
Local access itself isn't killed, there are still some ways to do it. This Chrome post lists a number of options. I think the WebTransport and Reverse embedding options would both work for Portal.
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-upd...
Full disclosure I work at Google, but not on Chrome or any of the other products you mentioned.
All Google APIs should include a call that tells you how long until the API stops working.
Apple got away with it, why can't Google?
Because we deal with this kind of stuff all the time in totally benign ways -- people aren't too upset that the kernel can do things that userspace processes can't and that certain privileged functionality has to be built-in.
Chromecast isn't that magic. If you wanted to build a CC competitor you have to provide a browser extension or an app that uses native messaging which seems fine, it's the same as what Google themselves do. Google's advantage is that they get to be bundled with Chrome (heyooo Pocket). I think you could make a case that maybe it shouldn't be necessary and that a sandboxed webpage with local network access is better than an extension or native app that isn't sandboxed at all but tomato potato.
Here are some FOSS alternatives to Portal that don't depend on Chrome:
- ShareDrop (https://www.sharedrop.io): WebRTC-based P2P file transfers through the browser
- Sharik (https://github.com/marchellodev/sharik): File transfers via Wi-Fi or mobile hotspot for Android, iOS, Linux, and Windows
- KDE Connect (https://kdeconnect.kde.org): File transfers, notification sync, and other integrations between Android, Linux, Windows, and SailfishOS. Other compatible clients: Soduto for macOS (https://soduto.com), GSConnect for GNOME (https://extensions.gnome.org/extension/1319/gsconnect/)
- Syncthing (https://syncthing.net): Continuous P2P file syncing for Android, Linux, macOS, Windows, and BSD
- Wormhole (https://wormhole.app): File sharing from the browser through encrypted uploads that expire after a set amount of time or number of downloads
My phone takes images so large - 108MP - that my normal service (an instance of Up1 pastebin) hangs on complex scenes while encrypting in android Chrome. Installed syncthing on a VM I already had with public facing httpd and I can just hit "share to syncthing". The linking part isn't automated, I type it by hand then copy and paste to recipients.
I looked around for another way to do this, including ssh, and syncthing fit the bill and has been running fine for about 2 years.
I have no idea what it's doing on the backend, though, and now I am wondering if my "node" is passing traffic for people who are not me...
I still prefer my pastebin service, even if it won't accept the largest images from my phone, because you can zoom forever, for some reason, whereas windows viewer, syncthing direct jpeg mime type, etc, will not actually let you zoom 1:1 or beyond on 108 megapixel images. This also ignores the fact that my pastebin only has 200MB of tmpfs storage available, so perhaps 2 crazy images before I have to reboot it... Still worth the zooming, though.
AFAIK it shouldn't unless you're a relay: https://docs.syncthing.net/users/relaying.html
in my opinion on a smaller screen, and especially oled, the unzoomed and uncropped pictures always look better than the other cameras the phone has, but it takes longer to take and save the shot, there's no "pro" mode, and the files, as mentioned, are massive, embarrassingly so.
website: https://schollz.com/software/croc/
It's not an issue for apps that are actively developed -- but it's devastating for side projects or open source apps that rely on volunteers.
Some changes (like new code signing requirements) might be possible to implement in a few days, but if you need to make bigger changes you are quickly looking at weeks of development time -- which is kinda hard sell for people who develop software in their free time.
The linked post (https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-upd...) says "If your website needs to issue requests to localhost, then you just need to upgrade your website to HTTPS". Also, I just tested a Chrome extension on Chrome 94 and it has no problem sending a fetch API request to http://localhost so maybe that's an option too?
Am I missing something?
You could probably hack it with a relay server but at that point, why bother?
Google still has the "don't do evil" motto?
It ditched it quite a while ago.
It used to be in the first and last sentence of its code of conduct (https://abc.xyz/investor/other/google-code-of-conduct/). They've removed it from the preface, but it's still in the last sentence.
What kind of scenario does that prevent?
My evil website can no longer access the top secret stuff you are developing on localhost.
My evil website can no longer enumerate the http servers in your local LAN.
But that isn't very elegant, so I propose version 2.0:
"This site has requested communication with a local device. Please select it from this list:"
[the user is presented with a list of devices discovered by zeroconf/dns-sd/mdns/upnp matching the service descriptor given by the page]
Turns out, this was an actual spec [0] pushed by Opera of all companies. Here's a quote from the spec:
> window . navigator . getNetworkServices ( type , successCallback [, errorCallback ] ) > > Prompts the user to select discovered network services that have advertised support for the requested service type. > > The type argument contains one or more valid service type tokens that the web page would like to interact with. > > If the user accepts, the successCallback is invoked, with zero or more NetworkService objects as its argument. > > If the user declines, the errorCallback (if any) is invoked.
Full disclosure I work at Google, but not on Chrome.
> If your website needs to issue requests to a target server on a private IP address, then simply upgrading the initiator website to HTTPS does not work. Mixed Content prevents secure contexts from making requests over plaintext HTTP, so the newly-secured website will still find itself unable to make the requests.
The solution, of course, is clear to the Chrome devs - certificate pinning. Unfortunately, they implemented it in an absolutely ridiculous way that limits you to WebTransport for absolutely no other reason other than they want to force developers to use it as soon as possible before the other browser vendors (*vendor) implement it. As I mentioned in a sibling comment, there is absolutely no reason to not simply add a "CACert" option to XHR,fetch,WebSocket... and let developers use the existing protocols.
What do you mean? The only change Chrome is making is limiting it from http:// sites. If Portal is saying Chrome is breaking them, then they must have been making connections from http:// sites. The mixed content limitations have been there for a long time already, which must be why they were using http:// . I've never used Portal myself so I don't have direct evidence they were using http:// , but this is the only logical explanation I can come up with for why they would say Chrome is breaking them.
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-upd...
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-upd...
I believe the change is that http:// pages on public websites won't be able to talk (such as via XHR/fetch, embedded images/scripts/css) to private IP address or sites with domains that resolve to private IP addresses.
One obvious workaround is to change the requesting page to https:// instead of http:// . This is somewhat difficult because then there's the problem of mixed content, since it's often difficult to get an https:// certificate for the server that runs on the private IP address.
There are 2 other workarounds listed on the Chrome blog post: WebTransport and and Reverse embedding (which means running the site on a private IP address instead of a public IP address). It looks to me like those could work in the Portal case.
Full disclosure I work at Google, but not on Chrome.
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-upd...
To answer your question:
HTTP is vulnerable to MITM attacks. For example your ISP can modify any page you visit, steal passwords, cookies, oauth tokens, etc. If the site is forced to switch to HTTPS, your ISP can no longer pull off this attack.
Full disclosure I work at Google, but not on Chrome.
> The aim is to protect users from cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks targeting routers and other devices on private networks.