Extreme concentration of wealth in US economy has led to central planning
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First, you get people who don't know about a profession trying to dictate to people who do know about it. EX: Hitler and Stalin managing farm production, even though they didn't know anything about farming - agricultural production goes down leading to famines.
Second, you lose the price signal which says what people really want enough to act on, given scarce resources. This leads to a feedback loop where goods priced below the equilibrium have demand far in excess of supply. EX: Everyone would love to buy a subsidized steak instead of a hamburger, so if steak is subsidized to hamburger prices, there'll be shortages and you'll need to impose rationing and coupons and things (which becomes a dual currency system where the coupon/ration becomes the real constraint currency, and then those become blackmarketed until an equilbrium is reached - but only with a lot of hassle).
Third, central planners generally have incentives that diverge widely from the people they're supposed to be planning for - ex, making sure those new centrally planned jobs go to your political supporters. This has happened in the majority of centrally planned economies.
You wouldn't expect a high concentration of wealth to have these same problems. Steve Jobs having central planning ability over Apple, and by extension, over a lot of the high quality glass and semiconductor industries isn't the same as Brezhnev having that power. Jobs, of course, is much more competent at building high end consumer technology than Brezhnev and not prone to make some of the common errors.
"Picking better technocrats" is impossible a priori. We don't know who the best are until they have been selected by the market. It's like determining ahead of time what the best species are.
"Best" is not defined, it is discovered. Until then, we don't even know the meaning of the term.
(I'm not sure I actually believe that. But I'm not sure I believe the market answer either, since on the scale of large companies, there are so many factors involved, that luck and timing more than skill tend to be huge ones determining who ends up in top management positions of successful companies.)
This is why we have ethanol subsidies. We "knew" the right outcome and tried to make it so.
That's not the only problem, but it's the main practical problem, and a serious one.
Edit: and that's even assuming a qualified person exists to fulfill some of these dreams -- definitely questionable.
Just one of the problems. The other problem is that managers did not have knowledge that is available in a free market, because of what they were expected to make decisions about. If you fix the price of something then it's harder to know its real market value.
If HP makes crappy computers (or simply too few), I'll buy Lenovo. In contrast, if Stalin makes too little food, I'm hungry.
The entire purpose of corporations in a capitalist society is to get the benefits of central planning (technocratic experts engaging in central planning to achieve results better than free markets) without the harms (nowhere else to turn if the technocratic experts screw up). So far, they seem to be doing a great job of this.
Antitrust is often ineffective in practice. Sounds great in theory, but it is also a form of central planning. The best the gov't can do, in my opinion, is reduce the barriers to entry that it itself erects. Highly regulated environments, for example, usually protect incumbents.
But the outcome is that the Internet became a mass phenomenon. I don't think it would obviously have been so if Netscape and MS charged for browsers. Heck, companies used to charge for TCP/IP stacks. Dumping looks pro-consumer in this context.
In practice, however, the only areas I can think of where actual monopolies exist are areas with government granted monopolies, e.g. telco/cable or patent trolls. I'm sure there are a few natural ones, however.
But you did catch me - I'm not a laissez-faire capitalism purist. I just think it's a pretty good first approximation.
a) Mortgage issuers tended to be the victims of fraud, not the perpetrators. The people committing fraud were mostly mortgage brokers and and home borrowers.
(Mortgage issuers are now using fraud to cover up lazy paperwork after the fact, but that's a separate matter.)
b) The mortgage market doesn't even come close to being an "unregulated market". While you can dispute the extent to which the regulators played a role, it's indisputable that the regulators were solidly on the pro-bubble side of the fence.
re b) "Unregulated" is perhaps an overstatement. Would "substantially less regulated" or "Markets where the regulators regularly turned a blind eye to rampant fraud." work better for you? Greenspan has a lot to answer for, as do the OCC, OTS, and Congress. Go read about the FBI report in 2004 of "rampant mortgage fraud" and the total lack of interest on anybody's part of taking any action on it. Note that they just issued another report that it's still going on.
I think you missed the main point of the article. This isn't about business vs. government having more power, it's about few vs. many.
There's an odd amount of borrowing in the other direction, too. Many large businesses do realize that they internally are basically inefficient, bureaucratic command economies, mirroring some of the problems with the Soviet system. So they introduce some of the same attempted solutions that the Soviets tried: intra-corporation pseudo-markets, competition and awards, recently the trend of "gamifying" workplaces, etc. (At the risk of self-promotion, I recently wrote a bit on the latter similarity: http://www.kmjn.org/notes/soviet_gamification.html)
Central Planning = Government decides and industry follows, like in China.
If you want to take this as a definition, then fine, we have nothing to argue about. But if you just give the phrase its literal meaning, I believe the article is arguing that: One form of central planning is what you described. Another is a very small number of entities controlling a very large amount of money.
I hear what you're saying here and I agree. In any effect, we can probably all agree that the end result of all this is overwhelmingly negative for the long-run productivity growth of the US economy, and that means more stagnating real wages, more structural unemployment, and more hardship for a lot of families. Some would argue that we need MORE central planning to lead the economy out of this hole, and there was a good op-ed in the NYTimes about why this probably isn't possible with our current government.
See Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/what-happen...
A growth which has massively slowed. That it hasn't actually been outright negative is cold comfort.
Look at total factor productivity in the US: http://macromarketmusings.blogspot.com/2011/02/great-stagnat... (Notice all the supporting citations to other productivity measures in the comments.)
For example, here's one model which nicely matches the TFP lack of growth and subsequent wealth concentration: 'the wealthy 1% demands a fixed additional sum per year (due to some sort of hedonic treadmill or cultural imperative - relative status seeking perhaps); while TFP growth exceeds this fixed sum, we will see the additional wealth distributed to the other 99% through wages etc. Once TFP falls below this sum, all TFP gains now go to the 1% and everyone else stagnates.'
I would say that the checks and balances that kept our country strong have been steadily eroded, with the result that he describes.
We need to start accepting the fact that near 10% unemployment could easily be equilibrium in a modern economy like the US.
So I guess productivity going up isn't attached as strongly to more employees being hired, and that does imply the potential for larger, structural unemployment (though probably less than the current 9%). It also means that trick-down ideas of a "factory owner using his money to hire more employees" are increasingly irrelevant.
The only way to deal with it is proper social welfare, because you can't just "create jobs."
We could have a freer market and near full-employment if we replaced all our social welfare programs with a single minimum living stipend (you apply if you make below it, and if you qualify, get a check for the difference), and abolished minimum wage. It would save tons of money to as so much complicated and unnecessary administration of multiple agencies would be eliminated.
Sadly, a proper social welfare system is exactly what the US refuses to implement. From healthcare to unemployment to disability.
The economy is fine. It's not booming, but companies are flush with cash. The only thing wrong is unemployment, and the only option to deal with it is some form of welfare. The other option is to let the number of unemployed get to a point that social unrest starts becoming a problem.
I disagree. A minimum stipend, at least in the way that you described, would create a perverse incentive. Let's say this stipend is $20,000/year. Why should anyone who makes $5,000/year and get $15,000 free want to work harder to earn the same amount?
A slightly better take on this is to have some sort system were it always pays to earn more. For example, you get 1/3 of the difference between what you earn and $30,000. Under such a system, if you earn $10,000, you would get $6,667 for a total of $16,667. If you earn $15,000, you get $5,000 for a total of $20,000. Thus, it always pays to earn more/work harder.
Personally, I don't like either idea. In my opinion, things like the minimum wage only serve to create unemployment. By making it more expensive to hire workers, companies find other means of being more productive, such as automation or illegal labour.
You could abolish minimum wage if you had a system of welfare that covered everybody adequately.
I understand that there are forces at play that make this difficult, but if we are willing to steal from some people to give money to others it seems like we would be morally no more wrong to say that people may only work some smaller number of hours a week from now on, with this and that exception for emergencies.
BTW, It's interesting to look at the environment in which Glass-Steagall was enacted and compare it to our own times.
The financial industry has too much bureaucracy and paperwork - not enough sensible regulation and with that I'm 100% in agreement. Why not treat financial instruments like drugs are treated by the FDA? Each new financial instrument would need to be studied, approved, and it's distribution controlled for the public benefit. We could reduce reporting burdens for financial houses, but increase common sense controls on the types of securities that actually serve a public benefit. That would be my vote.
- the building trade (obvious)
- the defense industry (less obvious... in order to "sell" an expensive war, the masses have to feel rich, thus there was pressure on the Fed to let the housing market heat up, and on the SEC to ignore Fannie and Freddie so that Joe Homeowner felt rich enough not to worry too much about extremely high gas prices. There was virtually no talk about the actual cost of the war (short or long term) other than deliberately misleading statements by the leaders trying to sell the war.
- financial services industry (heat in the housing market improves consumer credit ratings and ends up giving free money to banks (b/c the homeowner whose house appreciated now has A+ credit and lots of collateral... and the boom created lots of such homeowners)... all the while the losses are socialized b/c the government will try to prevent large scale housing market price declines.)
The bigger they get, the more central planning we have... And they're gettin' pretty big.
I find it interesting to model gang violence as a market. If drugs are made legal, the demand for thugs will go down. If the supply of thuggery is elastic, then former gang members will leave gangs and find other work. If it's inelastic, they'll find other revenue streams.
Yeah, maybe they would, but it would be about a million times smaller.
Before clicking, take your guess. What percent of total American wealth does the top quintile control?
Summary: http://danariely.com/2010/09/30/wealth-inequality/
Paper: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/norton%20ariely%20in%20pre...
The finding that extreme concentration of wealth within the United States in the hands of a few thousand people amounts to central planning is empirical evidence in favor of the application to the US economy of a theorem in the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
In Chapter 11 of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (TGEB), Morgenstern and Von Neumann attempt to reduce the general theory of n-person games to the theory of (n+1)-person zero-sum games through the introduction of a fictitious (n+1)-st player. The payoff to the fictitious (n+1)-st player in the new game equals the negative of the sum of of the payoffs to the n players in the original n-player game. This defines the (n+1)-player zero-sum extension of a general n-player game. In the discussion, Morgenstern and Von Neumann observe that the introduction of the fictitious (n+1)-st player requires some analysis to ensure that the zero-sum extension of an n-player game does not create additional possibilities for interaction among the original n players–that the ‘”fictitious” player does not influence the game in any way. They rule out the absurd possibility of receiving payments from a fictitious player, but have to consider the possibility of self-denial among the n real players in the zero-sum extension.
In the reduction of a general n-player game to an (n+1)-player game in which a fictitious (n+1)-st player is introduced with no ability to form coalitions with the n real players, and whose losses pay for the winnings of the real players, Morgenstern and Von Neumann captured the plight of the lower 99.5% of the population (the "taxpayer"), which collectively serves as the fictitious (n+1)-st player in modern capitalism. The taxpayer is unable to influence the outcome of the games of the real players–the upper one half of one percent of the population (the "central planners"). The taxpayer's role is to passively fork over whatever funds are needed to ensure the maximum winnings for the real players, and the least for himself.
This outcome is established in a proposition on page 513 of TGEB, in which the possibility that the n players may choose self-denial to exploit some coalitional advantage is ruled out. The real players will never deny themselves in any imputation to the advantage of the fictitious (n+1)-st player, who always receives the minimum.
We might call that proposition the Taxpayer Theorem. Its application to contemporary capitalism, in which the taxpayer insures the central planners against losses, seems not to have been noticed.* In the case of the taxpayer, unlike the fictitious player of the (n+1)-st zero-sum extension of a n-player game, there is some slight possibility of influencing the n real players, but in practice this effect is negligible, and in the strict terms of cooperative game theory, irrational. In the case of the lower 99.5%, side-payments to the upper 0.5% are ruled out because taxpayers are effectively unable to form coalitions, since the concentration of wealth in the upper 0.5% is too extreme. To almost any approximation, the taxpayer is the fictitious player in the zero-sum extension of whatever game the important players in the upper one half of one percent happen to be playing.
*It is inconceivable that Von Neumann would not have foreseen this application, but it is conceivable that he would chose to leave its rediscovery to posterity.
This entire premise would go out the window if he only knew how to graph money correctly.
It is very common for inflammatory articles to use absolute numbers that (intentionally or not) ignore inflation, changes in GDP, etc... because it is both simpler to explain and more effective for inciting outrage.
The author's main goal is to show how a proxy for decision making power (viz. household cash income) is highly concentrated.
I don't think the author's graph is the best visualization of his point. I would like to see a graph of the proportion of national wealth owned by households at each percentile. The would deliver the point the "power is highly concentrated" in the top percentiles. Wealth is a better proxy than income and understanding the proportion of wealth each percentile holds claims to is better than seeing the absolute amount of wealth held by that group.
There is no central planning in the US. There is nothing even close to central planning. Our politicians cannot agree on anything - the political parties are almost as divided as they've ever been - and we are only beginning to see the effects of that. How is this central planning? The examples the author gives at the very end of the article (the main article on globalgorillas), is the result of the free market at work. The political situation we were in in 2008 and we are in today, is the response to that. That's democracy and, as gut wrenching as it seems right now, it will eventually work itself out.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybersyn
The Chilean attempt at realtime computer controlled planned economy.
He wrote it in the 30s as a response to the push for more central planning.
There are simpler models if you want to explain the current economic malaise. Just look at the fundamentals: we've run out of cheap energy!
Again, who?
How is this relevant to the article above? Did you read O'Reilly's article?
It would be really cool if folks read the article before commenting. Sehr kool.
The article doesn't literally mention "smoke-filled rooms". It is an expression: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoke-filled_room
The article does show a graph of the concentration of wealth according to a power law. It also mentions that "All it will take is is one extremely bad decision and the cascade of failure that follows will catch everyone off guard."
So the article is suggesting that the decisions of a small group of a powerful elite have a large influence on our lives. Unless you are saying that these people don't talk to each other, that's what the "smoke-filled rooms" expression is all about.