Though it means mach 5+ in terms of weapons systems it indicates a capability for a long highly maneuverable period at those speeds.
https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-dev...
https://www.gao.gov/blog/faster-speed-sound-u.s.-efforts-dev...
These weapons represent an ability for both the US and China to conventionally intervene from their mainlands to any location within the Pacific.
This would likely mean the weapon hits its non-mainland target prior to the other side taking notice for a retaliatory strike. In the event the other side did notice - it's likely they wouldn't treat it as a nuclear incursion unless the weapon was heading inland towards missile silos or other infrastructure that would motivate a nuclear retaliation.
To your point on stranded assets - these weapons make performing any large military action in the pacific much riskier with greater probability for missteps or stalemates. Assuming a cost of 20-100 million dollars per missile I wouldn't be surprised if they are cost competitive with high risk carrier based F-35 operations in a hypothetical Pacific conflict. It's probably cheaper to stock pile such missiles than maintain additional carrier strike groups for the sole task of participating in a great power conflict.
Why not? If it was carrying a nuclear payload and was destined for strategic sites on the mainland, it could be too late to retaliate if they waited to see where it is going, particularly if it was aimed inside the first island chain.
If China detected nuclear capable missiles heading toward their country then they would have to consider the possibility their second strike capability is not a sufficient deterrent (including being compromised in various ways such as their subs being all located) so there seems like a large incentive to retaliate before missiles land.
Would there be enough time for them to watch and wait it out and see if it approached their missile installations? If it was a very stealthy missile, could they be sure they had detected them all?
The concept of nuclear triad is that, yes, armies very strongly depend on their second-strike capability. So, the game is for the subs to not to become compromised.
> We are not in the 1960s when at times it was literally true.
You are claiming that not only China, but the US and Russia don't have the capability of launching strikes from 30 minutes? (i.e., well beyond the time to respond to ballistic missile launch detection)? Do you have a source for this?
This doesn't appear to agree with you:
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_0021...
Launch-On-Warning
One source of ambiguity in the implementation of China's no-first-use policy is the ongoing debate in China regarding the pursuit of a launch-on-warning posture. Recent doctrinal publications and Chinese interlocutors indicated that the debate has yet to be resolved. On one side, some members of China’s strategic community argued that a launch-on-warning posture would ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent if its opponent has robust targeting intelligence. The Science of Military Strategy states that a launch-on-warning posture "is in accordance with China's long-standing no-first-use policy, and may effectively protect China's nuclear forces from sustaining even greater losses, improving the survivable nuclear counterstrike capability of China’s nuclear missile forces." China's first priority should be to prevent its adversary from precisely locating its missile launch positions. If China is able to reliably ascertain that an adversary has already launched nuclear missiles at China, however, China could quickly launch its nuclear missiles for a counterstrike "before the enemy has been able to actually inflict nuclear destruction." Launch-on-warning would therefore provide China with an option for nuclear retaliation if a nuclear adversary were able to overcome Chinese efforts at concealment, deception, and mobility to ensure that its forces survived a first strike.
What you cited is sad, but firstly it is still an "ongoing debate", and secondly the road from declarations to the actual ability is long with this one. And may it never materialize again.
Do you have a source for that?
The sibling comment says Russia and USA have a prompt alert which can launch in under 15 minutes. Other articles say the US president could be contacted and approve in under 30 seconds, not sure how the Russian chain of command goes.
The decision process does not begin when nukes are detected of course, that's the end of the process. Pre agreed criteria have already been met. Quite likely there is no decision about entering a full scale nuclear war because they are already in one.
> These weapons represent an ability for both the US and China to conventionally intervene from their mainlands to any location within the Pacific.
Is that the kind of range these have? Almost 9,000 miles from LA to the South Western most corner of the Pacific. If you meant the North Pacific then even the western edge of the US to the yellow sea is over 5,500 miles.
Ballistic missiles of course have these kind of ranges and can carry conventional payloads.
Just call while the missile is on the way to let the people it's going to kill know its not a nuclear bomb headed their way so they shouldn't fire a nuclear bomb back.