I'll admit that's a very optimistic view of things though. It has to be a little hard to stick your neck out in Russian politics when the result may be transdermal poison secretly smeared on the insides of your underwear. (And that is not an exaggeration or speculation of the risk)
It's one of the only places in Russia a jury acquits a person 3 times, just for him to finally get jailed for the 4th.
2018 token provincial elections had Lutun's candidate lose despite ABSOLUTELY MASSIVE fraud. And yet they still pulled this at the end:
https://meduza.io/impro/LCjzlLaaoQX5pld_zlmxXqom_TRmlz9WhemQ...
Citation needed.
In the last election in Primorsky Kray Putin got 65% up from 57% in the previous election. Pretty much the lowest in the country, but far from the single digits you claim.
https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2394633.html
Even Levada approval polls (pro-opposition “foreign agent”) shows he is the most popular politician (although they don’t provide a breakdown by region).
https://www.levada.ru/2021/02/04/prezidentskie-rejtingi-i-po...
Yes, and in 1927 Liberian general election Charles King received around 240,000 votes (out of 15,000 registered voters). So what?
"Embarrassed by the results"? They didn't seem to have been embarrassed by this: https://manipulatori.cz/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Sn%C3%ADm...
By definition, the issue is whether or not past results will be repeated. Pointing to those past results is supposed to mean... what? That things won't change? Maybe they won't. But the claim here is that Navalny's actions might move the needle a little. You can't point to past results as an objection to that claim because then you're just saying "The results won't change from the past, because look at these results from the past." It is tautological. If you object to that claim, the way to justify it is by addressing how Navalny's initiative might be useless.
And it might be useless: it depends on how many people it reached and, as I said originally, how fine grained the current party's control is over the election outcomes.
Also there are investors, external and internal, which are too all over risks, this damages economy and national currency.
That's not what "Smart voting" is about. The SV works by recommending the candidates that a) are not the ones actively pushed by the Kremlin b) have a shot at winning or credibly pretending they did. These could be some batshit crazy Stalinists, mobsters or whatever - the point is that they aren't the guys that the suits in Kremlin have already secretly anointed.
In short, this will hurt Kremlin's credibility and put an organizational tax on all its future efforts. With the pandemic, an economy in deep crisis and Putin's term ending in 2024 he'd need a lot of political capital and SV hits him where it hurts.
Here's a bit longer explanation. The point is that in autocracies elections are not rigged by altering an Excel column. In Russia we have empirical statistical evidence to this: the presence of poll watchers has a very clear effect on the electoral outcomes, the rigging elasticity is capped by the anti-Putin sentiment etc. This is a consequence of how the elections are organized: the local authorities are handed the required numbers and told to deliver, as a test of their loyalty, capability and popularity. They have limited number of ways for this: they can mobilize their base, force their dependents (state employees, the military etc) to vote or press local polling committees to alter the results. If they overplay their hand, they will face local unrest (this actually happens a lot) and the Kremlin will jettison them without a second thought - so this is a balancing act. The efficiency of all their tools is capped by the popularity of Kremlin and the overtly pro-Kremlin forces, and it is at all-times low and still going down. So to get things done they need to depress the turnout - and this creates an opening for organized opposition. If openly pro-Kremlin candidates are hurt en mass then the president's admin would have to renegotiate with both the winners and the losers, effectively losing a lot of organizational cohesion, and that's on top on very public humiliation. With Putin's popularity near its all-time low and going down and 2 years before a very uncertain end to his current term, that's a lot of damage - although likely far from enough to topple the guy. But we take what we can get and this may be a rather large take.