I basically decided to just give up. Email is an insecure protocol and there's not much that can be done about it. Choosing a "secure" email provider feels like choosing a "secure" VPN provider: it's impossible to verify the provider's claims so it's a kind of security theatre.
Email can't guarantee E2EE without a block cipher tool like GPG. Even if your provider stores and transmits only encrypted email data, once sent it does not maintain that guarantee while being passed by another entity's MTA.
If you email google, google gets to do whatever googly stuff it would like to do with its algorithm. If you email exchange, roundcube, ISP, hotmail, it could wind up being archived to tape, or simply be sitting for a long time in some unencrypted mail spool, maybe in a public cloud. If you selfhost, you would be forgiven if you find you have made a mistake or simply got pwned.
I've never selfhosted email, but I understand it is a lot of work to set up if you aren't familiar, and while maintenance is okay once you get rolling, there are occasional emergencies or hiccups that require intervention.
Aside from being much slower, regular mail is quite better since you can easily inspect the envelope for evidence of tampering, while email will be imperceptibly copied.
What? If Alice encrypts an email to Bob, using Bob's PGP key on her laptop, then it doesn't matter how many MTAs that email passes through, the email stays encrypted at every hop.
> it could wind up being archived to tape
I guess you're saying that an encrypted email could travel through a provider that keeps a copy of it in the hopes that quantum computers will one day be cheaply available enough that they can crack the private key and read the email.
That seems expensive (and illegal) for a company to do just on a whim (assuming the sender and recipient are periodically deleting old emails), and I'd like to think that a judge would turn down a request for a warrant that covers data that won't be readable for a decade or more.
>I guess you're saying that an encrypted email could travel through a provider that keeps a copy of it in the hopes that quantum computers will one day be cheaply available enough that they can crack
No, I'm saying when you send the email, the next MTA might not use encrypted transport and any mailbox/mail spool/cache might not store the data encrypted in any way.
You can of course get E2EE if you use GPG (you always could), but if somebody doesn't know how to use GPG or uses it wrong, that is problematic.
You can also just broadcast your gpg block message via public/ham radio or even hire a skywriter to spend his day tracing out your GPG cyphertext as a huge QR code in the sky :-)
Except that's not true. Often envelopes can be opened and resealed without any trace, meaning contents can be read or changed.
Notionally, I would imagine something that looks like "email" and acts like "e-mail" (to the end user) could eventually exist that provides the same (conceptual) security that the Signal protocol provides (and perhaps a hosting provider option that's the same level of user confidentiality that we get the Signal foundation), although you're correct that foundationally it would be a different protocol. Backwards-compatibility would be required, at least for seamless transition (perhaps represented as "secure" and "plaintext")
Wasn't Ladar Levison (the individual behind Lavabit) working on something like this? https://darkmail.info/
- The ability to login from multiple devices (using both dedicated clients and webmail) and subsequently being able to immediately access all my old messages, too.
- Global filtering, tagging, folders, read/unread tracking etc.
- Full-text search that doesn't require downloading all messages to your local device beforehand.
But if you want truly private and secure communication, you'll have to forget about email. Even with encryption there's still way too much metadata floating around that can identify you.
I don't thinks that dedicated server provider (like Hetzner) or cloud provider (like Digital Ocean or Vultr) stores traffic logs with enough details to be useful in such case.
But payment will be a problem...
Even if they don’t, as long as they have the email address then they can probably find the mail server even if the payment is anonymous.
Anonymous/protected enough payment is the problem.
One expensive but possible option would be to build a server yourself with sufficient traps to shut off when it's tapered with. Then set it up with full disk encryption and put it in a shared rack.
What would be the benefit of being in a shared rack? Wouldn't the service provider still know which physical system is yours if you only rented a 1/2/3U space? (Or is there an advantage at a network layer?)
Going for a rack has the advantage that you own the hardware and can install the anti-tamper measures so that the server can't be turned against you. Anonymity wise, renting a server makes things a lot easier.
But as sibling comment mention, it can be seen as destroying of evidences in many jurisdictions :-(
Things like hiding or destroying evidence of a crime generally are separate crimes of which you can be convicted even if you're acquitted of the original crime (e.g. burying a corpse in the woods or throwing a gun in the river).
Destruction of evidence with the intent to hide it from prosecution also may enable so called 'adverse inference' where essentially the jury/judge can assume that the destroyed evidence actually showed what the prosecution intended to find there. For example, if you're being prosecuted for possession of child sexual abuse material, there's a warrant for your hard drive, but it gets fully destroyed because you have rigged some device to destroy it (and the prosecution proves that you did that with the intent to destroy evidence) then the court may take it as a fact that the hard drive did indeed contain CSAM and treat it as sufficient evidence to convict you.
In short, self-hosted service on a rented service does not provide much protection.
But, as far as I understand, case law is not in my favor in this case :-(
So tutanota would be a good alternative to protonmail. And mailbox.org is a good alternative to fastmail. Both are based in Germany.
> Storage only takes place for IP addresses made anonymous which are therefore not personal data any more.
What the heck does "IP addresses made anonymous" mean?
It gives no worse privacy guarantees than protonmail and possibly way better - because if you use protonmail through a web client and they get a court order to serve you a "special" client that forwards your certificate you won't notice it.
This also applies to ISP's and wiretaps. They need to provide NAT mappings when doing a wiretap if i remember correctly.