I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
2. The Afghan army was basically not designed to function independently on its own. For example, it relied heavily on US air power. Take away the US military assets and it's no surprise that an "army" that was really nothing more than a support apparatus for the US military fell apart.
2. Again, if you totally outnumber your opponent and still lose, that means you just don't care. Patriots would fight against the odds.
American hubris at its finest. Invade a country, try to install a Western-style democracy despite the fact that the country has no history of such, bet heavy on corrupt local power-brokers and politicians, predictably fail spectacularly, creating an epic humanitarian disaster in the process, and then...blame the people of that country for being so unenlightened.
Here's a thought: if American society was so enlightened, it wouldn't be leaving Afghanistan with its tail between its legs, having squandered thousands of American lives, trillions of dollars and its credibility on the world stage.
They had 300k men and an air force after 20 years bulding up their nation and training their forces.
They didn't lose the will to fight because of us. Most of them never had it because the people who they were being asked to fight were their uncles, cousins, and brothers and they had little loyalty to their fledgling state. This is utterly unworthy of the new York times and sufficient reason to cancel my subscription.
> The Afghan forces were trained by the Americans using the U.S. military model based on highly technical special reconnaissance units, helicopters and airstrikes. We lost our superiority to the Taliban when our air support dried up and our ammunition ran out.
> Contractors maintained our bombers and our attack and transport aircraft throughout the war. By July, most of the 17,000 support contractors had left. A technical issue now meant that aircraft — a Black Hawk helicopter, a C-130 transport, a surveillance drone — would be grounded.
> The contractors also took proprietary software and weapons systems with them. They physically removed our helicopter missile-defense system. Access to the software that we relied on to track our vehicles, weapons and personnel also disappeared. Real-time intelligence on targets went out the window, too.
> The Taliban fought with snipers and improvised explosive devices while we lost aerial and laser-guided weapon capacity. And since we could not resupply bases without helicopter support, soldiers often lacked the necessary tools to fight.
Under these conditions, what would you expect members of the Afghan army to do?
You are correct that in some cases, surrenders were arranged due to family and tribal considerations. But anyone with a modest understanding of Afghan society and culture could have predicted this so it boggles the mind that the US, after 20 years, seemed utterly clueless about how Afghanistan works.
If this was the strategy all along, Afghanistan is an even bigger embarrassment to the US. Graveyard of empires indeed.
If only we had clapped harder, the Afghan Army would have been more resolute.
Anyone know how to say der dolchstoss in Pashto?
Conservatives tried to use that as a justification for not accepting refugees. Arguing on one hand refuges would include communists who will murder us in our beds. And the ones that aren't communists need to be forced to return to Vietnam and fight. Or that because they ran away they aren't worthy of help.