According to Apple only images that will be uploaded to iCloud will be scanned.
If this is the case there is zero reason to scan locally and you can just scan the uploaded image once it is on the server.
Apple has not implemented E2E nor has it released a statement indicating this will be implemented in the future.
Whereas if the CSAM scanning was performed exclusively in the cloud, protection under the 4th Amendment does not exist as it would likely fall under the third party doctrine.
Now I'm not saying the US Government would let mere unconstitutionality get in the way of any surveillance program. But Apple would. You don't think Apple wouldn't be itching for another opportunity to flex in public? Especially now, with their reputation on the line? Apple would love nothing more than to have more opportunities like they got with the San Bernardino iPhone.
There's no reason not to assume this isn't already happening, being closed source and proprietary. The question to ask is, what are we going to do about it?
Scanning makes phones a greater threat, and also erodes the expectation of privacy that is a legal barrier to surveillance.
All I'm saying is that the implementation Apple has described would be constitutionally blocked from being co-opted by US law enforcement. Obviously if there's no end-to-end encryption, any cloud operator could still be coerced into searching for material server side, as that falls under the so-called third party doctrine.
The hashes are supplied by NCMEC, a non-profit which is auditable, not a secret government agency.
In any case, even if a non-CSAM hash were somehow in the database, Apple reviews the images before making reports, and those reports are used in normal criminal prosecutions.
To the extent that you can say that they're not exactly a government agency, they absolutely have been deputized by the government.
Yes there is. It’s called legal liability. They are not immune to being held accountable for their actions just like any other non-profit. They may be immune from prosecution for possessing CSAM, but they don’t have any kind of immunity for damages they cause through their own actions.
It's just your friendly trillion dollar tech company putting on a mask and cape and engaging in a bit of vigilante fun. You know? Like batman! ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kr7AONv3FSg )
Timeline:
1. Leaked documents show Pegasus software exploits all iphones using an exploit in iMessage 2. Apple releases security update (doesn’t patch imessage. exploit) 3. Apple announces CSAM client scanning coming soon 4. Apple releases another security update (still leaves iMessage exploit unpatched and used by Pegasus)
….
Perhaps Apple is under pressure to provide a back door prior to patching a tool that may be widely used by governments around the world.
Every piece of data is CSAM encrypted with a one-time pad. It's just that nobody knows the one-time pad.
To all of a sudden introduce this scanner doesn't negate the expectation of privacy as that is how it was sold and marketed. There is an implied warranty of merchantability of how this service functions.
The government can't compel warrantless searches of Apple. 3rd party doctrine means Apple can search your iCloud, and can give it away if they choose. Same as how Apple can search your phone if you run their software, and can give away whatever they find if they choose.
In summary, I’m guessing they tried to invent a way where their server software never has to decrypt and analyze original photos, so they stay encrypted at rest.
Surely that's just the data, but resized?
But I'm unsure that the thumbnail is included with every CSAM "voucher" -- it's likely only included when you pass the 30 image limit. Need to read that section more clearly.
A secret sharing scheme is used to drip-feed Apple the key: each time a positive match occurs, Apple learns a bit more about your key. Once the threshold is reached, Apple will have learned enough to recover your encryption key, and will be able to use it to decrypt all your matching thumbnails at once.
I seem to recall that the white paper speaks of a "visual derivative" without specifying it further.
>The decrypted vouchers allow Apple servers to access a visual derivative – such as a low-resolution version – of each matching image.
https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Security_Threat_Model...
I suppose folks who don’t like privacy implications can downgrade to an iPhone 4 and maybe it will not support the feature.
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelin...
(Note: I have worked with law enforcement in the past specifically on a case involving Apple and two iCloud accounts. You submit a PDF of the valid warrant to Apple. Apple sends two emails one with the iCloud data encrypted. A second email with the decryption key.)
To me it's pretty clear they are doing the absolute minimum possible to keep congress from regulating them into a corner, where they lose decision making control around their own privacy standards. The system they came up with is their answer for doing it in the most privacy conscious way (e.g. not decrypting user data in icloud) while balancing a lot of other threat model details, like what if CSAM-hash-providing organizations provide img hashes for a burning American flag, and lots of other scenarios outlined in the white paper.
And for the suspicious, it's of course much easier to notice if Apple would change their algorithms if they happen on device.
No amount of data center optimization will beat running computations on hundreds of millions of devices other people have to pay for.
You’re having a house party. Because of the pandemic, you’d rather people who have COVID not attend. You can’t trust everyone to get vaccinated or get tested beforehand. So, you decided to set up a rapid-test system, just to be sure.
Would you rather test in your kitchen or your driveway?
If contagion wasn't a factor, I'd rather test in the kitchen, it's cozier.
Are you suggesting CSAM will infect more unwilling victims if it gets into a private iCloud account?