Windows should not install random drivers from the Internet when a non-admin user is logged in.
Windows should not install random drivers from the Internet when a non-admin user is logged in.
Now, it's true that MS has a flawed architecture here. But it's not inherently so as I see it. Third party devices do need automatic driver install of some form. Drivers do need elevated privileges. Microsoft's model was that they'd audit and authenticate the software through the WHQL process. And it turns out that let a really glaring hole through.
But the problem is just really, really hard. If you want third party driver software to run on your system (and not all vendors want that: iOS has nothing of the sort, obviously, and Linux vendors ship all the drivers themselves) then you need to be prepared to do a ton work ensuring it's safe.
Not to let Razer off the hook here, because they're responsible as well, but in doing as you've described here, Microsoft are have willingly placed the onus for security on themselves.
>Linux vendors ship all the drivers themselves
Not all of them. Nvidia is a famous exception to this. If you want to install their drivers, I don't know of a Linux distro that will allow you to without root privilege.
Now, that user experience broadly sucks vs. plugging the same PCIe card into a Windows box and booting it up to get an automatically installed driver. But it's not subject to the same security problems either, which was my point.
Would you be ok with the AMD kernel driver launching a web browser as root on first boot? Or every boot?
Sure, but a tonne of them come with them by default these days
Clearly Razer played a role here since they were doing something that is (from my experience) unusual by presenting a wizard during a Windows Update installation. On the other hand, this is a fault that Microsoft has to fix.
I don't see why. Particularly not if the user wouldn't have permissions to do it themselves. If the user doesn't have permission to install a driver, there is probably a good reason for it and the system shouldn't be automatically installing drivers on their behalf either.
If you accept the paradigm of third party hardware sales at all, then you need to have some kind of automatic secure install.
If Razor can't make their gamer mouse autoinstall drivers, then neither can Logitech. This would be an equal playing field.
> (or flee to another platform entirely).
If somebody can't type in their own password when prompted to install a driver, it probably isn't their computer in the first place. The computer almost certainly belongs to their school or employer, or at least another family member, and I think any of those would rarely be receptive to "Please replace your dell with a macbook because the turbo button on my gamer mouse doesn't work."
Furthermore, the gamer mouse will have basic functionality without the razor driver anyway, and from my experience I doubt most clueless computer users would notice the difference. If they can "click the internet button and the google shows up", then the mouse is working as far as most users of this sort are concerned.
Only if your user doesn't have admin permissions you need to type in a password to run something elevated.
This is a mouse. It works perfectly fine as a USB HID device. The software install is to unlock optional features on the device, and that can be done after the user has authenticated to the host and gone through a security elevation prompt.
In fact there are precious few third party devices without a usable built-in driver that absolutely need to be available before the user had logged in. I can't think of any.
That's not true. It may help you to watch the video.
The user was authenticated as a regular logged-in user. It was the driver installation that had elevated rights as SYSTEM, and there was no security elevation prompt.
I assume the mouse driver only bypasses it because it wants to have the driver installed before the user has logged in.
Also it should be if possible minimally fit for use without extra software even if all features aren't available.
There is no way any of this should ever happen automatically. People installed custom hardware for windows in the year 2000 and it worked fine then.
It's a flaw in Windows culture, where application publishers and device manufacturers are allowed and perhaps even encouraged to run amok, especially at install time, and run all manner of bespoke procedures with elevated privileges.
And it's a flaw in device manufacturer culture, where first-party device ‘drivers’ are expected to be bundled (sometimes optionally, sometimes by mandate) with entire applications for managing them, usually with flashy wizards and always-on GUIs that live in the system tray. More and more, it seems like manufacturers push that shit so they can track users usage of their devices, as well.
This is as much a result of device manufacturers' marketing teams' ruinous desires for customized, unique user interfaces and branding as it is a result of anything else. This kind of shit is really alien on platforms where universal management interfaces are the norm, package installation is expected to be well-behaved and non-interactive, etc. It's par for the course on Windows (and significantly so, but to a lesser extent, on macOS).
In the end, the driver is running executable code which could (I believe) just start an EXE install wizard anyway so this seems unpreventable.
If only Razer customers are affected then, sure let's put all of the blame on Razer but this affects everyone using Windows 10. There are some very good reasons why you cannot simply install device drivers without admin rights and if Microsoft chooses to wave those rights for trusted suppliers then they can very much be blamed for this kind of oversight.
My work was only confidential (and that only by default) but it was definitely interesting to be an in environment with secret sauce about, and processes for handling it. (Fire procedure not being drop everything and exit the building, for one.)
OAuth for Windows, I rest my case.
In a perfect world, or at least a tech user world, sure. But there was a compromise to make, either this (and that behavior can be disabled), or user stayed on admin account at all time. Which was the norm for windows since forever. Even on vista people disabled UAC.
From that point of view this is still the more secure outcome, at least the admin hatch is only broken through sometimes, instead of always.
Not saying this shouldn't be improved, but if you look not only at the end result but also at the path to get there, it does make some sense.