Boeing to ground Starliner indefinitely until valve issue solved
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
* motivated/passionate/skilled engineers/builders/scientists make a thing happen
* what starts out as a healthy balance between doer/creators and business/decider/facilitators slowly tips towards the latter
* economic cycles and other disruptive actions cause the passionate engineers that make things happen to depart to other pastures
* management/business continues to consolidate decision making prerogative and fails to realize that they are left with engineers of a more compliant ilk (not necessarily worse, just more willing to do as told and less incline to exercise risk taking initiative)
* progress slows to a trickle
I’m curious if anyone with insider information can speak to the possibility that this has happened in Boeing’s space division. The symptoms seem similar from afar.
Like others, I wish the engineers success from afar, because I would really want to succeed in an endeavor like this. But I know sometimes the engineers can become largely a body of people just willing to get the days tasks completed and that’s enough for them.
First, there will be those who are devoted to the goals of the organization. Examples are dedicated classroom teachers in an educational bureaucracy, many of the engineers and launch technicians and scientists at NASA, even some agricultural scientists and advisors in the former Soviet Union collective farming administration.
Secondly, there will be those dedicated to the organization itself. Examples are many of the administrators in the education system, many professors of education, many teachers union officials, much of the NASA headquarters staff, etc.
The Iron Law states that in every case the second group will gain and keep control of the organization. It will write the rules, and control promotions within the organization.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerry_Pournelle#Pournelle's_ir...
Boeing, like the government, has a lot of antiquated heavy weight processes that slow development down. As a field matures, it gets more complex, many past mistakes result in new processes to follow. Eventually, it is cruft that is difficult to remove and hard to navigate. Overtime, this increases development costs and slows projects down.
Personally, probably the most difficult thing I've experienced is moving towards iterative processes (away from waterfall) and having a government customer wanting to support it but not really being able to.
For example, if one were to begin to develop/evolve a complex system, the government about half way through would want a list of materials so they can be reviewed for a variety or purposes. Well, in an evolving system, this list is generally everchanging as people learn more about the domain and are able to make better choices over time. Something as simple as a list of materials can create all kinds of headaches. I could probably give a dozen or so examples where the government wants to, but cannot interface with modern engineering programs and practices.
I also know that both the government and Boeing are trying to change, but it is difficult to change direction when so much of a large behemoth is made to work a certain way.
Boeing was an engineering and manufacturing company. Then they bought McDonnell Douglas but MD executives ended up in the management chain.
s/in Boeing’s space division/at Boeing/
There's also the MCAS fiasco on the 737 MAX.
Unfortunately there's little sane about NASA's funding and contracting process, unless you look at it from a pork barreling politician's perspective.
One team may be failing, but the broader process has clearly worked to produce revolutionary progress in our space industry.
Boeing had their shot to make space travel cheaper and they never even tried to make it happen.
The "double dipping procurement officer" - the procurement officer arranging a purchase from a supplier that he's already got a job offer from - is so endemic in this sector that these people brag to each other about it over the buffet line at industry conferences. The first time I heard this spiel I thought someone was wearing a wire, but then I realized, slowly, that they didn't care who was listening because literally everyone - from the pentagon down through junior lieutenants and up to the supplier CEOs- was in on this. The corporate "Company-All" email chain is constantly littered with CEO announcements bragging about the latest retired procurement officer they've managed to scam with corner offices and tight little executive assistants.
And of course those same officers are the ones who sign waivers allowing substandard everything. MIL-STD avionics can be duct taped in the rack with a waiver from the program office, but the same equipment on a civilian PAX-carrying aircraft need actual testing by qualified people and equipment, no exceptions. And God forbid you get a EUROCAE auditor with the usual FAA mix - hold onto your nuts/ovaries. But the civilian stuff is aboveboard, for the most part, unless you're Boeing.
But the MIL-STD stuff . . oh god
The defense procurement business is horrifyingly corrupt, maybe even worse than the bureau system of the late USSR, and this is with dollar amounts that dwarf anything you've ever seen anywhere else. Every day I pray to the Defense Gods that a "SpaceX But For Defense" will show up and just blow everyone else out of the water. It might mean the end of my career, but it's what needs to happen.
I know SpaceX is capitalizing on the bad news, but they do have a history of being aggressive with the promises and hitting delays, but no where NEAR the magnitude of boeing.
https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/11/nasa-report-finds-bo...
Funneling money to Boeing is one thing, but that claim’s a stretch, surely?
One metric in which Startliner could be different from crew dragon, is that Starliner does not splash down in the sea, rather parachutes down on land.
As has been proven by the commercial aircraft wing; the 'reverse acquisition' ~2 decades ago put the accountants and MBA types in charge and effectively gutted the engineering, safety, and 'built it right then apply a price tag' culture the company used to have in decades past.
I'm amazed no one in that thread asked you for details about this. What happened?
To be fair, I do not know for sure if HIS house went under; there are houses in the neighborhood that were spared.
I didn't bother to ask because when I stalked him it said he was an employee of Theranos, and I decided it was probably not a good idea to poke a hornet's nest.
Speaking of Theranos, back when I was in my 2nd postdoc (2013) we were talking about how theranos was a fraud and it was going to come crumbling down, Some other crazy short term things I predicted: Sarah Palin VP candidate, Feb 2008, Simone Giertz becoming famous (ca winter 2015). I also predicted the failure of the first starliner launch (documented here in HN). I also have managed to pick some ascendant "obscure" PLs just before hockey sticking. Used Julia professionally in 2015 (proof of use in 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aP0Y1uAA-2Y&t=53m), used Elixir in 2017, been using Zig since 2019. And I haven't really used any other non-mainstream PLs, so I have a pretty good hit record I think. And a couple of obscure cryptos that I don't want to talk too much about.
While software spent a few decades slaved to traditional engineering approach (building a bridge), R&D like this, even in hardware, has proven to do well at incremental development approaches.
We had a few hints of this with how Apple produces things...but it never leaked out into the rest of the world until SpaceX literally started building a spaceship factory out in the open.
Yet, this craft was ready to launch. What else might wrong with it?
Luckily for them they literally cannot fail because their competitors simply don't have the production capabilities to take over- Airbus has a massive backlog.