Comment by drenvuk | Hacker News Reader

Comment by drenvuk | Hacker News Reader

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I really don't understand how you're arguing as if you don't see the bigger picture. Is this is a subtle troll?

They are now scanning on the device. Regardless of how limited it is in its current capabilities, those capabilities are only prevented from being expanded by Apple's current policies. The policies enacted by the next incoming exec who isn't beholden to the promises of the previous can easily erode whatever 'guarantees' we've been given when they're being pressured for KPIs or impact or government requests or promotion season or whatever. This has happened time and again. It's been documented.

I really am at a loss how you can even attempt to be fair to Apple. This is a black and white issue. They need to keep scanning for crimes off our devices.

So to your answer your question, yes it is preferable to have them be able to scan all of the unencrypted photos on iCloud. We can encrypt things beforehand if need be. It is lunacy to have crime detecting software on the device in any fashion because it opens up the possibility for them to do more. The people in positions to ask for these things always want more information, more control. Always.

The above reads like conspiracy theory but over the past couple of decades it has been proven correct. It's honestly infuriating to see people defend what's going on in any way shape or form.

Frankly the distinction seems arbitrary to me.

This is a policy issue in both cases - policy can change (for the worse) in both cases.

The comparison is about unencrypted photos in iCloud or this other method that reveals less user information by running some parts of it client side (only if iCloud photos are enabled) and could allow for e2e encryption on the server.

The argument of "but they could change it to be worse!" applies to any implementation and any policy. That's why the specifics matter imo. Apple controls the OS and distribution, governments control the legislation (which is hopefully correlated with the public interest). The existing 'megacorp' model doesn't have a non-policy defense to this kind of thing so it's always an argument about policy. In this specific implementation I think the policy is fine. That may not hold if they try to use it for something else (at which point it's worth fighting against whatever that bad policy is).

Apple's good solutions to the CSAM problem (which I think thread the needle for a decent compromise) could prevent worse policy from the government later (attempts to ban encryption or require key escrow like in the 90s).

Basically what I said here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28162418

This implementation as it stands reveals less information about end users and could allow them to enable e2ee for photos on their servers - that's a better outcome than the current state (imo).

They've given you two options:

1. Encrypt everything in the cloud but upload the hashes of these items as well on the device. Also notify us so we can notify law enforcement if they're doing some illegal stuff.

2. Everything is unencrypted in the cloud. No actions are taken on the device. No notifications to authorities.

With option one the sanctity of the device ownership is breached. With option two it's maintained. Maintaining that stark distinction is hugely important for what future actions can be taken in the public eye. Normalizing on device actions that work against the user must be fought at every instance they occur.

Your line of thinking dangerous because you're ignoring the public perception of a device you own actively working against you. Apple's behavior cannot be allowed to be considered normal.

For #2 actions are taken in the cloud, authorities are contacted, and all of the photos are unencrypted.

Option #1 doesn’t really breach the ‘sanctity of device ownership’ because it only occurs if you’ve enabled iCloud photos on the device.

Option #1 seems better to me in its current implementation. I understand the fear of abusing the hash matching. I just think that’s a separate thing.

>Option #1 doesn’t really breach the ‘sanctity of device ownership’ because it only occurs if you’ve enabled iCloud photos on the device.

I'm done. You'll rationalize anything.

To be fair - I think reasonable people can disagree on this.

I don't think it's a rationalization to point out that it only occurs when the same baseline conditions are met (using the cloud). I think those constraints/specifics matter. I wouldn't be in favor of the policy if they were different (and I'm not even sure I'm in favor of it now).

My personally preferred outcome would be e2ee by default for everything without any of this, but I also understand the concerns of NCMEC and the general tradeoffs/laws around this stuff (and future regulatory risk of CSAM) - and just the general issue of reducing child sexual abuse.

I largely agree with your point fossuser.

I am also in favour of E2E by default for everything without any device or cloud based scanning. However, Apple doesn't want to be caught in having developed a service that enables for child exploitation. Doing nothing may have even more invasive requirements legally forced by government, so Apple is stuck with a dilemma. Also lets not forget that Apple should also not want child exploitation to occur and therefore also should do something.

The question I have for drenvuk is how else is Apple able to prevent or detect child exploitation and the storage or distribution of content such as this on Apple's services?

They can rely on users reporting it. They are not obligated by law to do this.

For now, but if they don’t do something like this laws can change and that change could make things a lot worse for privacy than this implementation.

I suspect they’re trying to get ahead of that and solve this in the most privacy protecting way possible.

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