I really don't see why the scanning would ever be done on the phone instead of on iCloud if it only affects iCloud images.
But I do have guesses why.
But I do have guesses why.
a. Apple intends to E2E encrypt iCloud data.
b. This is intended to extend to all photos on the device in the future.
I'm hoping it's (a), but it's probably (b). And in either case it sets a bad precedent for other companies to follow.
Edit: This also turns every jailbreak into a possible CSAM detection avoidance mechanism, giving the government plausible cover to treat them as serious, criminal actions. Apple would probably love that.
That makes absolutely no sense. There is nowhere such a requirement.
They could just E2E encrypt iCloud data. Point.
How do for example hard drive manufacturers comply?
But, I think it's safe to say if Apple did turn on E2EE w/o any provision for things like CSAM, it would help drive legislation that is likely more heavy handed.
If they were badly losing on that front (such that all hope were lost so to speak), then they could attempt this new approach at that time, they could offer that up as a middle ground, and their seeming capitulation then would buy them a lot of slack. Instead, they're supposedly pre-capitulating (if you buy into that premise).
Doing what they're doing now, it looks like one of a few possibilities: they're just that stupid (I'm skeptical), they're groveling for points (hey, if we give you this, maybe you'll leave us alone on anti-trust, as our size and quasi-monopolistic position is beneficial to your surveillance aims), or they're already being compelled (as they were with PRISM) and are not publicly able to reveal that.
It's coming exclusively from Apple fans desperate to give them the benefit of the doubt on this rather epic implosion of Apple's brand when it comes to privacy.
So many people hooked themselves up to the Apple-is-pro-privacy wagon. They invested into the ecosystem across the board. They've been swimming in Apple's products & services pool for years or decades. Apple just went from hero to maybe villain on privacy. So now many of those people that are getting screwed over by Apple are going to be emotional about it, irrational about it, in denial about it.
It won't be used nefariously in the future. It won't be expansive, it'll remain the very limited program they say it is today. It won't be abused around the world by authoritarian governments. One of the greatest potential surveillance tools ever deployed and it won't be rampantly abused by the world's most powerful governments and agencies (all of which are hungry to spy on their citizens and or other nation's citizens). Yeah right.
Apple's report count to the NCMEC is really low so it's probably true that they are not scanning on iCloud unless they receive a warrant.
I’m talking about the mechanism as described, not a hypothetical.
> If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions.
As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction.
That is very worrisome. How do they want to withstand political pressure then to make the database of "bad hashes" dependent on the jurisdiction if they've already made the feature dependent on the jurisdiction?
How do you know? I think it's just implemented in the US. Nothing stops Apple to implement it elsewhere.
Biggest mistake Apple has ever done was to roll out three different features at once and announce at the same time. This is creating all sorts of confusion.