If so, then I’ll immediately change my mind and join the protest. Device local scanning is equivalent to someone checking your personal possessions at your home.
From the overview:
> Apple’s method of detecting known CSAM is designed with user privacy in mind. Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided by NCMEC and other child-safety organizations. Apple further transforms this database into an unreadable set of hashes, which is securely stored on users’ devices.
If iCloud is off, do they still do this? Your quote actually doesn’t contradict that, which is my main hangup. If you turn on iCloud, you forfeit certain expectations.
I’ll read through it carefully now.
EDIT: It was the very first sentence of the intro:
> CSAM Detection enables Apple to accurately identify and report iCloud users who store known Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) in their iCloud Photos accounts.
I don’t get it. It’s their platform. Other image platforms do this matching. Old film shops used to do this matching. Why is this evil?
There’s also the fact that the “only scans local photos marked for upload to iCloud” is a technically thin barrier. A switch that could very easily and quietly be flipped in the future.
Do you have an objection even though it means that the content (in a form readable by anyone else) never leaves your device? Would it be preferable if Apple scanned files that were synced to iCloud, but no longer encrypted them in transit/at rest, or encrypted them in a way that they are able to decrypt?