The current zeitgeist appears to be denial that consciousness exists at all. I don't think this helps either.
If I had to take a punt I'd say that we can't find a solution because it's the substrate of everything, so by definition can't be measured by us.
This gives them an unusual take on observers and consciousness.
While everyone else tend to be happy with "consciousness is a physical computation", they tend to need/want something more.
As far as I can make out David Deutsch started Quantum Computation to be able to have a quantum observer to probe the nature of quantum reality.
That's very surprising to me, because Deutsch is heavily in the Everett interpretation branch of possible quantum interpretations (pun intended).
So, he doesn't need any wave-function-collapse magic to explain quantum mechanics.
>>"Remember that quantum theorists have a strange dog in the race due to the whole wave-function-collapse by an observer thing."
That's very insightful.
He considers a working QC as basically an experimental confirmation of the many-worlds interpretation.
Something like: "So tell me, these amazing parallel computations - where exactly do you say that they are being computed again if not in the parallel worlds?"
There is a nice interview with him in Wired that touches this briefly:
https://www.wired.com/2007/02/the-father-of-quantum-computin...
Check his answer to:
"So what prompted you to start thinking about quantum computing?"
My take is that for him the QC started as a thought experiment to get a quantum observer to sidestep the whole wavefunction collapse by a classical observer problem.
>> That's very insightful.
Thanks.
I'm talking here about the hard problem of consciousness: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
The only solutions which don't involve a fundamental reworking of physics basically end up denying that consciousness (as phenomenal experience) exists at all.
Where?
This is "strong reductionism" which comes under the heading of "Rejection of the Problem" in the linked article. GP is essentially denying that the hard problem exists.
It seems like you're assuming the author intended to redefine the word, but I still don't see where that redefinition took place.
That's as far as I can parse this bit of sentence. Could you reword, please?
1. Consciousness is the activity of the brain in response to stimulae, or things that people report that they can experience. These are the only things which need to be explained.
2. We can measure these and explain them with reductive science.
3. Therefore we can explain consciousness.
But of course this is a redefinition of consciousness because it ignores phenomenology. And that also needs to be explained.
No, it isn't, and it doesn't.
1. Deliberate motor movements are caused by signals from the motor cortex.
2. Poets have written poems about phenomenological experience.
3. Therefore, phenomenological experience causes activity in the brain.
It's not a redefinition; just a challenge of your assumptions.
If there truly is something of “I feel it” factor that’s not just “physical” as you say it, then this can be disproven easily by seeing if a machine can attain consciousness. If that never happens then good for your theory. If it happens at some point then you’re wrong. Until then it seems like a fairly non scientific philosophical argument at best. I.e., it’s still worth having but let’s not try claiming your microtubules are tingling the quantum realm to make you think shall we?
That’s odd, arguably it’s the one thing we know exists.
> because it’s the substrate of everything
Recommend checking out Bernardo Kastrup (two PhDs, many books and videos on YouTube) who argues that mind is fundamental.
They do it by changing the meaning of the word "consciousness" so that they can then show that this new thing they've defined doesn't exist. It's a remarkable strawman.
It's quite silly to deny consciousness though! It's similar to deny one's existence. So philosophy and psychology shines some light on these questions.
lesser kook.