Just to clarify, I don't mean that these distinctions are meaningless, just that their meaning is inherently embedded in human experience.
Just to clarify, I don't mean that these distinctions are meaningless, just that their meaning is inherently embedded in human experience.
I don’t think it’s arbitrary. There’s a clear distinction between say a rock and a cell, even if you view the rock on geological timescales and the cell on biological timescales. I don’t think it’s arbitrary or even surprising that humans view things from our own vantage point in reality.
This isn't a big deal for science, but it's a moral victory for atheists.
If "souls" aren't defined precisely enough that there's an experiment that give different results depending on whether they exist, then the statement "souls exist" is meaningless, and anyone saying it is not even wrong.
> This isn't a big deal for science, but it's a moral victory for atheists.
Theists won't care, although I suppose some will mutter something about separate magisteria.
Well and also in the sense that it takes some pretty arbitrary decisions to distinguish living from nonliving.
I don't mean that these distinctions are useless or unimportant, just that for the most part they may not be all that fundamental... You end up drawing lines in the sand.
For example, are you gonna exclude viruses from the tree of life? Why? Because viruses don't have any known local macroscopic motility? Because they rely too heavily on their environment ("host") to reproduce? Those are summaries of the arguments I've heard against viruses being alive, and imo they're pretty arbitrary.
On the other hand, viruses reproduce and are subject to selective pressures, as are most phenomena with a lifecycle and an external environment. So then if you include viruses are you gonna include RNA? What about reactions, e.g. combustion? Are these alive? Well then and what about consumer product/producer systems? Don't they have lifecycles of their own? Some feedback loops that cause selective pressures? Environments to survive and reproduce in?
It's fuzzy.
A lot of rational, materialistic categorizations of living vs unliving look to me like hunches based on assumptions about motility or consciousness, and might as well be reframed as "does it move?" or "can I communicate with it?" or "does it see me?"
Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan wrote a nice essay called "the uncut self" that's really great and related to this in my view. It's all about where the tendency to draw boundaries around "individual selves" when looking at living systems, boundaries that might not be so fixed or obvious when you look carefully.
Back to cows...
You can remove the heart of a cow and keep the heart alive in a proper device, and keep the rest of the cow alive with an artificial heart. (I don't know if someone has tried this with cows, but this should be possible with the same technology for hearts transplants in humans.)
Are both parts alive? What happens if I unplug one of them? Is the heart-less-cow is the real cow? I think we all agree about this last question, but from the cellular level it's just an arbitrary classification, in spite it's useful for us.
What level of complexity is required for experience?
You could just as well assume that a rock has the processing power of a computer CPU but it just lacks input and output.
IIRC It can keep beating even without brain signals. It's not the ideal rate of beating, and there are other problems, but the heart somewhat beats on it's own.
I don't know how many sensing neurons the heart have and how they interact with the beating. The heart is not as "smart" as a brain, but it's "smarter" than a rock.
Stealing the examples from other comments: Is the heart of a cow smarter than a planaria? Is the heart of a cow smarter than a hydra?
My point is simply the presence of interconnected neurons running a certain program is not sufficient to give rise to sentience or conciousness. I believe what we call sentience or conciousness is not an accident or even really an "emergent" phenomenon but rather the direct, purposeful result of specific structure that was selected for by evolution.
The phrase "level of complexity" is inartful because it implies there is one axis or dimension to complexity when that is not the case. If you make a random soup of 100 billion interconnected neurons and teach it to classify images it is highly unlikely that you will get a sentient being by accident although you may have a very efficient neural network at the task it was designed for. If however you take a 100 billion neurons and subject them to the selective pressures of evolution in the real world, where a sentient or self aware self may have advantage then it is not unlikely perhaps that you end up with a sentient or counscious being. Thus sentience is the result of specific selected for structure not the random outcome of a certain level of complexity. I don't see why this is even contraversial.
General intelligence does not exist divorced from the real world and it does not just happen as the side effect of a certian "level" of complexity.
With regard to the question is the heart of a cow smarter than a planiar (worm) whole organism I do not see this as a meaningful question because the starting premise is wrong. The starting premise assumes that there is some abstract quality "sentience" or "intelligence" that exists on a single axis, a continuum of "levels." I'd say the axis does not exist, there are no levels, what matters are functions and it is not meaningful to argue whether or not the planarian or the heart is at a higher level of intelligence because the preform different functions. Notably one is a free living creature while another is an organ inside another creater. I think they are incomparable. Neither has the specific brain structure that gives humans and other higher animals sentience so it does not make sense to argue whether one or the other is at a higher level when neither is at any level at all in terms of a structural or functional comparison with a brain. A worm is not further ahead or behind a heart when compared to a brain because neither is anything like a brain. Maybe a plannarian can learn. I doubt a heart can learn but maybe it can. But overall the idea of levels of sentience or sentience simply emerging from complexity that does not intentionally provide for it is silly in my opinion.
That's a very interesting question! (Do we have here some biologist that can try it?)
The difference between an isolated organism and a part is sometimes no so clear. For example in Clonal Colony https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clonal_colony Is each trunk of Pando a different organism? Why not each branch? (Plants do very nasty things to other plants, but in slow motion. It's nice to see time lapses videos of plants "fighting".) Most examples of clonal colonies are plants, some of them have specialized members and some have identical members. If you prefer animals, one nice example is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portuguese_man_o%27_war
The individual insects in a hive are typically 75% identical genetically.
It is popular to admire the selfless ants or bees who willingly give their lives for their society.
But if you think of them as cells of an organism, that happens in every living being.
When you see a hive sacrificing itself, we can talk :)
The point being that as technology continues to develop in this area, our understanding of when someone is "dead" may also continue to shift.
There's also the classic example of comatose people.
Origin of life and origin of consciousness are as I see it the two major mysteries of the universe. I see them as separate.
That a materialist perspective gives us some nice hard rules for understanding certain things, it also by definition struggles to help us understand the nature of other things, i.e. 'most important bit' which is 'life' itself, so maybe we should be thinking about that problem a little bit differently. 'Emergence' seems to be a least one idea, among many.
Interesting and plausible, but you didn't give an argument or any example for that.
We have difficulty with biological distinction, but we can still confidently categorize something as being a 'Horse' and 'Not A Horse' ... even if sometimes it's a little bit ambiguous, aka 'Kind of a Horse'.
Edit: and as for 'other ways of thinking' it very quickly goes into metaphysics so it's hard to talk about because we don't spend much time in that realm. 'Emergence' and 'Biocentrism' are interesting ideas (fields?) that sit within more or less regular bounds of science and so they're just examples of what I'm referring to.
A paleontologist might disagree with you.
I don't think biologists would agree with you about the horse. It's actually consider a crisis in the philosophy of biology that the concept of species is ill-defined. [1] Like I said, the resolution to me is pragmatic: the definition will depend on whether it is effective relative to some purpose.
While 'value' is surely in the eye of the beholder ... whether or not something fits into the category is not as subjective.
And frankly, the 'big question' is 'who is the beholder' - which is something that materialism is struggling to tell us.
What does that add? Do we have better models if we say we're all hallucinating the same seemingly-kind-of-objective reality?
What if I'm the only human, you're all p-zombies, BUT all dogs are conscious?
Not necessarily, some animals have the same perception. Some carnivores don't eat dead animals, others primarily eat carrion and they interreact differently with inanimate objects.
In that case, describing the distinction as "arbitrary" seems wrong.