Ditto watchandwait below.., glad it finally happened.
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190355490...
Ditto watchandwait below.., glad it finally happened.
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190355490...
From the article: if you’re a holder of Greek bonds right now, you have three choices... 1. You can do nothing, and hope that Greece pays you in full and on time. (and other stuff)... The first option is by far the most interesting. No one has come out and said that Greece is going to default on bondholders who don’t exchange their bonds;
IE, the aim is to threaten and arm-twisted big banks into exchanging their bonds without any formal default happening. If we're going by a "gold standard", when Greece actually misses a payment on its bonds, then it will have defaulted. Until then, this is negotiation.
Further from the article: "Is it possible for other bondholders — those who haven’t had their arms twisted — to free-ride on the back of this deal and continue to get paid in full? I suspect that it probably is. Which is one reason why this Greek restructuring won’t be the last."
Again, nothing has happen to the non-big-bank holders. Indeed, they get a convenient free-ride.
You're basically saying that Greece renegotiated some of it's debt obligations. Which is a default.
"Sovereign defaults Sovereign borrowers such as nation-states generally are not subject to bankruptcy courts in their own jurisdiction, and thus may be able to default without legal consequences. One example is with North Korea, which in 1987 defaulted on some of its loans. In such cases, the defaulting country and the creditor are more likely to renegotiate the interest rate, length of the loan, or the principal payments."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Default_(finance)#Sovereign_def...
Greece knows that there are lots of important people who are overexposed. It knows that if it does the wrong thing, it could trigger a run on its creditors that is akin to what happened to Lehman. It doesn't want to be the bad guy necessarily, who does? But its finances are untenable.
I promise to pay you $100 tomorrow. I then tell you you'll get your money in 30 years and at a much lower interest rate. That's breaking the original promise, even though I haven't actually 'not paid you back'.
A way to describe what is happens is that the EU says "we know some people are worried about the money Greece owns them. For them, we offer insurance. We have several pricing schemes for that assurance:..."
Phrasing it that way would IMO put some spin on it, but it would not be a bland lie, either.
I think they stroke a good balance here. It is not arm-wrestling, but they likely will reach the intended goals (decrease immediate pressure on Greece, and show the world that the EU will help countries in trouble)
The point is that in an "effective default", there's no violation of any explicit contract however much the loaning parties may have lost confidence. IE, if Greece was home-owner renegotiating its mortgage, there is no point where the bank can go to court and demand the house (though against sovereign nation, banks, of course, have no such recourse but its considered important, I believe).
Another agency, the ISDA, says it's _not_ a default for the purposes of a CDS trigger. That, for another percentage of the population, is binary-off. http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/07/22/the-cds-mar...
A semantic argument won’t help you there. If it were my job to write articles about the situation I certainly wouldn’t pick “Greece Defaults” as a headline. I would mention the default in the body and explain what that actually means. Context. Not all defaults are created equal. And that’s actually kinda sorta important.
But we all know the truth. Shit is going to happen. If for no reason other than that the Greek government is going to stop working because it can't fund itself.
[Edit: What diff does it make if they're going to practically indefinitely extend the terms? And at those rates? That's like hoping that inflation will make the debt go away. Except Greece is in the Eurozone so that's not quite going to happen.]
But the existing bonds still have value and they'll still be held as investments. It's not like the whole country has collapsed and the value of its debt is worthless. A haircut is just that, a downward adjustment in the value of the debt.
It's inane to think that Greece will exit the Euro zone because of this. The Euro zone is the only thing keeping them going at this point.
Debtors have "an option" to gain additional guarantees at an additional cost. For debtors that don't enter into such additional contracts, Greece made all the payments up to date.
It's an accurate statement, it's not some semantic sideshow.
The author of the piece writes as if Greece is getting off scot-free here. Is not aware of the manner in which mobs have been rioting there for the past month? This is not a pleasant situation for anybody.
German government sources said they had received assurances from the international ratings agencies that they would not rush to judgment in declaring a Greek default but would take their time in studying the deal.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jul/22/bailed-out-eu...
Which implies to me that "default" is in the eye of the beholder.
Finance is not my kink, but my understanding is the nature of the "write down" is generally that as a bank you cannot borrow against the money that is owed to you, rather than actually giving up on collecting it entirely.
In other words, the OP headline sees a bit dramatic.
But that won't stop the credit rating agencies giving Greece's bonds a default rating — this is a coercive deal, which clearly reduces the value of banks' Greek debt. (After all, just look at those haircuts.)
A default is when you fail to fulfill your obligations. If I owe you $1.00, but instead pay you $0.80 (1 year late)...I didn't fulfill my obligation to you, and it's fair to consider me a credit risk.
Or, put another way, people who declare personal bankruptcy don't do so because they can't pay _any_ of their debt, they do so because they can't pay _all_ of it.
It's just offering additional guarantees (which were not present in the initial debt agreement) at a specific cost (a 20% cut or a longer maturity date) for those that want to enter willingly into such transactions.
I think the ECB was extremely careful in the crafting of this deal to do everything possible to NOT trigger a technical default. A default is a delay or missing any coupon (interest) payments or failing to pay back a bond upon it's redemption date.
The reason why it is so important that Greece not default is that a huge amount of hedge funds and other speculative investors have purchased CDS guaranteeing Greek bonds will not default. Because the CDS market is completely unregulated, we don't know how many billions or hundreds of billions in bets have been placed on a Greek default. In fact, even people that don't even own Greek bonds could purchase a CDS guaranteeing a payout if Greece defaults.
In other words, if Greece does legally default by delaying any coupon payments or failing to pay any creditors, the ripples caused by all of the highly leveraged CDS could create another Lehman like scenario where large US and foreign banks don't have the capital reserves to cover all of the bets.
The real crime in all of this is that the CDS market is still completely unregulated and the hedge funds are legally allowed to bet on this. The real world equivalent would be that you're allowed to take out a fire insurance policy on your neighbors house, and then proceed to smoke cigarettes and flick the lit butts at his house, hoping to spark a flame. The hedge funds do this every day by taking out CDS and then proceeding to short Greek bonds. If they can panic enough investors into running for the exits, they can trigger a default and become rich.
But there are also a couple of major types of contract. (a) if there's a Credit Event, the protection seller pays 100 for the distressed debt (essentially taking a loss equal to however much the value of the debt fell). (b) if there's a Credit Event, the protection seller pays EUR40 (fixed payout, with a specific 60% recovery assumption).
By playing on the mix of these CDS, people are probably already be playing on the post default value of Greek Debt, even before anything has formally happened. My guess is that process started over a year ago.
Yes, hedge funds (and everyone) are allowed to bet on this. If there's an issue here, the question is who is selling fire insurance policies (at non-exorbitant rates) when they know that arsonists are around? If it's European banks that know they'll be bailed out, that's a problem.
In theory, all CDS trades are registered with DTCC since 2009, and my understanding is this works pretty well for contracts as standardized and liquid as Greece. See also the WSJ article linked by ristretto below.
source: http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2009/cds_contract_va...
data: http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data_table_i.php?tbid... (see 'Hellenic Republic')
some analysis of data integrity: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0912y.htm
thanks to: http://www.zerohedge.com/article/debunking-some-myths-about-...)
Banks (mostly European banks, as I understand it) that held Greek debt, but insured it using CDS (written mostly by US banks, ditto), will be able to hand the problem to their counterparties, in exchange for 100%.
There may be some very interesting consequences about to unfold...
The same 4.8B could have been insured 1000 times.
1) Debtor simply stops paying interest or principal.
2) Debtor makes a voluntary exchange offer, offering new debt that is generally considered to offer _better_ terms (e.g. higher interest rate but longer maturity). 90% of creditors accept.
3) Debtor makes a voluntary exchange offer, offering new debt that is generally considered to offer _worse_ terms (e.g. same interest rate but longer maturity). 80% of creditors accept, perhaps because they think it’s better than an actual default later.
4) The debt contract has a collective action cause saying that if 2/3 of creditors accept, an exchange offer is binding on everyone. 2/3 of creditors accept an exchange offer that offers worse terms.
5) Debtor makes a voluntary exchange offer. The central bank announces that a month after the exchange offer replies are due, it will stop accepting the old debt as collateral for loans by the central bank and will only accept the new debt as collateral.
Would you say that all of these are default and there are no gray areas?
Yes there is. If this plan goes through, S&P will downgrade Greece's credit rating from CCC to SD ("selective default").
You mean as an employee of a firm on Wall Street?
What happens to you if you're not in that club?