Deep packet inspection used to stop censorship | Hacker News Reader

Deep packet inspection used to stop censorship

arstechnica.com

30 pointsrimantas13 comments

They should find a name that isn't already used.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telex

If Telex is ever to become adopted on a wide-scale, it needs to happen now. Think about it: governments, in general, are not becoming more friendly toward an open Internet.

No governing body will want to deploy Telex more next year than they do this year.

I'm not well-versed in cryptography, but how do I know that I'm talking to a "trustworthy telex"? What's to prevent the bad guy from poisoning the network with his "telex" router?

Unfortunately, I don't see why any government (including western democracies) would support a system that reduces their ability to censor traffic within its borders.

government help will likely be needed to get a system like Telex off the ground

I can't see this as being good for international policy. Imagine China's response to the US directly helping people circumvent their controls. That might as well be a soft declaration of war.

Am I wrong in my understanding that there is a single private key which, if stolen, will cause the whole system to fall apart?

That's not the case.

Each Telex Station has it's own private key which it uses to decrypt the 224 bit tag. If one Telex station loses its private key, then the user will just use another.

I feel like it will be a difficult sell to any government (even "liberal democracies"), let alone an ISP.

I've no doubt they can monetize it, but I suspect there'll be "traffic forwarding" libraries popping up on Github, if this idea takes off

If only this could be somehow tranformed into a p2p based service...

P2P does help promote anonymity and platform robustness. What aspect of Telex do you suppose could use P2P?

great this could also be used to bypass enterprise url filters. joy

Fascinating innovation!

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