I don't know, because you didn't engage with the content of the article at all. You merely casted nasty aspersions on its author.
> I am not attacking the guy personally
Yes, you are.
he seems to specialize in a specious species of polemic and obfuscation designed solely to justify and promulgate his political and religious views. If it lends a sense of purpose to his life, makes him a living or gives him a feeling of self-importance/bolsters his worth among his peers, who am I to criticize? Perhaps it is actually a deep satire with some ulterior motive.
So not only do you throw around unsubstantiated aspersions, but you are also dishonest.
> the author has started from his prior positions and then constructed an argument that reinforces them
There are two ways to interpret this:
1. You're accusing the author of making an argument that is circular. If so, describe the argument, including its premises and conclusion, and specify which premise is the conclusion.
2. You're merely attacking the author for arguing their position. Hardly objectionable and also a red herring, since the soundness of an argument is independent of the author's "prior positions".
Furthermore, I see nothing controversial about the statement you quoted. It is indisputably true, and would be true for any other author.
Moreover, does he need to challenge his own presuppositions? We can do that!
I feel like your expectations for how philosophers ought to behave aren't based on any significant familiarity with the work of actual philosophers, just your suppositions about how philosophy ought to be done.
Philosophy is a conversation, and valid argumentation is that starting point of any treatise. The work of contending philosophers is to challenge one another, so there should be no hesitation in using less-than-certain (that is to say, all) presuppositions.
Moreover, Feser does comment on his presuppositions in this very article.
> I would qualify this by saying that metaphysics is prior to logic if “logic” is understood in sense (b) described above, though not if understood in sense (a). Naturally, we have to presuppose certain canons of reasoning when reasoning about anything, including metaphysics. But it doesn’t follow that we have to presuppose the codification enshrined in some particular formal system – such as, for example, modern propositional and predicate logic rather than traditional Aristotelian logic, or rather than some system that tries to capture the best of both worlds (such as that of Fred Sommers).
> I think that sometimes being overly opinionated and incapable of changing your mind is potentially harmful to others, yes… Is it not potentially dangerous to advocate for various political realities based solely on unexamined/individual opinion-based constructs?
How can I disagree with this? Yes there is hazard in advocating for anything. Moreover, there is hazard in doing anything. But I see what you're getting at. There is some line we draw in our own minds between philosophy, that is the pursuit of truth, and political - the realm of opinions.
Where is the line? Most would say that it is when the philosopher argues in good or bad faith. Thus, we are in the realm of the unknowable, the motivations of all around us. Also, not to comment on the notions of whether it's possible for an individual's to be "good" or "bad", but I don't want to digress.
To return, I think you're saying that making statements result in harm to individuals is bad. I agree, but this is a political question, not a philosophical one. Thus providing a philosophical justification or contradiction for your statement is moot.
As in literally asking the question: What is Philosophy about?
The only answer we can give is political.