A classic Silicon Valley tactic – losing money to crush rivals – under scrutiny
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If you include human capital, it's almost all of SV's competitive advantage: co-location of the people and the money to scale up.
It's not necessarily a permanent thing; little related to industry is. But the seemingly permanent cases are telling (Walmart being a great example). But even the impermanent ones; 20 years, say, of suboptimal outcomes for everyone except the already rich (the VCs), and the founders playing a flawed system well, is a reason to re-examine the system.
Fundamentally being able to continually debt finance something that has no profitability, and possibly no path to profitability, or which leverages market inequalities to expand (again, Walmart; profits from one area enable predatory pricing in another to choke out competition, then you can raise prices, and repeat the cycle elsewhere), breaks a lot of the assumptions a 'free market' rests on.
Or more succinctly, the practice is what enables digging the moat. The size of the moat is entirely controlled by how much financing you can get. We're seeing a lot of companies focusing on building moats rather than competing fairly.
0% interest effectively means there is no time cost to money - As a large LP you could probably hold open a money burning position in a firm for decades as long as each year it looked like you would turn a profit within N years (conveniently far enough away that its beyond the funds horizon). At 5% interest N years gets a lot closer.
If WeWork subsidizes all office space with ~50 billion dollars, all other profitable landlords will need to lower prices to compete. To the investor the only viable business is the one that grows so large as to not have any unprofitable competition.
You mention Walmart as a good example, but their net income figures for the past few decades indicate that they have not been able to jack up prices.
I know we do and we are operating in Europe.
I can only imagine that in the US is worse.
I recently learned from a doordash courier that he and other Bangladeshi men had paid tens of thousands of dollars to a human trafficking organization to work doordash in exchange for getting to the United States. Of course he didn't have this money, it was debt to the organization, and he has to pay it out of his DoorDash wages, plus interest, to the organization. He lived in an apartment with dozens of other men in the same situation. He had a gps tracker around his ankle and everything.
How are you supposed to compete with a company that uses modern slavery in order to deliver your meal for $5 or less?
All the restaurants I know charge higher prices if you order online than if you call directly or go in person. I do not use food delivery apps, but I assume prices are similarly inflated there since people willing to purchase online or via app are amenable to paying more.
It is absolutely crazy to me the amount of premium people are willing to pay just to not have to pick up the phone or drive 5 min.
Crazy and awesome. It means people value their time highly, and can afford to buy it back.
Heck, Amazon is a fun example; they've long used their monopoly power to dictate to publishers, and are currently seeking to leverage their monopoly, Kindle Unlimited, etc, to help drive self-publishing on their platform, to cut out Publishers entirely. I'm not saying that removal of publishers is innately a bad thing, I -am- saying that making Amazon the largest publisher and the largest distributor of books in the world probably is. And they've achieved it not by simply being the best, but also via predatory pricing, and using money from AWS to cover costs in their retail arm to help gain market share, at the expense of smaller retailers who don't have a massively profitable cloud service to offset their losses with.
Source? Their financials do not indicate that they were or are subsidizing losses in their retail business with AWS.
https://dazeinfo.com/2019/11/06/amazon-net-income-by-year-gr...
AWS income did not even ramp up until a few years after it came out in 2006.
Their main competitive advantage was having a decent website and shipping operation early on when other retailers did not, and being able to sell goods to customers in most states without charging sales tax until the 2010s for most states.
You bet big, you win big. Of course, now it is just a side show since retail is playing for pennies, but they certainly were not "dumping" back then just to kill the competition, and then planning to raise prices. They clearly innovated and brought online shopping to the fore.
The market could have chosen Walmart, or Target or Home Depot too, but they did not (correctly) because the chances of the people working at those companies coming out with something like AWS is insufficient.
Amazon is a poor company to use as an example for one that dumps their product at below cost in hopes of gaining market share.
If you look at AMZN net income graph, they never really lost a ton of money.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-competitive_practices#Typ...
I have mixed feelings about some of the big money SV strategies. Antitrust concerns aside:
- They do allow some types of long-term transformative businesses, which would otherwise be impossible.
- They don't allow many forms of sustainable businesses to exist. If you and I have the same idea and ability to execute, whichever of us raises more money (and in an ideal free market, this means whichever of us is willing to accept less favorable terms) wins. This drains value from entrepreneurs to capital. Perhaps it speeds things up a little bit, but it's a net lose. It also leads to businesses with unsustainable debt and burn rates, and many viable business models crash-and-burn.
Imagine thinking that an individual or a group of normal people can be competitive in an economy like this.
I went through an entire economics PhD program, and had never before now heard of this founders' race to the bottom of investment terms. What a remarkable insight. Is there already a name for it?
I have about a half-dozen similarly remarkable insights each week. If you're interested in writing an econ paper about it, I'm glad to let you take first authorship.
We can call it the "Founders Race to the Bottom" or the "Brown Effect." :) If it goes viral, you'll be famous.
I've made that offer before on similar insights, and so far, no one has taken me up on it. And a few of them were really insightful.
Who knows? Perhaps you'll get a Nobel Prize for it. Econ give them out for less. Some of those insights were, er, less than deep.
The real insight behind this came in the Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith walks through this exact logic market-by-market, and for example, his section on rents leads to a similar degeneracy, where rents rise to match what the market can bare, and working people are driven to poverty by spending all excess income on rent. It's a great read.
This is very directly applying exactly his logic, just to a modern market.
As a fan of Henry George, I think the greatest trick pulled in economics was rentiers successfully getting Smith's concepts of capital and rent to be lumped together as "capital".
It is probably what allows Amazon to continue to exit as such a cesspool of fraudulent reviews counterfeit goods, shady sellers, and painfully bad search functionality. A near competitor could have pushed them to improve, but their moat is now too big except for certain niches, so we're stuck.
Also Amazon's moat isn't really its website, which is mediocre at best, but its backend systems like fulfillment. Plus brand recognition, size, general efficiency etc.
ISTM that it's draining value from entrepreneurs to the early adopters (on the consumption side) that make up the first-mover's market, and that the investors are just providing capital at competitive conditions, so they're not capturing any rent. Of course later-stage consumers can be seen as losers, if only because they must ultimately defray the increased cost of the initial excess-capacity building that results from imperfect competition.
There's nothing that suggests this is unique to the tech sector, BTW. It ought to apply whenever scale is sufficiently large and first-mover advantages sufficiently high.
Amazon is brought up often with regards to this, but somehow I've always encountered this argument when it was made as a rebuttal to a critique towards the business technique used by the Celebrity CEO at the helm of a particular car manufacturer (as well as battery manufacturer and solar panels manufacturer, oh and flamethrower manufacturer)
Where I live, we have WalMart, Target, other national "big box" retailers, three different supermarket chains, and a pretty wide variety of locally-owned small specialty retailers.
Could a town of 10,000 support this kind of diversity in retail? No. So there, WalMart wins. Before WalMaret, there was more local retail, but they were barely making a living.
I study consumer prices and I've found mom and pop shops are significantly more expensive than the big chains. I'm talking like 2x more expensive.
This is in suburbia where there are lots of competition.
Anti-trust is a funny thing because one hand it is clearly needed for power dynamics, but on the other hand orthodox econ with its increasing price curves underestimates how many sorts of monopolies are in fact "natural".
Put another way, anti-trust looks very different if one doesn't believe competition is a stable outcome in the long term.
In the specific Walmart/Amazon case, I would like to see a nationalized warehouse network run by the postal service. Warehousing-distribution of goods is just "content-addressed post".
Most of the massive companies today have successfully captured an entire network or a huge part of one, Facebook with the social graph, Microsoft with OS, Amazon with AWS and online shopping, Apple with mobile devices. Any antitrust legislation should focus on opening up those networks, but without introducing the inefficiencies that show up any time government takes something over because of misaligned incentives.
Do you have a source for this?
The legislative purpose was to amend the inadequate Clayton Act so as ". .. to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power." [1]
It’s now interpreted based upon cost of manufacturing, so the FTC has this Q&A [2]:
> Q: I operate two stores that sell compact discs. My business is being ruined by giant discount chains that sell their products for less than my wholesale cost. What can I do?
A: Discount chains may be able to buy compact discs at a lower wholesale price because it costs the manufacturer less, on a per-unit basis, to deal with large-volume customers. If so, the manufacturer may have a "cost justification" defense to the differential pricing and the policy would not violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
Note as [1] describes, this act was done in reaction to chains causing much distress. The nature of manufacturing changed, and as the notion from the 60s/70s that consumer pricing was the most important trait in anti-trust law, so enforcement stopped and now we have chains everywhere.
[1] https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti...
[2] https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-a...
EDIT: Although it may well be that they actually didn't: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~twod/oil-ns/articles/research...
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-a...
Amazon is (and even in the past, was basically at a rounding error to zero on margin, since they were plowing so much money into R&D), and Tesla has had the past couple quarters be profitable (though amusingly more on bets on Bitcoin than actual car sales), both essentially creating a new market, and while not actually undercutting the competition. But I thought Uber was 'expecting' to be profitable by the end of the year? While basically making it so cab companies have a hard time competing, since they, you know, obey the rules (albeit ones they created to, themselves, maintain a monopoly), and have to turn a profit.
They have been profitable for almost 1.5 years.
> (though amusingly more on bets on Bitcoin than actual car sales)
That is simply false.
https://www.autoweek.com/news/green-cars/a36266393/tesla-mad...
https://www.motorbiscuit.com/tesla-loses-money-on-every-sing...
Bitcoin was relevant for 1 Quarter. And trading in fuel credits has been a thing in the automotive industry for decades and are simply a normal part of the business.
You might as well point to specific spending and say 'they are only not more profitable because of XY'.
They have a ~20% unit margin excluding credits so clearly they are making a massive amount of money selling cars. If they weren't selling credits they would likely spend differently and still show moderate profitability. Their goal is not maximum profitability but maximum growth while showing consistent profitability.
Because people (for the most part) aren't fools, especially on here.
People see a 600B dollar company and expect it to feel its presence in their lives each and every day.
They expect to use the thing, or their employer to use the thing or their supplier to use the thing on a daily basis like it happens with Exxon, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Salesforce, Oracle, IBM...
They all earned their significance by touching so many lives and making people lives a tad better and less complicated for their users, and the rise to riches of their founders has happened in lockstep or almost lockstep with the changes and the improvement they were making in people's lives.
With Tesla you have a 600B company and Porsches (which are a rarity on their own) are still more common then them on our roads.
People are suspicious about unjustifed enrichment, always been, always will be.
"What have you done for me to deserve that amount of money? What have you done for society to deserve that amount of money?"
Such question will always come up. Musk has been able to answer to such question up to now with:
1) "Give me time!" and
2) "Wait, neat things are a-comin" as well as
3) "Population wide morale boost given by the prospect of amazing future is the real product"
People are more and more asking questions though, and he keeps answering with postponements and future deadlines, while Teslas are still less common than Porsches
https://ir.tesla.com/press-release/tesla-q4-2020-vehicle-pro...
https://newsroom.porsche.com/en/company/annual-sustainabilit...
And Porsche is stagnant compared to Tesla:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/502208/tesla-quarterly-v...
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263854/sales-development...
>With Tesla you have a 600B company and Porsches (which are a rarity on their own) are still more common then them on our roads.
I have seen far more Teslas than Porsches up and down the west coast.
They are private but the approximation can be extracted from Ferrari: 45.5B
Now, where does the remaining 555B come from?
I do not know what Ferrari has to do with Porsche.
If your question is why is the outstanding number of shares of Tesla multiplied by the most recent share price of Tesla equal to $x, then there are multiple answers.
The simplest is because someone decided they wanted to buy the most recent share of Tesla at $y. The slightly more complicated one is that that person decided that buying that share was a better use of their money than whatever other alternative they had. The most complicated answer is going to be that many actors in the market are betting Tesla is going to “grow” by market share or new technologies over some nebulous amount of time, and that given all the investment options, people are allocating that amount to Tesla compared to others.
"Hey chap, what are you doing for the consumer? Meaning those who buy products, not those who buy stocks. What's the concrete quality of life value your company is producing in exchange for all that wealth? How does it compare against Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Daimler, Ford, Porsche?"
And if enough people ask the question and the response is unsatisfactory and there are not enough people to defend him , then he'd be expropriated. You can see pockets of the population which are more and more asking the question. Especially here on HN, one of them was the one which started the discussion. Game recognizes game after all.
And again, just like Tesla market cap is fair game, and Musk wealth is fair game... so is people asking questions and the expropriation if the answer is unsatisfactory.
The only rule to the game is that there are no rules and that everything is fair game... never explain, never complain, for this sort of things have always happened and it goes with the territory really. It already happened with J.D Rockefeller, and nearly happened again with William Henry Gates III.
At least those chaps produced lots quality of life, people went after them due to the hedonistic treadmill effect and the inability of Standard Oil and Microsoft to keep the pace of quality of life improvement after the initial burst which happens when a new tech such as Petroleum oil or the Chip emerges for the first time.
Musk Reeve Lyndon Elon has yet to produce some tangible quality of life which is not to the benefit of Musk Reeve Lyndon Elon, or one of his cousins.
Tesla most successful product is the common stock of the company, it's also the most pitched and promoted by the CEO. Not even close.
But even if it were true and those revenues wouldn't exists and Tesla would have 0 profit, it wouldn't actually change that much about the overall position.
If you want to make the argument that Tesla is not worth 600B then just make that argument. Rather then endlessly trying to make an incredibly marginal argument about Quarter to Quarter possibility.
Literally nobody that owns Tesla stock believes this Quarter profits are what gives the shares the value.
> They all earned their significance by touching so many lives
No they don't. In fact most people don't have a clue about what Salesforce is or how IBM touches their lives.
They are valued because of their financial data, predictions about and predictions about future potential data.
> Musk has been able to answer to such question up to now with:
At this point you are just making things up. Musk has not said any of these things and seemingly isn't very interested in answer that question.
> People are more and more asking questions though, and he keeps answering with postponements and future deadlines, while Teslas are still less common than Porsches
No in fact people are asking less and less questions. The FUD about Tesla was 100x larger a few years ago.
Also, even a 14 old should figure out that a product that has 20-30 year utility will be more common then a competitors product of a company that started less then 20 years ago and didn't even growth to any relevant size until less then 5 years ago.
False, regular people were so confident in IBM that it became a catchphrase in IT departments around the world:
"Nobody ever got fired for buying IBM!"
Meaning the products not the stock.
A scenario where you make 150B based on future hypothetical execution which you can always postpone because your cult followers will always give you more time....that is bound to cause an opposite reaction of equal strenght among those who are not part of the cult and see this very suspicious allocation of wealth playing out.
It's just what it is, people are suspicious about unjustified enrichment, always have and always will be. The owners and founders of the other companies that I mentioned saw their fortune rise in lockstep with the real life relevance of their company. I mean concrete and tangible relevance, quality of life being produced in a way which is proportional to the rise in wealth, not future projections of infinite growth based on up & to the right charts.
Gates first made Windows 3.1 and then became a billionaire, he then made Windows 95 and then became a multibillionaire.
Same goes for Rockefeller, Ellison , Buffett and so forth
> No in fact people are asking less and less questions. The FUD about Tesla was 100x larger a few years ago.
It's not FUD, it's FACTS. As of today Tesla doesn't produce any tangible quality of life, whereas the guy who sued for the title of owner of the company is pocketing quality of life with a shovel, matter of fact he needs thousands of bulldozers to pick up all that quality of life.
People look around, see suspicious stuff and sound the alarm, it's just what people do. That's the reason why people report suspicious activity and denounce cults such as Scientology, NXVIM etc and I am sorry but this is one of those cases. You should not be upset about it, you should ask yourself why so many people are sounding the alarm.
And, as you mention, emission credits are something all competitors can take advantage of. Bitcoin kind of is too, though speculative investments outside of the business the company is in strikes me as just as problematic as debt/equity funding an unprofitable company. But not the point I was trying to make. I actually was putting them in the "reliable profit" category, unlike Uber. Though if being profitable requires governmental incentives and speculation on crypto, maybe not so much.
Uber is maybe the canonical example of what's being discussed.
Their free cash flow didn't really take off until AWS came along. A couple billion a year vs 100 billion in profit for Walmart. They were definitely trading cash for market share. The only reason to do that is if they can later use that market share to make even more cash.
investors will get burned and be more hesitant to pour more gasoline on the fire
that defintely makes sense, but from what i hear we are in a glut of cheap capital in recent times, so this might not be so effective deterrent What company has had long term success with this model
im not sure it needs to be long term sustained, as long as short term damage is severe enough, the player can just harvest the market share from the competition... when it heats back up again, just use that financial might again to clamp things down... it would be a huge deterrent to further investors/entrepreneursThe problem with anti-competitive practices is that they're immune to market forces.
No, they aren't, in general.
They are self-limiting, though, where the actor isn't insulated from idealized market forces by market position. In that case, they are incentivized by the same real market forces which protect them.
Seeing so many bills launched which appear to be so positive yet end up being either irrelevant or perversely damaging, has left me deeply skeptical anytime I hear another legislator announce some bill. The more I agree with the intent, the more I now just fear disappointment. The system is corrupt. Both major parties play these games and there is no longer a party I can rely on to be consistently better. Even when one party appears less bad, it's usually just that they promise things I find more agreeable, yet don't actually deliver when in power.
Maybe by itself, but it could be coupled with other laws designed to knock those incumbents down (e.g. by breaking them up), resulting in a better-structured and fairer market.
IMHO, the biggest tech giant should have their peripheral businesses broken off (e.g. separate Facebook and Instagram), and their main businesses should be further split to create well-matched peer competitors (e.g. Facebook Red, Facebook Blue, and Facebook Green).
Also, China is using this tactic now on critical speciality materials related to the global polymer supply chain.
Predatory pricing is a pricing strategy, using the method of undercutting on a larger scale, where a dominant firm in an industry will deliberately reduce its prices of a product or service to loss-making levels in the short-term.
The aim is that existing or potential competitors within the industry will be forced to leave the market.
It seems start-ups are different. When they do this they are not dominant. They are up and coming and attempting to leverage scale before competitors come and take their lunch (Uber, AB&B). At some point they cross the threshold and do become the dominant player, however, often not yet profitably. So the question is how to gauge that so as not to kill innovation but also to ensure other competitors aren't drowned.
Debt financing to expand is one thing; debt financing to expand when you currently aren't making a profit, and you don't have a business model to make a profit after expansion except "choke out competitors so you have a monopoly and can raise prices to profitable levels" is anti-consumer.
What exactly was the benefit that happened after the break up?
A loss-leader is not necessarily anticompetitive. It’s when you combine it with a dominant market position that the problems emerge.
My understanding is that EU antitrust law is more concerned with preserving competition as a benefit in itself for the consumer, whereas the US doesn’t think lack of competition in itself harms consumers, and requires you to show evidence of other harms before enforcing antitrust laws. The case of predatory pricing is a good example of where the US model tends to fail, and it seems like we are currently re-examining this regulatory philosophy.
I think it's quite widely understood by economists and legislators that it can work; the Wikipedia article up-thread gets fairly technical, e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predatory_pricing#Long_term_co.... You can absolutely loss-lead a competitor out of business if you have a bigger pile of cash, and then raise prices higher.
Perhaps facetiously, I'd suggest the question can be more succinctly answered by saying if it didn't work, then large companies probably wouldn't do it.
Or is the question about whether or not this is a failure of regulatory framework?
I am not sure about that. There's a lot of consternation about this currently, many people think that there are serious long-term harms currently being inflicted. The fact that Biden picked a strident anti-trust advocate like Khan to head up the FTC suggests that there's political support for the case that there's active harm going on right now, as well.
The article provides a few concrete examples, and while I think Amazon is sometimes unfairly treated in the press, this is a case that I find quite troubling:
> In 2009, when Amazon noticed an e-commerce upstart called Quidsi making inroads with a subscription business aimed at parents, Diapers.com, Amazon made a bid to buy it — while launching its own subscription service, Amazon Mom, that offered even steeper discounts. Documents later revealed as part of an antitrust investigation reportedly showed Amazon was willing to lose $200 million in a month on diapers alone to neutralize the threat Quidsi posed. Quidsi gave in and sold to Amazon in 2010.
And on the core point of the article, whether Facebook Bulletin is an example of predatory pricing -- I think that the FTC doesn't understand social networks, made a huge mistake allowing FB to buy Instagram, and the current regulatory framework doesn't work for social networks.
Zuckerberg understands social networks. As he put it:
"There are network effects around social products and a finite number of different social mechanics to invent. Once someone wins at a specific mechanic, it’s difficult for others to supplant them without doing something different.
“One way of looking at this is that what we’re really buying is time. Even if some new competitors springs up, buying Instagram, Path, Foursquare, etc now will give us a year or more to integrate their dynamics before anyone can get close to their scale again. Within that time, if we incorporate the social mechanics they were using, those new products won’t get much traction since we’ll already have their mechanics deployed at scale.”
Through this lens we can analyze Facebook's strategy. Zuckerberg (correctly, I believe) thinks that it needs to win in each of the finite number of "social mechanics" that will be invented in order to maintain dominance over these modes of sharing. If it can't buy competitors in these spaces, it will create clones and run them at a loss to prevent them from taking off. Hence "Bulletin"; copycats are in some sense inevitable, but if FB undercuts Substack on their platform fee and/or overbids for content creator contracts, then they could drive Substack's valuation down and ultimately acquire them, just like Amazon did to Quidsi.
> With his new company and new technology, Dow produced bromine very cheaply, and began selling it in the United States for 36 cents per pound. At the time, the German government supported a bromine cartel, Bromkonvention, which had a near-monopoly on the supply of bromine, which they sold in the US for 49 cents per pound. The Germans had made it clear that they would dump the market with cheap bromine if Dow attempted to sell his product abroad. In 1904 Dow defied the cartel by beginning to export his bromine at its cheaper price to England. A few months later, an angry Bromkonvention representative visited Dow in his office and reminded him to cease exporting his bromine.
> Unafraid, Dow continued exporting to England and Japan. The German cartel retaliated by dumping the US market with bromine at 15 cents a pound in an effort to put him out of business. Unable to compete with this predatory pricing in the U.S., Dow instructed his agents to buy up hundreds of thousands of pounds of the German bromine locally at the low price. The Dow company repackaged the bromine and exported it to Europe, selling it even to German companies at 27 cents a pound. The cartel, having expected Dow to go out of business, was unable to comprehend what was driving the enormous demand for bromine in the U.S., and where all the cheap imported bromine dumping their market was coming from. They suspected their own members of violating their price-fixing agreement and selling in Germany below the cartel's fixed cost. The cartel continued to slash prices on their bromine in the U.S., first to 12 cents a pound, and then to 10.5 cents per pound. The cartel finally caught on to Dow's tactic and realized that they could not keep selling below cost, they then increased their prices worldwide.
Lots of companies run negative cashflows for years before positive. The oil and gas industry get's to categorize drilling expenses "capital expenditure" and run it through their financial statements over many years. Intel builds a factory and does the same thing. If you could (and it's a reasonable position) run direct sales expenses for recurring revenue, and all R&D, through your financials as capital expenditures depreciated over 10-15 years... poof.. many so called Silicon Valley money losers are running positive net income.
Framing the law would be tricky though, as one doesn't want to criminalise high-growth (read: VC-funded) startups.
Taking this ability away without being careful means you'll likely further entrench incumbents at the expense of those new companies.
For example a company like Uber should not be allowed to sell rides for less than what they pay the driver for the ride.
These kinds of laws are fundamentally political in nature, as there is no real 'neutral' ground.
Arkansas https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1993/10/13/w...
Wisconsin https://ilsr.org/walmart-settles-predatory-pricing-charge/
Defining what does and does not constitute predatory behavior is difficult to define clearly and concisely.
One potential mitigation, given the above, would be to routinely break up companies above a certain size. To make it perfectly typical, ordinary, and automatic to do so. To shift the burden of proof from the government needing to establish monopoly status to the giant company needing to demonstrate that the consumer benefits due to economies of scale derived from its size outweigh the negative externalities due to its size and subsequent disproportionate power and influence.
Economies of scale leading to lower consumer prices are a positive good. The negative externalities of huge companies due to their size and outsized power and influence aren't given as much consideration as they are less quantifiable, but they are real and should be taken into account.
Seems like something that would be really easy to take advantage of by buying the material sold cheap and selling it later at a profit.
The one I can find most recently is: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-24/china-sue...
> China filed a lawsuit at the World Trade Organization over Australian anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures on Chinese exports of railway wheels, wind towers and stainless steel sinks, the Ministry of Commerce said Thursday in Beijing. This would be the third recent WTO case between the two countries, after Australia sued over Chinese tariffs on wine and barley.
Prior to that (three weeks ago), it was China dumping steel alleged by Japan.
In section 3.1.4 of the annex, they go into some detail regarding a dumping claim on electric bicycles from China.
[1]: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-de...
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/04/f73/Critical...
I know that there is lots of theory on this, but has any company really ever gotten to this point?
Trade wars between nations happen all the time because of dumping. Timber, aluminum, soybeans, and all kinds of other commodities.
Tech companies have largely gotten a pass on normal business practices and codes of conduct this century because they're shiny and new. But as the industry ages, it will have to learn to work within the boundaries or ordinary civilization.
Dumping, in the context of international trade, is very specifically a price discrimination rather than just an absolute price concept: it's where you export for cheaper than you sell domestically.
Source: https://caniuse.com/usage-table
It is an interesting thought. What if you, as a company, create some open source that eliminates or genuinely competes with other companies?
When a large company has the resources to foot the bill on some project, and just give it away as open source because it is not a core product, is that just as bad as any of the article cases? Some FB, Google, Amazon, MS et al. tool could be someone's entire business.
Is it fair, open source or not, to release software for free, because you make money elsewhere such that you don't care about monetizing it? Is harming a competitors admissible if you literally never intend to directly profit off the endeavor?
Imo, this line of thinking really challenges the point of the article, I don't know where you draw that line. I feel it would be interesting to evaluate a real example, though admittedly I can't think of one on the spot.
While markets generally don't respond healthily to regulations, it really ought to be illegal to offer goods/services for less than cost amortized over a certain period (maybe two years?). This would prevent a lot of monopoly formation, but probably have some unfortunate consequences for investment in markets that have slower yields.
Did we learn the wrong lesson from Amazon?
Also EU talent comes to the US because EU companies just dont value their tech workers as much. EU has to pay tech workers more, or else it will loose in tech, 100%.
Lastly, there's regulation and taxes that makes it hard for businesses to develop.
I worked for a German IT (software) startup in Germany and also in the US, for that startup and before that for another large German company. We found that getting started in Germany was easier compared to the US, where the "winner takes all" mentality was also visible on the side of potential customers, so entrance into the market was hard(er). In Germany getting initial customers for unproven stuff was pretty easy in comparison.
The problem is the switch from initial customers to scale. What made it easy to get started made it hard to achieve scale. When you get to a certain size and "fame" you get a big share of the entire US market. In Germany, but I think I can extrapolate to Europe, from what I experienced, the buyer side does not have a similar tendency to favor large already-winners and get them to become (European) champions.
It's maybe not exactly completely valid examples, but I like them as illustrations: coffee machines or phones. In Germany (never mind Europe) even within the same company I found completely different phone systems and desk phones in different buildings (same with many other small parts). In the US, where I was sent to many big companies, I saw much less variety. Same with coffee machines, where every single department often has a different machine. In the US, more of the same wherever I went.
I'd be interested what you guy think about my coffee machine and phone (and phone system) observations, if you have relevant experience. I saw this as a sign how buyer forces in the different countries (EU as a country) supports more but much smaller variety vs. fewer but large winners, but wasn't sure with my small sample.