List of Printers Which Do or Do Not Display Tracking Dots
eff.org
eff.org
"REMINDER: IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT ALL RECENT COMMERCIAL COLOR LASER PRINTERS PRINT SOME KIND OF FORENSIC TRACKING CODES, NOT NECESSARILY USING YELLOW DOTS. THIS IS TRUE WHETHER OR NOT THOSE CODES ARE VISIBLE TO THE EYE AND WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINTER MODELS ARE LISTED HERE. THIS ALSO INCLUDES THE PRINTERS THAT ARE LISTED HERE AS NOT PRODUCING YELLOW DOTS.
This list is no longer being updated."
I wonder if it would be possible to reverse engineer the firmware, and remove the dot printing, similar to camera hacks that remove feature restrictions.
Seemingly random pixel positions shift, brightness shift, density shift, etc.
These are all hypothetical though. We don't know if these techniques exist in the wild.
Edit: If you want to check your printer then: print something to a piece of really white paper, scan it, and then use a diff tool like in Gimp after resizing it to easily spot the differences. If you are using off white paper you can scan it also before you print on it, and attempt to remove the paper's natural color variations before "diff"ing it with the digital version.
List of Printers Which Do or Do Not Display Tracking Dots - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14501894 - June 2017 (210 comments)
List of Printers Which Do or Do Not Display Tracking Dots - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1408510 - June 2010 (27 comments)
Also, almost all such watermarks would be easily destroyed by bitonalization and despeckling, which is usually done anyway to reduce the file size (e.g. it's part of the default operation of https://github.com/4lex4/scantailor-advanced ). Arguably the same is true for yellow dots if one is leaking scanned printouts, but identifying leakers is not the main purpose of the dots...
If one really wanted to, one could try embedding little holes into certain letters and hope they survive the smoothing algorithms and don't stand out too much. Not sure how successful that would be, though.
As a side effect it might actually be repairable instead of disposable like most commercial printers seem to be.
I wonder if it makes sense to target used copiers as a baseline. They would be built to last and not screw people over on consumables, because the 99.9% business copier market is going to be way more TCO-sensitive than home users. I'm imagining some kit where you'd buy a minivan-sized copier, bolt a Rasbperry Pi onto a custom cable harness, and rip off all the scanning and controls stuff.
On the other hand, I'd suspect many of those devices are sold as having network-printer functionality already, so it may be moot.
If it matters if it's there or not, assume it's there. It's really the only safe option.
To answer the actual question though: how I'd start would be, scan a blank piece of paper. Print something small on it. Scan it again. Look for any differences using digital imaging tools. This should allow you to potentially find invisible differences.
You can also try to tell while it's printing if it does something to parts of the page that you didn't print to. Print at the bottom of the page only. Do the print heads engage anywhere else? Do the same thing with the middle.
There is an advantage if you are testing printers rather than reviewing a single scan as they describe - you can print the same content on two different printers and compare the output
Also, they're so rare now that it would be circumstantial proof of use if a color page lacked tracking dots and readily matched with the printer.
Your best bet for printing something without being caught is a burner printer: pay someone else to buy a printer out-of-state in a store with cash, do your business, and toss it.
It stands to reason that retailers link transaction information--including serial number--to unique individual identifiers. It is possible this data is traded.
It is depressing that people in Western democracies have to worry about authorship identification via printers the same way people in the DDR had to worry about authorship identification via typewriter. But here we are.
These might be informal (e.g., used appliances) or organised (straw purchasers or organised purchasing of burner phones, the latter was a subplot of The Wire.
Of course, utilising previously used devices might itself lead to traces for those printers, though that's probably a relatively low risk: the likelihood of any given printer producing output that's generally identifiable is relatively low.
That said, a fair point and consideration for anyone facing this threat model.
Both avoid store registration though.
So the title is misleading; this list indicates whether dots have been observed, not whether they are present.