[0] What is a repo? - https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus...
[1] Repos in charts - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RRPONTSYD
If inflation happens, the 30-year bond will likely rise with inflation: maybe 3% or 4%. It is better to store your cash today, than to "lock in" to 2.2% APY.
Next month, if inflation starts to kick in, maybe you'll get 3% over the next 30 years instead of 2.2% over the next 30 years.
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Obviously, a 30-year bond is 'different' than cash. However, when you start looking at 6-months, 3-months, 1-month, and overnight lending rates... things look more-and-more like cash.
No one ever holds "cash" per se, its always better to lend it out (even for only 1 day, you wanna have that cash generate more cash). By betting on shorter timescales (ex: 1-month), you're really betting that the longer-time scale bonds (ex: a 30-year) will rise up.
What does this gain them? Are they paid interest?
tl;dw: too much money in the system, big banks don't want the liability, push it to money market funds which use short term treasury while treasury is trying to increase their long term debt and reduce the short term ones. essentially, not as scary as it sounds.
How is holding lots of cash a liability?
Source? Does it? I thought negative interest rates were a thing in the EU but not in the US yet?
So putting the cash to work (in a reverse repo) even at 0.05% allows them to convert it to an asset and generate some return.
People advocating for deflation say they will still spend their money but what they really mean is that they will spend the money on basic living expenses and that is it. They will save the rest. How else would they benefit from deflation? If they spent all their money they wouldn't benefit from deflation as their incomes stagnate or even fall.
Deflation isn't just a fall in prices of goods, it's also a fall in cost of labor because the price of goods is what pays for the labor.
It's pretty easy to illustrate how deflation ruins the profitability of companies. You have a production line that generates $5 million revenue a year. You have fixed costs of $4 million. Your profit is $1 million. As the population gets older, demand for your products goes down by 20%. Now you have $4 million in revenue and your costs went down slightly to $3.5 million. You're making half the profit even though revenue only fell by 20%. Running the production line at below capacity makes the production line increasingly less profitable until it no longer makes sense to run it.
A fixed % reduction in revenue can result in a much higher loss in profitability. Low profitability is a self reinforcing cycle as companies stop borrowing money and the money creation process is being interrupted leading to further deflation that cuts into profitability until you reach the smallest possible economy. That economy would have a GDP significantly smaller than $22 trillion USD but the level of savings didn't change meaningfully.
Despite the illusion of deflation, your money is actually losing value over time as the economy gets smaller because your dollars are just a claim to the output of the economy and if the economy shrinks so does the ability to serve your claims. When people realize that the money they are holding onto wasn't risk free after all it's too late and we get very high inflation or even hyper inflation as people get rid of dollars that have no counter part in reality.
Central banks are basically pawn shops that get to create their own cash to lend out.
In more concrete terms, banks (i.e. members of the Federal Reserve System) keep USD reserves on deposit at the Fed. The only thing they can do with these reserves is loan them overnight to other member banks at a market-determined interest rate--the Federal Funds Rate--which is targeted to a certain range by the Fed's policymaking committee. The Fed also pays interest on these reserves, at two rates: one rate for required reserves, and another for excess reserves. These serve to put a floor under the FFR, since there is no reason to lend reserves at a rate below what you can get by just sitting on them.
Of note is the fact that only Fed member banks have access to this, so other financial institutions must go through the banks when they have excess cash to park somewhere. In essence, the bank can accept overnight cash from non-banks and split the IOER with them. This transaction is consummated through a repurchase agreement (repo) in which the bank sells a "safe" asset to the counterparty with an agreement to buy it back soon thereafter (often overnight, but potentially up to a year later) for a slightly elevated price. The price difference is effectively the counterparty's cut of the IOER accrued during the time that the bank was sitting on the cash. Repo transactions are used for all sorts of short-term funding needs among non-banks, so the overnight rate on high-quality repo is roughly equivalent to the FFR.
It is for this reason that the Fed started its reverse repo operation, whereby it offers basically the same deal that I described above to certain qualified non-bank counterparties, in order to set a floor on overnight repo rates. (You can ignore the "reverse" in the name; it just means that the Fed is the one lending securities in the transaction.) The Fed is extremely wary of negative interest rates and the effect they might have on market behavior, so reverse repo appears to be the preferred method for preventing this.
So what does it mean when usage of this facility skyrockets? Well, it means that banks are not willing to engage in overnight repo at the rate that the Fed is offering, which in turn means that there is suddenly a large imbalance between repo supply (high-quality lendable securities held by banks) and demand (idle cash held by non-banks). As to what that fact means for the near future, opinions may differ sharply.
Banks essentially make money by arbitraging time preferences--they borrow short term (e.g. demand deposits which can be withdrawn at any time) at very low interest rates, and lend long term for much higher rates to risky ventures. They realize a profit by earning a sufficient spread between these rates to offset losses due to counterparty risk (i.e. default) on their lending. One consequence of this model is that a bank may abruptly become insolvent due to short term market conditions, if it cannot roll over its sources of funding. Since financial assets can typically be liquidated quickly (as opposed to, say, a bunch of idle factories owned by a defunct manufacturer) this can lead to systemic instability when an insolvent bank is forced to sell everything and drags down the prices for assets held on other banks' balance sheets.
After the GFC, regulators decided to come up with a more nuanced set of rules about how "healthy" a large bank's balance sheet must be, in order to spot trouble before it exacerbates a liquidity crisis and produces a solvency crisis. A business's leverage ratio is basically capital (equity) divided by assets (or its inverse, depending on your framing). For banks, however, just looking at leverage is not that helpful since the assets being held have very different levels of risk. The new metric is the Supplemental Leverage Ratio (SLR), which includes off-balance sheet exposure. Notably, the bank's reserves at the Fed as well as holdings of US Treasuries are normally included in the denominator (risk assets), but at the start of the pandemic an exemption was put in place so these could be excluded, thereby boosting the leverage ratio and allowing banks to engage in more lending than would otherwise be allowed by the normal SLR calculation.
However, the SLR exemption has now been allowed to expire, and thus banks must tighten up their balance sheets to avoid the severe restrictions of a low SLR. We are now squeezed between the Scylla and Charybdis of financial regulation and monetary stimulus, as the Fed engages in QE to encourage lending towards riskier economic activity while simultaneously imposing leverage constraints to prevent large banks from posing systemic risks. The Fed's reverse repo has become the pressure release valve, as banks are completely hamstrung by their inability to offer negative rates so everyone is now going straight to the Fed for their overnight deposits.
Ironically, this is essentially a (short-term) negation of the Fed's QE activity, as the Fed is simultaneously purchasing assets as well as lending them out on an ongoing basis. In other words, the market is sending a pretty clear signal that QE is really unnecessary at this point in time.
The Fed raises rates in two years, and banks can lend out, but people a) can't afford the monthly payments for current prices at higher interest rates or b) have extra money from QE and don't need debt. Prices fall for things that require debt (cars, houses, college), but go up for things that people can pay for in cash? Less total is lended out due to the falling prices of things and increased interest rates? The whole volume of money moving around the economy decreases.
The Fed can inject more money, but there will already be too much (at large banks and corporations) on the market that is already not allocated effectively.
I guess... I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on what happens next?
This relates to scarcity of short-duration treasuries, it's mostly a scary sounding non-event
But more than likely you need to understand what Reverse Repo is and why it impacts all of us. Here's a great ELI5 On Reddit.
https://www.reddit.com/r/investing/comments/1ixbwf/eli5_repo...
TLDR: More inflation and shakey times ahead.
"as it raised the rate on its overnight Reverse Repo facility from 0% to 0.05%"
Right, the current situation is a money market "plumbing" issue; there are more deposits than banks can handle due to GSIB balance sheet regulations.
Here's some background info: https://fsforum.com/news/fixing-whats-broken-the-gsib-surcha...