A much better account of WW2 in the Pacific is the latest Hardcore History series.
The 6 part "Supernova in the East"
The 6 part "Supernova in the East"
Firebombing and the atomic bomb, while obviously subjects of internal bureaucratic and ideological jockeying, were considered viable primarily because they might shorten a long and very brutal war. Whether they did so or not is debatable, but we'd be on very shaky ground to debate the morality of the attempt from the comfort of posterity.
I don't particularly care for Gladwell's glib nonsense, but I also find fault with the sort of anti-Gladwell Brooklyn-podcaster history (e.g. https://thebaffler.com/latest/narrative-napalm-kulwin) that engages in righteous hand-wringing over supposed American atrocities, without once mentioning any of the context above, nor Japan's atrocities in China in the 1930s leading up to the conflict, nor the very obvious fact that America didn't start the war.
“They only wanted to keep the commies out” is a nicely glib line, but one that glosses over the many, many political considerations that shaped the end of the pacific war and reveals an almost total ignorance of the scholarship on the subject
> The ships' crews were briefed on the nature of the mission and given the opportunity to stay behind if desired; none did.
Your parent post is right, the Japanese military were absolute fanatics.
Edit:
And another point. After the second atomic bombing, military officers attempted to overthrow the Japanese emperor to prevent the surrender. After the second atomic bombing. Let that sink in. If not for the heroic actions of a few Japanese men, they might have succeeded in suppressing the broadcast of the surrender: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ky%C5%ABj%C5%8D_incident
The average Japanese soldier was certainly perceived as a fanatic—due a combination of the evidence at hand at the time, deliberate Japanese policy and propaganda, and also a lot of rather nasty racial narratives—which had a lot to do with why total war was seen as unavoidable.
Another example: 21,000 Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima, but only 216 taken as prisoners. They fought for five weeks until the bitter end. The stubborn defiance demonstrated at the Battle of Iwo Jima and Operation Ten-Go both played a role in the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan.
There is also some evidence that Japanese Army officers created a deliberate culture of extreme violence, ordering ordinary soldiers to commit atrocities, for example, as a way of ruling out surrender as an option. The soldiers would then assume that their treatment by the other side would be identical.
I don't object to the word "fanatic" out of some semantic pedantry or because it's derogatory per se, but I think it robs us of some consideration of the individuals in question, and the various strands of policy, training, propaganda, fear, group pressure, and nostalgic death-worshipping cultural narratives to which they were subjected. The result was certainly the perception of fanaticism, which was intended to demoralize the Allies but backfired terribly, like the decision to prosecute the war itself. (And, as you point out, produced an enormous wastage of lives for no real gain.)
It’s probably foolish to say the Soviets didn’t play a part in the decisions of some of the men involved but I also strongly doubt there’s a compelling argument that it was more influential than what the Americans had just shown themselves capable of doing. The Soviets were a distant threat compared to the Americans continually bombing Japan for 3 months up to that point.
The argument goes that the Emperor's public statements were an effort to save face in front of the country. "No, it wasn't our incompetence that created defeat, they had a Super Weapon!" The Russians could have had ground troops on Japanese territory in days, compared to weeks or months for the Americans.
Thanks for the tip on part VI, I've been eagerly awaiting the release of that.
When someone with a much (much!) bigger following than you parachutes into your field and joins you on your platform (where you are currently covering the same topic), you maybe withhold your most severe criticism of their work.
[1] https://www.google.com/books/edition/Downfall/cJXtAAAAMAAJ?h...
For a general; history of bombing as a tactic, I recommend A History of Bombing by Sven Lindqvist [2]. A short and unusual book in that the author gives instructions on how to read the book in two ways, either chronologically as a history book, or thematically, following the themes and ideas of bombing strategies.
[2]. https://books.google.com/books?id=Wws_HAAACAAJ&newbks=0&hl=e...
Carlin's podcast series are much, much longer than Gladwell's typical podcast treatments though, so at least it lets him include a lot more details.
How so? He seems to be pretty upfront in talking about his sources, quoting from them, and saying repeatedly that he's a journalist and not a historian.
But talking about the people who were in that event, leaning heavily on eyewitness accounts and primary sources, all of that makes the events come alive. I think both are valid and important viewpoints on history. I think history in school would be a lot more interesting if it took a similar approach.
Looking at an historical event at more of a ground-level is nowhere near the same thing as giving outright incorrect information.
That's not to say he never gets anything wrong, he and his researchers aren't steeped in the subject for their whole careers so they'll miss things. He is biased towards the exciting stories and sources, but usually qualifies them with "I'll tell you this fun story but historians disagree about X Y Z because of A".
I'll have to look into the criticisms but my impression just from listening is far better than any other pop history.
But you'll be happy to hear that "sometimes uses outdated sources or oversimplifies stuff" is a common criticism of basically all academic history written outside of the last 20 years, so he is in decent company.