As for tautology, I am claiming that we are attributing intent (a human characteristic) to an object. I think I used the term correctly. That behaviors of objects should not in general be allowed to be equated with human behavior leading to therefore imply human-like intent. I think this is a good idea in science.
In my case I was trying to forward the idea of these two being at a different scale was a differentiator. And that the ants therefore were better candidates for such human like behavior than a plant.
However a studying biology major set me straight on that and introduced what I think is a better criteria for looking at these systems. She said the underpinning work focused on these colonies establishing communication mechanisms. And while anthropomorphizing systems is frowned upon, in this case that might be an overly strict rule. After all both communication and conscious intent are both associated with humans.
In computer science we fearlessly anthropomorphize with our names (actors, agents, managers). Why that should be not be frowned upon, but disallowed for plants therefore seems less and less obvious. So I think my concerns are unwarranted.