>openness at the expense of security
This is a false dilemma. You can have both.
This is a false dilemma. You can have both.
That said, here's a challenge for everybody (including myself) who doesn't like Apple's app store monopoly and side-loading ban:
Apple now requires apps to ask for permission before tracking users. Facebook is _very_ unhappy about that. Imagine what would have happened if alternative app stores were allowed on iOS.
How long would it take before a Facebook/Google sponsored app store would emerge that would carry all ad funded apps? How would you prevent this from happening?
Very simply - enforce security permissions at the OS level, rather than the app store level.
There's no technical reason an app store also has to handle permissions. Leave the discoverability/reviews/curation functionality in the app store, and then just move the app installation functionality into the OS - the app store delivers an app package which the OS accepts, parses the manifest file, prompts user for permissions.
Put APIs behind a sane, capabilities-like model where the OS has to approve everything.
Facebook and Google can make their own app stores - but they still won't be able to spy on you by using privileged APIs without your consent.
(yes, they'll still be able to spy on you using data collection and aggregation - but then Apple's App Store privacy labels becomes a differentiating feature that build user trust and add value to the system, and Apple could add a warning when you install another App Store "privacy labels don't transfer, etc.")
In order to view your facebook timeline and newsfeed, we need access to your address book. Please allow access.
Allow/Deny"
There's no automated capabilities-based OS-level permissions model that can protect against this. Accessing the address book is a legitimate app request - just not for Facebook Inc. in my opinion. But they can gate access to your timeline and friends by demanding it. And I guarantee you that 9/10 smartphone users will grant it. This is why you need curation and app store rules.
Or, Google and Apple tell me to f*cking cut it out and threaten to toss me out of the App Store.
At some point they can just tell you to upload your contacts and drivers license via email or a web form if you want to use the app, WTF do you plan on doing then?
Probably for the best. Social media is poison.
At some point they can just tell you to upload your contacts and drivers license via email or a web form if you want to use the app, WTF do you plan on doing then?
I'm really trying to help you understand why Google and Apple can't rely on OS-level caps and perms. If you don't understand how app devs can cheat you blind regardless of what system-level perms you set, you're clearly not an app dev. I can ID your device and send it encrypted back to my server. I can find your non-standard address book and read it off the user partition by nicely offering you a utility service like backup. It's gzipped and encrypted and sent back to my db and forget about your privacy. I can do a lot more on your ROM'ed android device than you expect, and I can do it all with permissions and a bit of social engineering.
Now just imagine what I can do with your grandma.
No amount of careful OS design could fix that and the two companies running App Stores are unwilling to perform the curation required to fix it.
At this point the only safe curated app store is F-Droid.
I agree with you that permissions and a sandbox that actually works would have to be part of any solution.
But you can rest assured that Facebook wouldn't have made such a fuss if all that was at stake is losing access to IDFA and getting slapped with some unenforceable privacy warning.
What's creating a real problem for Facebook is the enforceable legal obligation that Apple has put in place as a precondition for being allowed on iOS devices at all.
It works exactly because it is not a technology based solution. It has created a choice that we didn't previously have.
So I wonder how we can keep this choice without making Apple this all powerful, rent seeking, patronising overlord that also happens to be an ideal attack vector for censorship happy authoritarian governments all over the world.
Similarly, Apple’s new, much-lauded anti-tracking policy does have a technical component to it, but it would be easy enough for motivated developers to get around it. All that stops them is app review, or more precisely, the threat of app review.
In both cases, I assert that such editorial control cannot survive store diversification. Right now the App Store policies are able to nudge developers towards pro-consumer behaviours. Any substantive amount of store competition flips the script and means stores will compete to appease developers, rather than apply principles in the long term interest of consumers. The nanosecond after Apple is forced to change their product, big names like Google and Facebook will be the first to set up their own shops, specifically to escape Apple’s pro-consumer editorial policies.
Yes, and they can also nudge us to pro-Apple business model behaviours such as direct payment instead of ad funding or force us to mislead consumers into paying higher prices than are available elsewhere.
They can also enforce random cultural biases such as "no porn" and threaten our human and civil rights as a side-effect of banning side-loading. In other cases they help to protect our civil rights.
So that's the dilemma. Apple can make arbitrary rules for arbitrary reasons, sometimes helping us, sometimes hurting us. Taking away Apple's right to make those arbitrary rules would allow other companies to impose their own rules without giving users a real choice.
One way or another, users and small developers are left with very little choice and very little freedom.
iOS malware authors tend to publish their binaries as unsigned dylibs and don't need Apple ID accounts so they aren't even banned when they're caught. instead they convince other developers to ship it in seperate apps (there are various ways, money, convenient APIs, both in the case of Facebook.)
Don’t get me wrong, I’d love to have an iPhone I can install anything on - but there is _no_ way I would ever install anything from the open internet on the same device use to read my email or log in to my bank.
Nor is security just about "can the device be exploited or not?".
What are you trying to explain with these articles? How does the existence of iOS exploits support your thesis that Security and Openness can co-exist?
Hopefully if they lose this case (due to the market reality of being a duopoly) then they will be forced to at least entertain it.
Android's way of handling sideloading or multiple app stores is far from the only way to do it. I'm sure Apple could find a better middle ground between what we have now (incredibly locked down, anti-competitive, with arbitrary rules and Mafia-like enforcement of prices) and a total free-for-all.
Wage fixing aside, and that was years ago, the companies don’t appear to collaborate a lot anymore, much less conspire, other than the payments Google makes to retain its position as the default search engine.
iOS exploits are cheaper than Android exploits because iOS exploits are so plentiful[1][2].
[1] https://www.theregister.com/2020/05/14/zerodium_ios_flaws/
You must realize that this is a meaningless comparison, since F-droid is barely used and not a target comparable to iOS.
I’m quite sure you are aware of the relative sizes of the stores. If that is a mistaken assumption, please say.
On the other hand, Google's and Amazon's app stores are not open source but built for an open source platform, together have far more users than the Apple App Store and far fewer malware installations. Discovery in the Epic case dug up some documents showing that Apple had no dynamic analysis for App Store apps at all. Google and Amazon both run Android VMs in their datacenters to catch fishy behavior that can't be found via static analysis.
So you compared the absolute numbers, knowing it would be misleading.
> Are you aware that the relative amount of malware is is not merely proportionally less?
You wouldn’t expect them to be merely proportionally less.
You’d expect malware authors to put their efforts where the money is.
> People using an iOS device can never be sure they are installing the secure app they wanted to install or some switcheroo.
This is complete bullshit. Apps are signed by developed and by Apple. Were you not aware of that?
> Google's and Amazon's app stores are not open source but built for an open source platform, together have far more users than the Apple App Store and far fewer malware installations.
Doesn’t seem remotely true - here’s just one recent example:
https://threatpost.com/unpatched-android-app-billion-downloa...
And while we are at it, what’s your source for the half billion malware installs you claim on iOS?
I gave the absolute numbers thinking you were smart enough to convert 0 proportionally. I certainly didn't know that it would confuse you.
> You’d expect malware authors to put their efforts where the money is.
That would be a good point if the stores were incompatible. However, it is possible to write an app that you can publish to the Amazon App Store, the Google Play Store, F-Droid, and the hundreds of Chinese app stores. Despite this, F-Droid has had zero infections. Despite the Play Store having far more users than the App Store, it has infected far fewer users.
> This is complete bullshit. Apps are signed by developed and by Apple. Were you not aware of that?
You are clearly not aware that the package submitted to Apple is signed by the the developer, and the package delivered to the user is signed only by Apple. Apple (or China) determines what app actually gets to the device. https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/12880
> Doesn’t seem remotely true - here’s just one recent example:
Your example is a vulnerability in an app that can be exploited to access that app's data. It is not a malware app, and there is no evidence that any users had malware that attacked that app, let alone that any such malware was being distributed by any of the stores. By that standard, 100% of iOS users are exploited because Safari is so bugridden.
Half billion was an external estimate for xcodeghost. Apple's internal estimate pegged the number of users infected by just half of the identified malware apps at 125 million. https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bbmz/the-fortnite-trial-is...
It doesn’t matter. Your claim: “Google's and Amazon's app stores are not open source but built for an open source platform, together have far more users than the Apple App Store and far fewer malware installations.” is still bullshit.
https://www.pandasecurity.com/en/mediacenter/mobile-security...
> I gave the absolute numbers thinking you were smart enough to convert 0 proportionally.
We’ve established that this the targets are not proportionally attractive.
> I certainly didn't know that it would confuse you.
This is a public conversation, I’m sure you didn’t expect It would confuse me, but it would obviously mislead casual readers. Have you considered this?
> That would be a good point if the stores were incompatible. However, it is possible to write an app that you can publish to the Amazon App Store, the Google Play Store, F-Droid, and the hundreds of Chinese app stores. Despite this, F-Droid has had zero infections.
That still doesn’t mean it’s worth targeting f-droid. Unless you have numbers on attempted malware that has been blocked from the f-droid store, and similar numbers for the other Android stores, this like of reasoning is complete bullshit.
> Despite the Play Store having far more users than the App Store, it has infected far fewer users.
How do you know?
>> This is complete bullshit. Apps are signed by developed and by Apple. Were you not aware of that?
>> You are clearly not aware that the package submitted to Apple is signed by the the developer, and the package delivered to the user is signed only by Apple.
What makes you think I’m not aware of this?
> Apple (or China)
Are you suggesting that China gets to re-sign software going to devices either a) inside and/or b) outside China?
Everyone knows that all governments can legally require Apple to block apps. Unless you are claiming that China can do more than this, this is another obviously misleading statement.
> determines what app actually gets to the device. https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/12880
Yes, Apple determines what app gets to the device. Who in the world would think otherwise? - it’s part of their marketing for the iPhone.
> Yes, Apple determines what app gets to the device. Who in the world would think otherwise? - it’s part of their marketing for the iPhone.
You used to think otherwise. You claimed that the package sent to the device was signed by the developer. It is not. Apple (or China) works as a MITM who can modify the package however they like with no way for the user to verify that malware hasn't been inserted. F-Droid allows the user to verify that the package contents hash the same as what they would build locally.
> Are you suggesting that China gets to re-sign software going to devices either a) inside and/or b) outside China?
Yes. Because the App Store has this MITM vulnerability and China gets to MITM all US services (with blessed MITM status for iCloud that even defeats Apple's "E2E" encryption for their other services), they can replace the Signal package with a compromised one.
>> Despite the Play Store having far more users than the App Store, it has infected far fewer users.
> How do you know?
Unlike Apple; F-Droid, Google, and Amazon allow security researchers to analyze apps on their respective stores instead of blocking their access. Lower case count despite higher test rate isn't a guarantee that fewer people have been infected, but it is strong evidence for that conclusion.
False. If I claimed that, you’d be able to quote me.
> … (or China) works as a MITM who can modify the package however they like
Seems like this is total bullshit. Do you have any evidence that China can modify the packages?
> Are you suggesting that China gets to re-sign software going to devices either a) inside and/or b) outside China? Yes. Because the App Store has this MITM vulnerability and China gets to MITM all US services (with blessed MITM status for iCloud that even defeats Apple's "E2E" encryption for their other services), they can replace the Signal package with a compromised one.
The seems like bullshit. There is no indication of an MITM vulnerability between the developers and Apple, nor is there one between Apple and users. China cannot MITM packages based on what you have said so far.
Yes, Apple can change package contents. Numerous App Store features make use of this to deliver partial packages and device specific binaries.
Nothing about this mechanism gives China an MITM.
>> Despite the Play Store having far more users than the App Store, it has infected far fewer users. > How do you know? Unlike Apple; F-Droid, Google, and Amazon allow security researchers to analyze apps on their respective stores instead of blocking their access. Lower case count despite higher test rate isn't a guarantee that fewer people have been infected, but it is strong evidence for that conclusion.
So you misled people by claiming this as fact, when it’s actually just speculation.
How do you know the case count is lower, and the test rate is higher?
Your claim about aggregate Android malware numbers being lower than iOS was false: https://www.pandasecurity.com/en/mediacenter/mobile-security...
Here you go:
>> People using an iOS device can never be sure they are installing the secure app they wanted to install or some switcheroo.
>This is complete bullshit. Apps are signed by developed and by Apple. Were you not aware of that?
If you are now going to claim that when you said apps were signed by the developer, you didn't mean the apps sent to the device, that quoted response makes no sense in that context. I interpreted your response as charitably as possible.
> Seems like this is total bullshit. Do you have any evidence that China can modify the packages?
I explained how app distribution works and assumed you could work it out. It looks like my assumption was mistaken, so here it is step by step: 1. The package sent to the device is not signed by the developer but by Apple or China. https://www.quora.com/Is-iMessage-encrypted-in-China 2. China's firewall sits between users and servers outside of China. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Firewall 3. The Great Firewall routes the app store download request to a proxy that injects malware and resigns the package with their own key, which is trusted by the device.
Interesting that you seem unworried that Apple's own privileged MITM position allows it to insert malware, which governments can request.
> There is no indication of an MITM vulnerability between the developers and Apple, nor is there one between Apple and users.
Once again, the biggest MITM is between the developer and users, which F-Droid's reproducible builds prevent.
> Your claim about aggregate Android malware numbers being lower than iOS was false:
My claim was about malware from the Play Store and the Amazon App Store.
Please stop calling claims bullshit (you've done this five times now) just because you are unwilling to follow the logic and want me to spell it out. If you need help understanding an argument, just ask for it.
It makes perfect sense. The apps are signed by the developer and uploaded to Apple. Apple signs them for delivery to the device. Importantly. Both paths are protected.
Nothing I said before or after contradicts that.
> I interpreted your response as charitably as possible.
No. You misrepresented my response.
> Seems like this is total bullshit. Do you have any evidence that China can modify the packages?
> 1. The package sent to the device is not signed by the developer but by Apple or China.
This is a false statement. There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.
https://www.quora.com/Is-iMessage-encrypted-in-China 2. China's firewall sits between users and servers outside of China. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Firewall
3. The Great Firewall routes the app store download request to a proxy that injects malware and resigns the package with their own key, which is trusted by the device.
None of the links you have supplied substantiate the claim that iOS devices trust a key from the great firewall. If you have a link that does, I would be interested to see one, otherwise I think we can safely call this a lie. You know it’s not true, but you are saying it anyway.
> Interesting that you seem unworried that Apple's own privileged MITM position allows it to insert malware, which governments can request.
I’m not unconcerned about that, but your claim is that China can sign iOS packages without Apple’s knowledge, which is a very different issue.
>> Your claim about aggregate Android malware numbers being lower than iOS was false:
> My claim was about malware from the Play Store and the Amazon App Store.
Yes and it is false.
> Please stop calling claims bullshit (you've done this five times now) just because you are unwilling to follow the logic and want me to spell it out. If you need help understanding an argument, just ask for it.
I will continue to call out lies and bullshit when it’s clear that is what is being presented. You have so far not substantiated the facts you have been challenged on, and your arguments rely on claims which you can’t support.
It makes perfect sense. The apps are signed by the developer and uploaded to Apple. Apple signs them for delivery to the device. Importantly. Both paths are protected.
Nothing I said before or after contradicts that.
> I interpreted your response as charitably as possible.
No. You misrepresented my response.
> Seems like this is total bullshit. Do you have any evidence that China can modify the packages?
> 1. The package sent to the device is not signed by the developer but by Apple or China.
This is a false statement. There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.
https://www.quora.com/Is-iMessage-encrypted-in-China 2. China's firewall sits between users and servers outside of China. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Firewall
3. The Great Firewall routes the app store download request to a proxy that injects malware and resigns the package with their own key, which is trusted by the device.
None of the links you have supplied substantiate the claim that iOS devices trust a key from the great firewall. If you have a link that does, I would be interested to see one, otherwise I think we can safely call this a lie. You know there is no evidence for it, but you are claiming it anyway.
> Interesting that you seem unworried that Apple's own privileged MITM position allows it to insert malware, which governments can request.
I’m not unconcerned about that, but your claim is that China can sign iOS packages without Apple’s knowledge, which is a very different issue.
>> Your claim about aggregate Android malware numbers being lower than iOS was false:
> My claim was about malware from the Play Store and the Amazon App Store.
Yes and it is false.
> Please stop calling claims bullshit (you've done this five times now) just because you are unwilling to follow the logic and want me to spell it out. If you need help understanding an argument, just ask for it.
I will continue to call out lies and bullshit when it’s clear that is what is being presented. You have so far not substantiated the facts you have been challenged on, and your arguments rely on claims which you can’t support.
It makes perfect sense. The apps are signed by the developer and uploaded to Apple. Apple signs them for delivery to the device. Importantly. Both paths are protected.
Nothing I said before or after contradicts that.
> I interpreted your response as charitably as possible.
No. You read something into it that simply isn’t there.
> Seems like this is total bullshit. Do you have any evidence that China can modify the packages?
> 1. The package sent to the device is not signed by the developer but by Apple or China.
This is a false statement. There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.
> https://www.quora.com/Is-iMessage-encrypted-in-China 2. China's firewall sits between users and servers outside of China. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Firewall
> 3. The Great Firewall routes the app store download request to a proxy that injects malware and resigns the package with their own key, which is trusted by the device.
None of the links you have supplied substantiate the claim that iOS devices trust a key from the great firewall.
If you have a link that does, I would be interested to see one, otherwise I think we can safely assume for now that this a lie. You know there is no evidence for it, but you are claiming it anyway.
> Interesting that you seem unworried that Apple's own privileged MITM position allows it to insert malware, which governments can request.
I’m not unconcerned about that, but your claim is that China can sign iOS packages without Apple’s knowledge, which is a very different issue.
>> Your claim about aggregate Android malware numbers being lower than iOS was false:
> My claim was about malware from the Play Store and the Amazon App Store.
Yes and it is false.
> Please stop calling claims bullshit (you've done this five times now) just because you are unwilling to follow the logic
I have followed the logic. It relies on unsupported claims, some of which appear may be outright lies. I think that is bullshit.
To repeat myself, not in the context of what you replied to. If you understood that it works the way you now clearly understand it to, you would immediately see that it does not solve the problem you claimed it did.
> This is a false statement. There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.
I provided link from an Apple employee saying as much.
> None of the links you have supplied substantiate the claim that iOS devices trust a key from the great firewall.
The quora link says iOS devices trust a key from the Chinese government. Where that key exists is irrelevant. What I showed is that your claim that China cannot MITM iOS packages is false.
> your claim is that China can sign iOS packages without Apple’s knowledge, which is a very different issue.
I showed how they can, and you have not disputed it. You only said that I haven't given evidence that they are, which I never claimed.
> I’m not unconcerned about that
Then your statement about app signing makes even less sense in the context of the user not knowing if they are installing the secure app they wanted to install. It can only make sense if you trust Apple completely (which I found unlikely for anybody to trust any intermediary completely) or if you erroneously thought that the package sent the device was signed by the developer (which seemed to me comparatively more likely). Now you've admitted that the first case isn't true, which only leaves the second case (that I had assumed) or opens a third case, which is that you are arguing in bad faith, knowing that what I said is true but calling it bullshit anyway.
> Yes and it is false.
You say this on the basis of zero evidence. I gave you over a hundred million infections on the App Store from xcodeghost alone that Apple did not have the ability to scan for.
> It relies on unsupported claims, some of which appear may be outright lies.
If that is what you believe, then point them out. You have repeatedly failed to do so, so perhaps you should reconsider whether I am bullshitting.
> To repeat myself, not in the context of what you replied to. If you understood that it works the way you now clearly understand it to, you would immediately see that it does not solve the problem you claimed it did.
It solves the problem of China MITMimg iOS packages. That is the context.
>> This is a false statement. There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.
> I provided link from an Apple employee saying as much.
That’s a lie. They don’t say anything of the kind. If they did you’d be able to quote them
> None of the links you have supplied substantiate the claim that iOS devices trust a key from the great firewall.
> The quora link says iOS devices trust a key from the Chinese government.
A browser certificate. This has nothing to do with packages from the iOS App Store. I believe you understand the difference.
> Where that key exists is irrelevant.
It is relevant. The Chinese key iOS devices trust doesn’t enable them to MITM App Store packages..
> What I showed is that your claim that China cannot MITM iOS packages is false.
You haven’t shown this. It’s seems like just a lie.
You have pointed to a key which can’t sign packages, and a conversation where nobody says anything indicating that China can MITM packages.
Neither of these are evidence they can do this. If you have real evidence feel free to present it.
>> your claim is that China can sign iOS packages without Apple’s knowledge, which is a very different issue.
> I showed how they can, and you have not disputed it.
You have claimed China can MITM iOS packages but you have provided no evidence to support this claim. The links you provided don’t support the claim. It looks like you’re just lying.
> You only said that I haven't given evidence that they are, which I never claimed.
Also false. You said the link to the Apple employee’s statements supported this claim.
Me: “There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.” You: “I provided link from an Apple employee saying as much.”
Lie. Here is the context to which you replied that packages are signed by Apple and the developer: "People using an iOS device can never be sure they are installing the secure app they wanted to install or some switcheroo."
As you've admitted, Apple can do the switcheroo.
> They don’t say anything of the kind.
Lie. Here's what they said:
"All of the major iPhone vendors in China do this by using an enterprise enrollment certificate to adda new certificate to the code signing certificate chain of trust.
"And then when they repackage the government malware, they do so by signing it with the enterprise signing certificate, which allows them to bypass the Apple signing certificate for code execution on the device."
> A browser certificate
Lie. See above.
>> Where that key exists is irrelevant.
> It is relevant.
Then why don't you explain why where the keys are is relevant to whether something is possible instead of ignoring where the keys are and saying the following?
> The Chinese key iOS devices trust doesn’t enable them to MITM App Store packages..
Lie. See above.
> You have pointed to a key which can’t sign packages
Lie. See above.
> You have claimed China can MITM iOS packages but you have provided no evidence to support this claim.
Lie. See above together with my description of how to use that key together with the Great Firewall and a proxy.
> Also false. You said the link to the Apple employee’s statements supported this claim.
Lie. I used the Apple employee's statements to say that they can, not that they do. Quote: "they can [emphasis added] replace the Signal package with a compromised one."
> Me: “There is literally no evidence anywhere to support the idea that China is signing iOS packages delivered to devices.” You: “I provided link from an Apple employee saying as much.”
I sort of understand how you would be confused. The statement I was responding to here was not about China MITMing the App Store but about China signing iOS packages delivered to devices. The quote above shows that they do.
All consumers of computing devices place trust the manufacturer. Even if you use reproducible builds, they can be patched at execution time by an attacker who had access to the device.
So yes, I assume the customer trusts the manufacturer - not completely, but sufficiently.
>> The Chinese key iOS devices trust doesn’t enable them to MITM App Store packages..
> Lie. See above.
> China MITMing the App Store but about China signing iOS packages delivered to devices. The quote above shows that they do.
So you have been lying all along about China MITMing the App Store.
That was never true, and your links didn’t substantiate it.
Delivering government software via enterprise distribution has literally nothing to do with any kind of MITM attack at.
You repeatedly claimed that China can MITM the App Store, which has always been a lie.
You claimed that users cannot tell whether China has performed a ‘switcheroo’. That is also a lie.
We know Apple can deliver whatever they like from the store. We also know that China can install software using an enterprise certificate.
Neither of these are surprises, and neither constitute an MITM or a switcheroo.
Your entire goal here has been to lie or mislead.
Here’s the obvious example:
> b) outside China? Yes. Because the App Store has this MITM vulnerability and China gets to MITM all US services (with blessed MITM status for iCloud that even defeats Apple's "E2E" encryption for their other services), they can replace the Signal package with a compromised one.
You outright lied here that China can replace signal on US devices, and nothing you have said so far changes this.
Finally, a reasonable argument after repeated intentional strawmanning and name-calling. The difference is that an iPhone is only allowed to get apps from the App Store, which is impossible to reach except MITMed via the great firewall. Android devices can get apps from F-Droid and its mirrors, so you can get an Android device not compromised by China and still use it in China with verifiable builds.
Additionally, without the app store MITM, you only have to trust the vendor at the time of purchase. With the MITM, you must also trust that the vendor won't become malicious in the future.
> So you have been lying all along about China MITMing the App Store.
No, I never said they are, which I don't have any evidence for. I said they can, and I have repeatedly made this distinction clear, so you are deliberately lying that I said otherwise.
> You repeatedly claimed that China can MITM the App Store, which has always been a lie.
I showed you how they can, and you have not shown why they can't.
> You outright lied here that China can replace signal on US devices, and nothing you have said so far changes this.
Lie. I never said they can do this on US devices, only that Apple can.
Apple does all that for you. That's why they win. "General purpose computing" is for nerds -- ordinary people would much rather have an iPhone.