One position I've heard is that cultural concepts that are used in legislation or contracts ("reasonable effort", "reasonably foreseeable", "undue risk") may always be assessed subjectively by humans, but that the logical structure of rules and conditions ("any of the following", "none of the following", "two or more of the following") may not be.
There are lots of drafting disputes about things where someone wrote something like
> a and b or c
leading lawyers to argue about whether this should be read as ((a and b) or c) or (a and (b or c)).
There's no reason that this kind of ambiguity should have been permitted to exist in the first place.
I think my understanding of this is related to my understanding of Lojban, which tries to avoid all syntactic ambiguities but explicitly says that it's a non-goal to avoid ambiguities related to the cultural meaning of words and concepts. Like if you say something is "medieval" or "fun" or "convenient" or "beautiful" or "fair" or "postmodern", Lojban doesn't try to make the truth-conditions for your statement objective with regard to what these concepts do or don't refer to. But to the extent that that's agreed between two people, they should then agree on what a particular sentence using these concepts means or doesn't mean.
Though I do envision that when people use better tools for avoiding parsing ambiguities in legal texts, they will still argue (and there will be many legal philosophers insisting) that they should still be permitted to argue that something was still a drafting error, because the (only permitted) interpretation under the drafting formalism is manifestly unfair or unreasonable and could not have captured their true intention.