Midair Collision over Denver
avherald.com
avherald.com
From:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cirrus_Airframe_Parachute_Sy...
The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) is a whole-plane ballistic parachute recovery system designed specifically for Cirrus Aircraft's line of general aviation light aircraft including the SR20, SR22 and SF50. The design became the first of its kind to become certified with the FAA, achieving certification in October 1998, and as of 2014 was the only aircraft ballistic parachute used as standard equipment by an aviation company.
This mostly clears it up.
They changed this because it turns out that the same phenomenon that leads to private pilots taking undue risks in the rest of flight ("Get-there-itis") also makes them reluctant to pull the chute even when it's clearly their best option. Pilots who clearly couldn't reach a safe landing spot, yet had working CAPS would dig themselves (and their passengers) a grave rather than just pull the handle. So teaching them to start by assuming they'll pull the chute and only then considering whether there are other options reduces the fatality rate.
> Four CAPS deployments occurred successfully at higher speeds, 168, 171, 187 and 190 knots indicated airspeed, and one deployment failed at an airspeed estimated at over 300 knots airspeed.
* https://www.cirruspilots.org/Safety/What-Is-CAPS
Anything lower than that will forward-motion stop the aircraft. AFAICT, there is a need for 2000' (650m) of altitude above the ground for the system to deploy in time to be useful (slow descent).
Official Cirrus guidelines include verbalizing "CAPS is available" when crossing 600ft AGL during climb-out.
Source: I fly an SR22.
Yes you're gliding right now, but whilst that's better than just falling uncontrolled from the sky it's no guarantee you'll walk away.
Now if you're gliding... right towards a perfectly nice runway you were already lined up on then CAPS is likely the wrong call, not least because you may already be too low. But if you're just in the middle of nowhere then CAPS is much safer than hoping that's just a big empty grassy meadow you see ahead and doesn't have a thin, wheel-snagging ditch, or a barbed wire fence, or a dozen other obstacles that you wouldn't see until it's too late.
Even for a water landing, if you have never practised there are a lot of ways for putting a conventional plane down in the water to go badly, including flipping or breaking up the plane, whereas CAPS should just plonk you in the water, relatively gently, right side up, not great news, but very survivable.
This is a good overview on the survivability of water landings: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LwGYBBhTss. I haven't watched the video recently but I think even a 172 that cartwheels after landing has a pretty good survivability rate, something like 90%. Parachute is a nice to have, of course.
One downside of the systems is that they typically have a maximum lifespan of 10 years while airframes last 50+ years. So every 10 years there is a large maintenance cost to replace/renew the parachute system. Much less an issue for a $ 800k Cirrus SR22 (like the one in this incident) than for a $ 30k old Cessna.
I'm reminded of a 2011 airshow crash of a Red Arrows T1 jet which, at least according to this account, [0] may have involved the pilot heroically making the decision not to personally eject, but to crash the aircraft away from crowded areas, perishing as a result. Of course, the aircraft itself had no parachute, unlike a Cirrus. (Also, I'm uncertain if that account of the incident is consistent with later investigation. The relevant quote is not from any investigation, but from a politician.)
It’s possible that the Cirrus could hurt or kill someone but I don’t think it’s happened in the about 100 parachute activations so far.
Of course there is, that's the reason I emphasised it.
> I don’t think it’s happened in the about 100 parachute activations so far
That's good, although there could be a selection effect there: pilots might be more hesitant to deploy it if they think the falling aircraft could do harm.
A lot less than from a plane traveling at terminal velocity!
Sometimes you succeed in [save your life] and are still on-track / on-piste pointing in the right direction and are back to [win the race] in the space of a few seconds. Other times, you are on the sidelines, and hopefully not on the way to the field clinic.
But the switch in perspective must fully committed and absolutely not include [save the equipment], which is replaceable, even custom one-off gear. Anything else is over-constraining the problem and inviting disaster.
I remember an incident from one of my auto racing instructors. In a race, coming into a downhill turn (Diving turn at Lime Rock) at triple-digit mph, he found that he had no brakes. So he very rapidly pushed in the clutch, redlined the engine, grabbed 2nd gear, and popped the clutch with some steering input. The result was that he spun the car with enough control to crash into the barriers with the back end first. It was the end of that Porsche, but it would have been anyway, and he walked away.
Or, another guy I knew who was at logging school, 150' up pruning in a pine tree, realized that it was getting way out of balance and was about to get violent. He cut to just the right point, then threw the multi-$1000 chainsaw as far as he could away from him, and hung on for life to his harness and tree strap as the tree whipped back and forth until the oscillations dampened. He got kind of beat up, but climbed down and walked away.
It's key to be ready to completely change your mindset in a flash.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cirrus_Airframe_Parachute_Syst...
I think it’s great that the system exists, it has undoubtedly saved lives, but unless Cirrus crashes are overwhelmingly fatal compared to other airplanes, it’s overstating “fatal accidents turned into non-fatal accidents” by likely a factor of ~3 and number of fatalities avoided by ~4.
This type of mishap is probably the best scenario for a chute, though. I have no illusions that following a mid-air that I am still a strong favorite to bring my non-chute airplane to earth without fatalities. (The stats say I’m about a 60:40 favorite to do so.)
CAPS saves lives. CAPS has not saved the lives of every person who survived a CAPS deployment, because most of those would have survived anyway. In most off-airport arrival scenarios, I’d be wishing to have a chute.
* - One of my instructors was in command for CAPS Event #46
IIRC, Cirrus is now encouraging pilots to use CAPS in any engine failure with sufficient altitude for it to work, on account of the number of such accidents, in CAPS-equipped aircraft, where the pilot chose not to use it, and someone aboard was killed or seriously injured. This will presumably further muddy the used/saved ratio, while probably increasing the total number of saved.
In a collision situation, at least one as violent as this one, you can't be sure whether some vital control or structure has been damaged to the point where it is about to fail, so using a parachute of any sort, where feasible, seems to be the rational choice.
Quite by accident, I came across this pucker-inducing article a couple of days ago, where thre's little doubt that bailing out, if it were an option, would have been the right thing to do, even though this flight ended safely in this case.
https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/student-flight-control-j...
(On second thoughts, if the pilot had a parachute, he could have attempted to free up the controls without making his situation any worse.)
Landing fees are quite reasonable. Off peak, the landing fee would be $25 now. On peak, it would be $125.
https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/airports/pdfs/scheduleofc...
Note this was a midair with a much larger, faster aircraft and at an unfavorable aspect. The empennage was sliced nearly entirely through by the other aircraft's propeller and the elevator/horizontal stabilizer is deflected into a position commanding a steep dive.
The SR-22 can recover from a spin, using conventional anti-spin control inputs. EASA testing showed that.
It is true that Cirrus secured an “equivalent level of safety” ruling during FAA certification and so did not demonstrate conforming spin recovery in flight testing here, but it can recover.
"An aircraft is most vulnerable during take-off and landing because it is closer to the ground (its biggest obstacle), and is travelling at low speeds and therefore is harder to manoeuvre. According to statistics from Boeing, almost three-quarters of deaths from plane crashes between 2005 and 2014 occurred during these phases of flight. But this is the time when a detachable cabin would least likely be successful at saving lives. Being closer to the ground would give the pilot much less opportunity to jettison the cabin following an incident and if it were detached it could well land in a built-up area."
https://theconversation.com/why-a-detachable-cabin-probably-...
> As of 1 May 2021, CAPS had been activated 122 times, 101 of which saw successful parachute deployment. In those successful deployments, there were 207 survivors and 1 fatality. No fatalities had occurred when the parachute was deployed within the certified speed and altitude parameters
The parachute has never "failed" in any engineering sense. The stat is taking into account all deployments, including those well outside of the deployment envelope, such as not enough altitude or too much velocity. No one can expect any parachute to deploy if you're too close to the ground.
Within the envelope of deployment, the statistic says it has a 100% success rate.
These parachutes have been an absolute game-changer for small aircraft pilot survival. It's unlikely this kind of collision would have been survivable for the small-plane pilot 25 years ago.
He sold his plane about 15 years ago (to a group of owners, one of which was a priest, I'm sure there's a joke in there). A few of winters later, he was called out to Romeo Airport; the pilot flying the plane that was formerly his had crashed the aircraft a few miles short of the runway in bad weather[1]. He was traveling with his daughter, a friend and, I think, his wife. He died, but his daughter was able to get free and make her way to a nearby farm to call for help. Looking at the plane, the fact that anyone survived at all let alone walked to a nearby house with minor injuries is pretty miraculous.
It's hard to impress upon folks who have never been in a small plane like that just how ... yeah ... how much it feels like you're hanging onto a kite. I have no idea the kinds of structural technologies are involved in the aircraft but I know his plane was made in the 70s and was light enough that he only had a pole which attached to the front landing gear to pull it out of the hangar. The weight is so critical that the 7-seat plane can realistically only seat 4-5 adults. I remember being shocked that they had to weigh the paint they applied when he had the plane re-painted.
[0] I'll spare the details as I have left many comments in the past about his experiences.
[1] https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/43894 - "Pilot Error"; I recall my Dad saying "all plane crashes are pilot error"
I think you overlooked an important factor there. The plane was indeed designed to realistically seat 7 adults.
The issue is that in the 50 years since the plane was originally designed, the average weight of adults (in the US) increased by about 18% [0] and the average adult woman today weighs as much as the average adult man in the 1960s.
[0] https://www.newsmax.com/US/average-weight-man-woman-obese/20...
It used to be more common to have a flexible combination of seats/baggage/fuel. But pilots flip out (or crash) if they can't fill the tanks, every seat and the baggage compartment and come in under gross. So the same airplanes often don't have the "bonus seats" they used to.
Numbers from Wikipedia, from the 1972 PA-32 owners handbook:
3,400 lb gross - 1,788 empty - (4 hours * 15gph * 6 lbs) / 7 passengers = 178 lbs per passenger. The average adult in the 70s was about 160. So you're not going across the country, but you could safely do a day trip with a 90 minute flight each way.
Now the average adult is 180. And they're a little taller than they were in the 70s, but not much. So every passenger has an extra 20 pounds horizontally. So in 2021, you'd be just over gross except that the people can't actually fit in the airplane.
Here's a Piper ad from 1966 with seven adults and their bags: https://i.imgur.com/fWyArRH.png
"The SIX will carry up to seven adults and their luggage - in real comfort"
And here's an ad from 1969 with six adults in it (and some rifles. a different time!) https://i.imgur.com/kGMrENf.png
I can't read into the minds of the engineers who made the airplane. Maybe it's true "I don't think they even imagined 6 adults as a typical cabin load". But we can see that the marketing department at least tried to make people think it was.
Some planes have more margin: the Cessna 182 for example is a four-seater and can carry full fuel plus 800 lbs, so you really can load it up with four people plus bags and still go somewhere.
But all planes will be close to their operating limits when fully loaded. Even a jetliner will typically be very close to its operating limits on takeoff and pilots have to pay very close attention to this. If you think about it, this has to be the case. If it weren't, the plane would have been over-designed and much more expensive than it has to be, and so it would lose to the competition.
Even with FAA standard people it would be small for 7.
I recall him saying 7, but that was a few decades ago (the plane was destroyed by its new owners in 2006, and I hadn't flown in it since a few years prior to that). :)
I think the "some adults, some kids" is more significant - similar to back seats in many small cars - you can put 3 passengers in there, but 3 adults won't be happy.
My Dad almost always flew alone. So much so that when the plane was packed and we were making an approach into the Sandusky, OH airport, we had a sudden "dip" on the way down that everyone noticed (we were headed to Cedar Pointe, so it was preparation, I guess). My Dad explained that he wasn't used to landing with so much weight and hadn't adjusted the trim correctly[0].
[0] If it wasn't abundantly clear, all of my flying experience ended at about age 17, which was a while ago, and I was never a pilot, so to the extent that I get any of this wrong -- that's why :)
I have a couple of friends that each crash landed at least twice in the past 10-15 years; one was in the hospital once, for the rest of the incidents they simply walked. In two cases it was engine failure, in one a stuck landing gear and the hospital one had an external factor.
Looks like he tried to land in bad weather, descended before he could see the runway, and clipped some trees. Weather is an alarmingly common cause of accidents in general aviation.
Or—to rewind the causal chain just a little further—pilot hubris, impatience and/or ignorance, which leads to weather being a factor in the first place. The choice to wing it and hope bad weather in the area will not affect you is the pilot’s.
From my shallow study of fatal and non-fatal GA accidents, there is hardly ever such a combination of life-or-death urgency and absence of alternative transportation options besides flying that could justify risking one’s own life and lives of one’s passengers by wilfully or accidentally ignoring weather forecast, and yet too often that appears to be the case.
It’s not a pleasure to talk about incidents like that, but “all plane crashes are pilot error” strikes me as a decent framing of the situation to adopt as a pilot when considering a risky flight.
> Or—to rewind the causal chain just a little further--pilot hubris, impatience and/or ignorance, which leads to weather being a factor in the first place. The choice to wing it and hope bad weather in the area will not affect you is the pilot’s.
But he really meant everything is the pilots fault. I heard him explaining to someone that there's ultimately no other valid excuse. When his engine failed over Lake Michigan, it was pilot error because he didn't have the necessary instruments to detect a common engine condition that would have prevented him from taking off had he known it was happening.
I think it's a little extreme, but frankly, I want the person flying my plane to have that attitude for themselves!
I think my Dad applied that to small plane/private pilots, rather than commercial, as well. While it might make someone with that absolutest thinking feel good to say "The pilot should have known someone's phone battery was nearing explosion before it blew a hole in the aircraft and required an emergency landing", I think my Dad would land somewhere in the territory of "If the pilot had a reasonable way of preventing the problem and didn't, it doesn't matter if it was negligence or lack of creative thinking". Me, I define that "reasonable way of preventing" as "it's in the checklist". I think my Dad would expect a whole lot more.
And even though I'd be more forgiving in my judgement of pilots, I can't fault him for his thinking. Every time something unexpected/dangerous happened in the air to him, he wouldn't get back up in the plane until he had figured out how to eliminate/greatly reduce the risk. When telling the story of what happened, he'd point out why it was his fault[1] and I don't doubt that he believed that when nobody was looking.
Over the years, he added a device to monitor the exhaust temp after the pipe blew threw the front of the aircraft and made the plane into a fireworks show of ignited exhaust. He added these strange (very inexpensive) rubber wire-like things to various parts of the wings after being struck by lightening which broke his radio, resulting in an interesting problem with getting clearance for landing[0]. He owned the plane with a partner who used it on the weekends, occasionally (they paid the company to use the plane), and they both had this same philosophy, so by the time he sold it, there were more gadgets attached to the dashboard than built into it. They had a weather radar gadget that was hypnotic to watch.
I can't think of a single incident my dad encountered in the air that would have fallen anywhere near the category of "skill-related/irresponsible failure". It was always a mechanical fault where the plane lacked any way of detecting/alerting the pilot and there was no other way for the pilot to confirm, before take-off, that the condition would not occur. And weather at Romeo airport can switch on a dime in the winter[1], which he managed with radar on his plane. Outside of the small explosion and an occasional hit from a bird, the plane was never damaged/crash landed or even had a non-runway emergency landing[2] despite losing the engine a few times and having many, many other problems.
Often these things just sat and monitored things that should never fail -- in the case of the exhaust heat, a separate fault caused the excess heat, which caused the (very small) explosion -- it should never have gotten that hot, but were it to get that hot, it didn't have to result in a fault or even an unscheduled landing. For the lightening, adding the $3 wires, apparently, eliminates the threat entirely. And despite all of the flying he did, I don't think he ever encountered the same kind of (or even related) problem more than once. That's about as perfect a score as you can get, in my opinion. :)
[0] I was told this as a kid and probably have most of it wrong, but he had these extremely bright flashlights as part of his emergency kit (strange, ABS plastic, four C-cells, not mag-lite, but these were damn bright); they were for Morse-code signalling (had both an on-off switch and a button that turned it on when depressed and off when released). He somehow had to notify the tower and receive a reply using the flashlight -- I imagined he flew the plane past the windows like in the movies, but it was probably less dramatic.
[1] He frequently ended up landing/having to get a ride from Oakland County International because of weather he wasn't willing to land in -- I don't know how the licensing works with that, but after he got his IFR but before he got the remaining (something related to a Loran-C and weather), he'd enter his flight plan and find out he wasn't allowed to fly due to weather. That stopped after he "leveled up his license a few times" over an expensive 3-year period.
[2] The closest he was to that would have been nearly having to do an emergency landing at Selfridge ANG. This was the early 90s, so who knows what this looks like today (and my recollection is lacking) -- IIRC, it would have been illegal for him to land there, but in an emergency, they'll accommodate. I remember him saying something about losing his license/having it suspended had he done it but I don't know the details.
Well, flying VFR into IMC anyway.
I don't know what the characteristics are of that airport but I've been in the plane during a really touchy landing in bad snow, before. The occupants described that "everything seemed fine", they were coming out of the clouds and expecting to see the runway up ahead, but instead found tree-tops.
In the case of landing with my Dad in similar weather, the clouds were very low, he had no visual and was reaching the point where he'd have to put it down or abort the landing[0] when he suddenly flung the clipboard at my mom's lap and grabbed onto the yoke.
We were on the ground in a few tense seconds and I've never seen my Dad jump like that -- it seriously freaked me the hell out. His explanation was that he had already decided to abort the landing when the clouds broke and he realized he was in a good position to put it down. I get the impression that he was a little surprised about the position he was actually in -- and it was an uncharacteristically violent landing.
[0] I'm not sure what the technical details are or if I am getting that right...
Years ago I was doing pilot training in a Cessna 152. A coworker of mine was a retired Navy captain and instructor at the TOPGUN program, with hundreds of carrier landings in an F-14. He looked at me like I was crazy. He said those little planes were deathtraps and he'd never go up in one again.
Not long after that I had a lesson that coincided with some turbulence from the nearby coast. The plane janked around by seemingly hundreds of feet in every direction. I was scared (almost literally) shitless, and that was my last lesson. I haven't been in a small plane since.
And he joked that every gauge/gadget on the dashboard that didn't come with the plane was there because "if I had it when X happened, X wouldn't have happened" (...or I wouldn't have left the ground knowing the condition existed, or it would have warned me with well enough time to get to safety before I have to be met by emergency vehicles on the tarmac).
Funny enough, he would get a little uncomfortable flying commercial. I'm not sure if he was putting on a show for us kids or if he was serious but he'd say he "didn't like someone else in charge of the plane". My Dad flew GA (alone) a few times a week most weeks, so he was unusually experienced for a small plane pilot.
[0] He had a breathing apparatus that allowed him to fly at higher altitudes in the unpressurized cabin, IIRC, but I'm not a pilot.
[1] Except, when he tells it, he was never in any danger. Doesn't matter if he's hanging an arm out the window trying to manually spin the prop, "it was always under control.". Uh huh.
I flew with him as a child enough to have experienced some of them myself. I remember:
- An inflight electrical fire, at night, over the Sierras.
- A very tense IFR final into Monterey, at night in fog, in a twin Comanche just ahead of a Learjet when the controller had a power outage and lost radio contact.
- A test flight in a STOL Maule Rocket that ended with stalling and bouncing in the rough just short of the 7600 hundred foot runway at Stead AFB. The gear collapsed during roll out and damaged the wing and prop, but there were no injuries. Sadly, Maule went out of business and the aircraft was never repaired.
> He was a skillful pilot but enjoyed risk too much to be a "good" pilot.
One thing that kept me comfortable being a passenger with my Dad had little to do with his externally exhibited confidence (which was absolute, and usually reassuring to others). It was the fact that I knew how deadly seriously he took what he was doing. I watched him pull out the clip-board and perform every step on the check-list. We've been stranded overnight and missed vacations entirely because my dad decided the trip would not be safe enough.
The strangely reassuring thing, though, was my Dad's opinion of stunt pilots/air shows[1]. They make him visibly, and vocally angry. My Dad isn't one to create controversy or even one to lecture much so I was surprised when we went to a hydroplane race and they had a biplane pilot doing stunts how completely pissed off he was about it. It was years ago and I don't recall his exact reasoning, and it might have even been something specific to the aircraft involved but his opinion was that the pilot was being reckless/irresponsible, that pilot skill, alone, cannot guarantee the safety of the pilot, aircraft or spectators because they're not designed to be used that way. In anger, I remember him nearly spitting something like "I have no respect for a pilot who puts peoples lives at risk for entertainment." I was a snotty teenager at that time so I probably rolled by eyes at him. I also know that he'd never do anything like that with his plane -- he gets seriously motion sick spinning around in a circle more than once or twice. ;)
I think the biggest fear we had with my Dad, though, was him falling asleep in the air. He worked long hours and my mom often had to poke him awake on long drives. I remember discovering his cure for this was a 1,000 ct container of Atomic Fire Balls (cinnamon hard candy that "tastes like burning").
[0] The "good" being in quotes, I assume, isn't implying that he's an unskilled pilot, just willing to accept risks that can only be reduced by pilot skill, which he had plenty of, but one cannot practice/become skilled in some situations without being put into them.
[1] I'm not referring to The Blue Angels/Airforce related shows; I don't know his opinion on that because we never went as a kid -- I suspect they might be similar but he has enormous admiration for military members so I wouldn't be surprised if he drew an exception. :)
I used to work in general aviation. If my eyes could fly a loop in my skull they would have.
Were the occupants required to use the bathroom before flying? That's how much weight you're potentially saving by weighing the paint on a small aircraft.
They make you weigh the paint because they want you to spray on a certain thickness so they say "X oz paint, Y oz thinner/hardener" (or something like that) in order to get your mixture into the right ballpark so it will work with whatever procedure they want you to spray it on with and get the thickness/finish/hardness the OEM wants you to get.
In aviation there's a ton of treating simple systems as black boxes and "do X and exactly X" type maintenance that happens in order to smoothly transfer liability. You paint a cowl the way the OEM says not because you couldn't get an equivalently performing cowl a different way but because you don't want the NTSB coming after you trying to determine if you did it different but right or different but wrong.
The specifications to which general aviation stuff is done isn't really any more exacting than stuff in automotive or heavy industry. The service literature is just more verbose and the service procedures are more tightly defined.
I think the commenter was making the point that the weight of the paint is not a significant consideration, not that recalculating the weight and balance after a paint job should not be done.
This makes perfect sense. I'm using a kitchen scale to measure the 2-part silicone mixture that I'm using for making toys, not because weight is critical but because it needs to be right for curing. I should do similar when mixing epoxy, but I always eyeball that for some reason. Maybe has to do with cost, it's $10-20 worth of silicone I'm mixing, and usually a quarter worth of epoxy, just due to quantities involved.
Painting a plane is one of those times that you often strip everything out anyway, so it's a convenient time to check the weight and balance against the logbook.
This reminds me of how often I quote weight limits on cars to people and their eyes go wide at how easy it is to exceed the OEM's recommended limits. I'm fairly sure I'm one of the few among my friend groups that has read through every owners manual for the cars/vans I've owned.
Went up in a four man single engine chopper once. It had all the reassuring solidity of a bicycle. Never again. I can’t even imagine what the truly tiny ones are like.
It was actually pretty fun but, of course, the weather is everything. I can't imagine how bad it would be in any wind more than about 5 knots but on the day I had my lesson, it was calm and clear.
I was surprised at how similar the feel is. Your bicycle analogy made me laugh -- spot on. I used to love taking my macho friends up in my dad's plane. There's this moment after take-off where my Dad will comment on "how smooth the air is" ... it's either "perspective" or a pilot joke, I'm not sure, because said "smooth air" is about as bad as reasonable air-turbulence on a jet and the flight is usually marked occasionally by the kind of turbulence that would have the overhead bins tossing luggage onto passengers. I recall a humorous incident where my buddy Tim dropped an F-bomb over a hot mic on the headset when we got smacked sideways.
By comparison, there are some horrific crashes today that drivers are walking away from. [1]
Edit: just looked it up. The plane was a Beechcraft Bonanza A36TC.
The two "small" planes I've ridden in were a Cessna and an L-39. The Cessna felt like a toy, and the L-39 was a serious piece of hardware. Landings were also very different; the Cessna just got tossed around a lot more.
A photo of the airborne metroliner with fuselage blown open: https://imgur.com/gallery/yKPOWR0
A tube is only strong when complete. Cut away half the tube and bending resistance probably goes down ~10x.
It's probably the opposite: that the fuselage was only strong enough to resist the air pressure differential, and that the real structural component was the cabin floor. And that, luckily, the control cables for the tail were routed through the cabin floor, instead of through the top of the cabin.
Many aviation enthusiasts / pilots first go to is to have a look at the flight data - usually available on FlightAware / FlightRadar24 and a few other websites, plus LiveATC usually can provide recordings of the flights communications to towers as well. We should refrain from using just those data points to draw conclusions to the cause; the NTSB (and other orgs) will perform an investigation and the report will be made public (both interim, and final ones), and changes are almost always made to processes / systems, and often to the virtual or physical items that led to this incident.
There are a few more photos and insights from various folks that were there at the time and captured a few moments on the reddit thread here:
https://www.reddit.com/r/flying/comments/nauck8/mid_air_just...
Note - it's incredibly rare for a midair not to result in fatalities so an incredible amount of luck all around.
Also, I like the headline including "all parties ok".
https://iflyamerica.org/midairs.asp
This one was incredibly lucky, especially for the Key Lime aircraft.
Most multi-engine airplanes can even take-off and climb with only a single engine functioning. You would never do it intentionally, but sometimes engines fail shortly after takeoff when you are 50 feet above the runway.
This is likely true. He was the only person onboard the plane, so he would not have been able to get up and look. Unlikely he could see the extent of damage from his seat. And as noted, on final approach, he doesn't have time for much to change plans. Even if he knew the extent of the damage, the choices are roughly the same - land as planned, or go around.
That said, he did exactly what he should. Aviate, navigate, communicate. He controlled the plane, made a decision, and communicated that to ATC. Well done.
It is not so black and white. One might (and normal person should) feel a stress reaction with rising levels adrenaline and suchlike in his bloodstream, and it is normal, it might even be beneficial, if one was trained to benefit from this mind state. I become more resolute from this, more concentrated than usual, sometimes even more concentrated than it is good for me because I might miss some important detail.
> If a tyre blows out, most of us wouldn't scream and close our eyes, we would try and steer to safety.
I never was in this situation with a blown tyre, but I was in some other situations when there was a danger to my life (or I believed that it was) I become extremely concentrated, almost silent (except for occasional curses), but when I needed to communicate, I did it loudly and with a good deal of swearing. I think that communication for me in these situations is like a distracting hindrance, so if I need to do it, I'll do it in a way that will make it unnecessary to repeat it.
The communication of the pilot have not a hint of his emotions. My mind was blown not because of his perfect actions (I expect perfect actions from a professional), not even because the lack of swearing. It is the tone of his voice, it is completely composed, almost relaxed. I can imagine myself in this situation restraining from shouting and from swearing, but my emotional tension would leak through my voice, I wouldn't even try to hide it.
When you get your medical clearance, one of the things they look for is signs of psychological issues or instability. Not saying that's you, and I bet you'd do better than you think. Pilot training also IMHO makes you better at that stuff.
For such a serious accident this seems about the best possible outcome for the crew of both aircraft. I'm not an expert so I'm not going to comment on root cause or blame here, but simply glad to read that at least everybody survived.
The Metroliner (one with the fuselage ripped through) is commercial, [0] but apparently carrying cargo only in this case. [1]
Surely a mid-air collision even between two hobby Cessnas say is rare/interesting enough to make it?
[0] - https://www.keylimeair.com/
[1] - https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2021/may/12/col...
Another lucky point is that it was at low altitude and at slow speed (preparing to land). Higher up it would have been much more likely to break up due to way higher speed and larger pressure difference between the cabin and outside.
Remarkable that the Metroliner held together, despite that terrible damage, and they landed it safely
edit: interesting photo of the landing from the Reddit thread linked elsewhere https://imgur.com/gallery/yKPOWR0
One thing that makes it more likely is that US air traffic control makes heavy use of visual approaches, and then it's allowed to point two aircraft at collision courses on the same altitude because they can see each other. The European way to do this is to have them intercept at different altitudes so if one overshoots they pass over/under. But it results in lower capacity per runway than the US system.
Something else I'd like to point out is that it might seem easy to 'blame the Cirrus' pilot or them call out for inattention, but doing so by itself isn't helpful. Aviation is so safe partly because it has managed to turn a culture of blame into a culture of continuous improvement and shared learning: I'd be very surprised if the airport's procedures came out of this unmodified, for example.
Once we got to the 1980s, we had so many airlines trying to survive that corners were cut, recommendations were not followed and various accidents were essentially negligent.
Now that lots of smaller airlines have been merged into larger ones, we now have Boeing type problems where the cost of manufacture, safety and development is so much higher than before, no-one wants to put a new plane through the whole approvals process, we just want to re-badge a 737 and get it into service.
Similar things happen on the railways in the UK where we have the RAIB to do a similar "no-blame" analysis of a crash/accident yet still time and time again, the same problems surface - lack of preparation, lack of training and lack of following procedures.
Some of the examples are whole-cloth cultural changes of entire industries (usually commercial flight actually, IIRC), but some are small, simple, changes that can be implemented by one or two people and still have a dramatic impact. One of the smaller-scale examples from the book that really stuck out was the attitude & approach of a surgeon in an operating room. When surgeons approach mistakes from the perspective of “okay, this happened, let’s focus on how we fix it” mistakes are reported to the surgeon quickly, the surgeon gets accurate information quickly, and can respond appropriately. Result: more mistakes are reported but the surgeon has fewer complications and better outcomes.
When surgeons approach mistakes by getting angry or assigning blame to the nurse who did X or the resident who did Y those surgeons have fewer (reported) mistakes but worse outcomes. Why? People don’t fess up because they fear the consequences. And when a mistake is identified, people don’t give accurate and complete information because their primary concern is KYA rather than fixing the problem at hand.
I'm curious. The airport is at about 5900ft and they were at 6400. If that's AGL for them that seems like a long and high approach. If not, then they were going to do a 3 mile straight in at 500 feet AGL? Either interpretation doesn't fit my (limited, student) experience.
Looking at the FAA's charts, https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2104/05715R17L.PDF, this combination of heights and distances isn't totally crazy -- I state without proof (and wait to be corrected!) that the approach is modified because it is a relatively high altitude airport and there may be quite steeply changing terrain underneath. I've never flown there (not even on X-plane) and I'm a low-hours UK person.
I haven't done the trig and meterological lookup to work out what their AGL altitude was on that day, but at the very least it's not crazy-wrong from the published chart...
This turn to final (with the unusual additional warning to “do not fly through final”) is a visual maneuver and I’d expect most every pilot to be hand-flying at that point. (My autopilot and navigator is capable to make that intercept, but it’s way more tedious and distracting to program it than to just fly it.)
In a Cirrus with what is probably a GFC 700 with flight director capabilities I would expect any competent instrument rated pilot to have the FD on and approach mode armed (the 1 missing button I meant) exactly to avoid this mistake.
Great to hand fly, but in a capable airplane just plain stupid not to use all the tools. And even mandatory on the professional side of things in many cases.
I agree I'd have an extended centerline up (it's up by default if I zoom the MFD in close enough in my lesser-equipped A36), but this is a fully visual maneuver.
Almost no one is going to define a user waypoint near the touchdown zone for 17R and pull an OBS line off that just so they can use the FD/AP to make an entirely routine turn to final.
I train at an airport with parallels with a tight-enough runway separation gap to necessitate a 15-degree offset in both T/O & L on the GA runway. > 100-hour me overshot into the adjacent approach when being cleared direct to base for the "commercial runway" which I've probably only been given once before. Shameful, yes, and a learning experience, but I never overshoot on the adjacent (we also have different TPAs for the parallels, probably for this reason though).
Can't really blame this on the Cirrus pilot alone. They probably made the mistake here, but they were not set up for succes (no navigation available as backup) and ATC had zero safety net (both at the same altitude). So my prediction is that the final report will include recommended changes and not just "pilot error shouldn't fly through final, any student pilot could do that"
The cirrus is the one that makes the mistake.
The 17 runways are quite close laterally (700’) , it may be either way a bad maneuver (overshooting) or chosing the wrong runway.
https://es.flightaware.com/resources/airport/APA/APD/AIRPORT...
The metro was not expecting another traffic in approach for his runway (I understand that they were in different frequencies with different controllers).
During the approach the upper-right side relative angle position in the window of the metro, makes the cirrus hard to spot. I guess he didn’t see the cirrus at all or just barely before the crash.
The cirrus is looking at the runway to his right and the other traffic probably the whole time, the metro is in front of him, so he doesn’t see the Metro till he is on top of him.
Usually with parallel runways, traffics are kept at different altitudes till they are aligned with their runways. This way if they make a mistake, they are separated by 1000’ vertically with the airplane flying parallel.
In this case the cirrus was cleared to visual approach and informed of the cessna he had to follow first. Once he says he has the cessna in sight, he is cleared to visual approach following the cessna. In the same comunication he is informed of the metro flying to the other runway and he replies traffic in sight again.
My guess is that he either has the metro in sight at the beginning and then he forgets about it during the maneuver, or he gives traffic in sight two times.
Thinking that the second part of the message is for the same aircraft (the cessna) he doesn’t even recognize what the controller is telling him about the metro. This is possible if he is too busy flying the maneuver and not paying proper attention to the radio, he hears “cleared for approach” and “traffic” but he mentally don’t really process the information the controller is giving him. A kind of sensory overload.
In airliners we have mandatory TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system) installed that shows you the near traffics in the screen and give you coordinated (between the traffics) automatic avoidance guidance and alarms( one traffic climbs and the other descends or keeps altitude).
In busy airports TCAS maneuver happen relatively often (a handfull of times a year) but nowadays is much harder to have a collision or a close call.
Also when two pilots are in the cockpit (like airliners) it’s easier that one is concentrated in flying and the other in the communications. It’s very common to correct and be corrected all the time during the flight.
It will be interesting to read the official report.
Edit: Kudos to the Metro pilot who was super calmed in the radio while declaring emergency and landing the plane. That is really difficult.
Edit 2: correcting the airport , KAPA (I talked about KDEN initially which has the same runways but with a bigger separation). This does make a difference regarding the mistake.
Thank you Denvercoder9 for the heads up.> https://flttrack.fltplan.com/AirportDiagrams/KDENapt.jpg
This is the diagram for a different airport (Denver International, KDEN). The accident happened at Centennial Airport (KAPA), where the two runways are only separated by about 700 feet.
If that is so, then it seems from the recording that the Metroliner pilot was only informed about the Cessna ahead of him and on approach to 17R, not of the Cirrus.
The Cirrus pilot is told about the Metroliner in an exchange that goes thus:
TWR: "Cirrus 6DJ, traffic you're following just turned right base there ahead and to your right at 6600', Cessna."
6DJ: "I have traffic in sight, 6DJ."
TWR: "Cirrus 6DJ, follow them, runway 17R, cleared to land. Additional traffic north shore, it's a Metroliner for the parallel runway."
6DJ: "Traffic in sight, cleared to land 17R, 6DJ."
Now, does that second "traffic in sight" refer to both aircraft, or only to the Cessna he had just been cleared to follow? It would be unambiguous if he had replied "two in sight", but if, for whatever reason, the mention of the Metroliner (in the same call as the clearance was given) had not registered, the Cirrus pilot would not have been aware that more than one other aircraft needed his attention. And if the Metroliner communication was being conducted on a different frequency, neither pilot would have had any other opportunity to become aware of the other airplane, except by seeing it - and, in addition to the Metroliner pilot presumably being in the left seat, the Cirrus was banked right, turning final, and one might guess its pilot was probably looking at the runways and/or the Cessna ahead.
Putting this together, I suspect the Cirrus pilot never registered the presence of the Metroliner until the collision - and I doubt the Metroliner pilot saw the Cirrus even after the collision, given that he thought he had an engine failure (he might have seen it earlier, when it was heading north on downwind, and assumed it was behind him.)
This does not alter the fact that the Cirrus pilot overshot the 17R approach while turning onto final, and it is this which caused the collision. One other fact, pointed out by several commentators: the Cirrus was travelling at about 160 kts at the time, so any delay in turning final results in being out of position more quickly than in your average small, single-engined airplane.
This is what I think aswell. The overshoot may be either way a miss identification of the runway, or just a poorly executed turn to final of the 17R. The investigation is going to be interesting.
SR22 Vs0 is 59 knots (call it 60 to make the math easier). 1.3 x Vs0 is a reasonable "over the fence" speed, so 78 knots (call it 80) indicated would be good on short final, maybe 90 on base-to-final. (Instead, they were descending and thus accelerating slightly and hit 169 knots on the base leg.)
Bombing into the pattern over 50 knots faster than appropriate (70 knots faster than the traffic you're following and 40 knots faster than the much larger and on-profile Metro on the parallel) might be contributing, but certainly suggests to me that the Cirrus crew was behind the airplane.
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a4eabe,a2cee7,a90ffa&la...
I really think that we should not have flying cars until we have true autopilot (hands off the wheel, meatbag!). The thought of the "Hey y'all! Lookit this!" knuckleheads that regularly open up, roaring past my house, in three dimensions, is chilling. They are bad enough with just two.
I'll bet that the advent of true driverless tech will also be the advent of illegal aftermarket "mod kits." I can see it now...the "Hold My Beer™" line of manual override modules...
I think the claim was qualified in some way like "collision between civilian flights that were both flying an ATC-assigned clearance at the time". (So some kinds of flights and some kinds of airspace don't require ATC clearance, and if one of them were involved in a collision, it wouldn't be ATC's responsibility, in some sense.)
My question at the moment is: is this claim plausible if you qualify or restrict it enough? Do you have to tack on additional conditions?
Is there any useful sense in which this collision was a first for U.S. aviation history?
It looks like the Cirrus wasn't flying to what the ATC cleared...
Glad to see no fatalities here; I'm an aerospace engineer in the field of airworthiness and technical risk management so my work sees a lot of accident reports and flight safety incidents. I can say with certainty these folks (esp. the metroliner crew) are very fortunate.
It's just an internal 16 channel GPS receiver with an external antenna and an altimeter that predicts the flight path and then transmits it - including a unique identifier - as low-power digital burst signals at one-second intervals. Other aircraft also equipped with FLARM receive that, compare it with their own flight path prediction, and also check for collision information with known data on obstacles, including electric power lines, radio masts and cable cars, etc. If a proximity warning is generated to one or more aircraft or obstacles, it bleeps like anything and generates bright LEDs that point in the direction of the threat. The display also gives indication of the threat level, plus the horizontal and vertical bearing to the threat -- and there are three warnings (iirc ~30s, ~15s, ~6s) -- it warns by time and not distance.
I remember the thing going off a few times; it's quite helpful and draws your attention to a region of sky immediately, including behind, above and below you. It's also dirt cheap† and is a battery-powered self-contained box with (I suspect) a microcontroller and glorified smartphone innards inside.
†(by aviation standards)
* https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/pemberton-b-...
Whenever there is a collision involving light aircraft the question of anti-collision systems comes up. Unfortunately the powers that be have completely failed to come up with a workable standard for such aircraft. The glider people eventually just gave up on waiting and now use a proprietary system called FLARM which has fairly good adoption. There is more than one system of that type available for light powered aircraft with not very good adoption. Each system is entirely incompatible with each other, including the standardized ones used in heavy commercial aviation.
In other words, my hypothesis is that the fact that there are few mid-airs is owed to ATC, technology (TCAS, TAS) and “big sky”, rather than vigilant pilots.
From the picture, the plane at rest is pretty messed up, but all occupants are safe, and pending investigation, there doesn't seem to be a sign of mechanical error involved.
Flying in (or near) small planes has a lot of risk, but I don't see how this incident would change your impression of this one manufacturer's planes.
I'm sure the chances of a collision outside of the airport is absolutely basically zero, but these small planes fly really low over my house and the downtown area all the time. They get pretty low and close for touring over the big buildings for photos and stuff, see photos on reddit all the time..
Reminds me of the Aloha Flight 243. My mom's cousin was the pilot and hearing his first hand account was pretty crazy. Fun fact, he got to be an extra in the made for TV movie of the event.
https://www.thisdayinaviation.com/tag/robert-l-schornstheime...
The space can be constrained though. There are "airways" (jet routes) for flights, and not that much of a volume/size ratio when the volume concerns areas near airports -- where many planes approach, exit, are asked to circle in a holding pattern, etc.
So it's not like the whole sky is their domain...
And better GNSS based navigation equipment is now making it more likely than 20 years ago. The historical accuracy was such that planes where often a bit offset left or right off the route giving extra separation. Now the accuracy is so good that planes going opposite direction on the same route are passing exactly bang in the middle on top/below each other.
We've improved GNSS significantly, but the technology to avoid collisions hasn't been widely deployed, even though it's orders of magnitude less complicated than high accuracy GNSS on the whole
So... a random dilution of precision generator could... save lives? ha.
Oceanic procedure, without radar control, is to turn 45 degrees off track while descending, but it takes a little bit of time to set all that in motion when things go wrong while you were just seconds before happily cruising straight ahead on autopilot (autopilot is mandatory above 29,000 ft in a lot of airspace)
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gol_Linhas_Aéreas_Flight_1907
[1] https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/01/air_crash200901
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_sky_theory
>In aviation, the Big Sky Theory is that two randomly flying bodies are very unlikely to collide, as the three-dimensional space is so large relative to the bodies. Some aviation safety rules involving altimetry and navigation standards are based on this concept. It does not apply when aircraft are flying along specific narrow routes, such as an airport traffic pattern or jet airway.
>The Big Sky Theory has been mathematically modeled, using a gas law approach. This implies that collisions of aircraft in free flight should be extremely rare in en-route airspace, whereas operational errors such as violations of formal separation standards should be relatively common. Three critical parameters are the number of flying objects per unit volume, their speed, and their size. Larger, faster objects, flying in a traffic-rich environment are more collision-prone.
http://code7700.com/big_sky_theory.htm
>It seems that there are a lot of pilots out there that believe in the "Big Sky Technique." They think the amount of airspace out there is so wide and vast, and that they are so small, that the chances of hitting another aircraft is too small to worry about. And yet history begs to differ.
The Big Sky - Kate Bush
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sV7w5TaYjRA&ab_channel=KateB...
They look down
At the ground
Missing
But I never go in now
I'm looking at the big sky
I'm looking at the big sky now
I'm looking at the big sky
You never understood me
You never really tried
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ug_Z-gu7u44&ab_channel=Naoyo...
Big sky, big sky holding up the sun
Big sky, big sky holding up the moon
Big sky holding down the sea
But it can't hold us down anymore
Big sky holding up the stars
Big sky holding Venus and Mars
Big sky catch you in a jar
But it can't hold us down anymore
Big sky, big enormous place
Big wind blow all over the place
Big storm wrecking havoc and waste
But it can't hold us down anymoreAround takeoff and landing - there is effectively a 1D track for the approach and the climb-out. It's not quite that simple because different aircraft will have different descent profiles and different angles to the wind, but it's a much smaller 'search space' for collisions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aloha_Airlines_Flight_243
It's amazing that the hull can survive in the air for any time with that much torn away.
As an aviator my stress levels are only just coming down now from seeing this headline and clicking expecting there to be deaths.
Often for large airports the code is very similar to the IATA code for passengers, e.g. KJFK for JFK and KSFO for San Francisco. But not always, as in EGLL for London Heathrow which is LHR in passenger codes.
This is mostly only the case in the United States, since it has a single-letter K prefix, so they can append the 3-letter IATA code to make a valid 4-letter ICAO code. In the rest of the world the second letter of the ICAO code is used to designate countries, so the 3-letter IATA code cannot be appended.
EF is Finland actually. The first letter is region code, and Europe is divided into multiple regions. Northern Europe is E, Southern Europe is mostly L (so France is LF).
Wikipedia has a nice map showing the different boundarys on it's ICAO airport codes page.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICAO_airport_code#/media/File:...
ICAO-registered U.S. airports in the contiguous 48 states start with a K. Alaskan and Hawaiian airports start with a P and other U.S. territories get other different initial letters depending on their region (e.g. TJ for Puerto Rico or NS for American Samoa).