Little of what you've said is at odds with what I'm saying, it just is dressed up in the pop-Bayesian signifiers that seem to be popular right now.
To put it in that context, what I am contending is that people seem to have unreasonably high priors about the impact of this pandemic on suicides that don't seem to be based on much at all, and I believe underestimate the fundamental complexity of the world, that cause and effect are often difficult to trace.
The fact that you are comparing the idea that suicides have decreased during the pandemic with the existence of ESP is, I think, emblematic of exactly this sort of false overconfidence.
Anecdotes should have some, but marginal, impact on our posterior when coming head to head with data.
> Epistemology is impossibly hard. Determining the strength of evidence is hard. In the places that a paper contradicts our mental model of the world, the only sane approach is to question the paper.
References to the sanity of one approach over the other aside, I do not see how this follows from what you said before. I agree that determining the strength of evidence is hard. I would suggest that creating a causal model of the world from anecdata might be a bit harder.
e: As a sort of meta-point, I really do find it interesting the increasing currency of Bayesian concepts in pop imagination, often combined with arguments against good inference. It seems almost like pop-Bayesianism is the sophistry of the 21st century, both in the sort of argumentation that characterizes it and as a sociological phenomenon, who it appeals to.