Linux: Don't get me started on “executives”
lore.kernel.org
lore.kernel.org
Paying technical debt or utilities is not sexy and a lot of people want their name attached to cool new things not keeping the lights on.
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Main homepage at https://hackclub.com / open source at https://github.com/hackclub/hackclub
My favourite story here is "Scrunchy the cat". Scrunchy was a cat in one of the UK cat charities (Cat's Protection?) who needed a hip operation. Management were very clear "if you raise money for this, make sure it's not restricted to just Scrunchy". Inevitably the fund raisers ignored this completely and ended up raising enough money for Scrunchy to have 20 hip operations and the money couldn't be used for anything else. Scrunchy had her hip operation, and then for a few years afterwards any cat in the Cat's Protection who needed the same operation was renamed Scrunchy!
But it's so frustrating to get a non-profit started and need funds to move forwards with the mission but donors don't want to fund the critical stuff like utilities. But hey, they still "love your mission". I also appreciate they usually want to make single donations rather than letting an organization get hooked on a steady stream of donations, it helps keep the org from getting stagnate. And segregating restricted and non-restricted funds is an extra chore on the already taxed treasurer has to look forward too.
Oh for sure, I can spend millions of dollars just by saying I believe it will deliver tens more to the company. If I'm right, I'll get a fat bonus, and if I'm wrong (too much), they'll fire me.
But If I say we need to send millions of dollars or else we'll run into an amorphous risk that might make us look bad, how possibly can the board evaluate my claim?
Or put another way, if I said I had a tiger-detecting t-shirt that made noise when a tiger about to strike, would you believe me?
It is really hard to invest in something that benefits anyone other than the company, and harder still if it benefits someone else more. Basically it needs to be your money, or clearly cost-of-sales to make that kind of decision, so while I think I can empathise with the rant, I'm not sure what I (or any executive, really) could do about it.
Since open source can be used for free, there is very little incentive to change the current situation. And with non copy left licences it can be even worse. The only realistic way to fix these problems I can imagine is to force companies to use paid distros, and let these companies hire developers.
But it has been historically hard to make people pay for distro support. Red Hat and Suse were successful, but they never got big enough. It's too easy to use their products for free, or use alternatives like Debian.
* Email the hackers list about intentions, ensure you aren't overlooking obvious things. The more core maintainers know and understand what you're doing the more likely you are to be met with critical support. (Hopefully this part is obvious!)
* Code patch: Prepare the work surface: clean up, refactor, debug, extend, whatever it takes to facilitate easy integration of upcoming feature patches, but preserves existing functionality. The code is internally pretty clean but not necessarily primed to go the direction you want.
* Code patches: Plan diffs for human review and validation: Scope and volume matter! Your additions join existing development; plan to maintain your additions against a moving codebase throughout the integration process.
Confusingly some companies use "executive" to refer to their lowest positions, since they "do" as well. I hope it's clear I'm not talking about that.
>People forget that only a few years ago have we decided that the kernel now has to protect userspace programs from malicious hardware. That's a major shift in thinking, now data that we used to blindly trust can not be trusted at all.
How come this wasn't being done already? Wouldn't you want drivers to do safety checks on everything, in case of a hardware failure? Or does this refer to something else, besides safety checks?
Designing code to be resistant to active malicious attack is very different than just handling error cases for things that don't work.
I think it largely refers to the Spectre + Meltdown class of attacks, which caused the kernel to introduce a whole class of fixes (retpolines, etc.).
malicious device - will send dma requests to read memory and then to send it to some other server or will implant some malicious software in memory or inside other devices.