A New Standard for Mobile App Security
security.googleblog.com
security.googleblog.com
Apple being noticeably absent from this list while Facebook is on it speaks volumes.
This could be a bad indication about Apple, but I think I'd end up interpreting this as a bad indication about ioXt. Big consortiums like this often end up creating a lowest common denominator, and Apple are known for not bowing to pressure to engage with things like this where they believe they can do better.
The amount of hoops you had to jump through to make a MFi bluetooth device was insane.
People said the same thing about Apple and USB. iPod and FireWire. MacBooks and Bluetooth. Apple not supporting HD-DVD. Apple not adding Blu-Ray to SuperDrive. Apple and DisplayPort. Apple when it released its first Airport.
It didnt matter that other companies were also using the same standards and methods. People are hypersensitive to what Apple both does and does not do.
My thoughts, exactly.
Since HomeKit operates locally, with the exception of remote access to your home through a HomePod/Apple TV/iPad hub, could that be why Apple hasn’t shown an interest in this?
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c6dbac1f8135a29c7fbb...
I think tech as an industry has come quite a long way in the past few years of clarifying (and hopefully adopting) what security best practices is. This, OWASP, and other similar initiatives are good: you can have a rough checklist of what's required to have a roughly "secure" app, and what the common loopholes are. This is not easy stuff.
I don't know what this means for the institutional/enterprise side, whether certification will be meaningless, etc. But the document itself seems relatively sensible to me!
VPN vendors collect all kinds of data on their users and are sometimes even backed by intelligence agencies. Sure, use them to get around region restrictions for something uncontroversial, but don't send all your traffic through them and expect privacy.
I also see that they didn't tackle the hardest part of mobile app security -- the backend services. Many apps scrape data from the device and then push it to the service, where it is logged (for how long?) and reused in who knows how many ways. The lack of transparency around backend processing is the real problem for app users.
How many users have been had their data exposed by an open S3 bucket or database versus by a vulnerability in the app code itself?
In a way DoD (STIGs), NIST, Mitre, SANS, OWASP are all different takes on the same general idea.
The document the post is about: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c6dbac1f8135a29c7fbb...
SE1.1 End of life notification policy is published SE1.2 Expiration Date is published
Planned obolescence.
AA4 Security Updates applied automatically, when product usage allows
VS4 Anti-Rollback
User-control and herding. "You want this feature we removed? Too bad, fuck you."
SI113 Enforce x509 certificate pinning for primary services.
You can't easily MITM and see what data it's exfiltrating.
When they say "security threats" they really mean "root access".
Of course, there'll be ways around this but it would stop a lot of dodgy apps. Of course, this is a lot harder as it sounds as you'd need all Android apps that want access to sensitive APIs to interact with the Playstore API. But it's better than Android just imposing systemwide security changes that break a load of apps.
Can you sell your trusted account?