On Export Controls and Dual-Use Emerging Technologies

This is a tough one close to my heart.

Working in semicon back in the 80’s, my dad travelled once to the Soviet Union for a semicon show.

Once returned, he had a debrief with someone from an intelligence agency.

But the fact is that during the Cold War stealing some semiconductors was of limited utility without the directly associated and massive sunk cost of the semicon fab supply chain.

So in some respects, we may have over-classified and been too aggressive with export controls, however the Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal did help the Soviets to substantially reduce submarine propeller noise.

Today, when you mix several off the shelf capabilities they can be recombined into a new capability with significant military applications.

Even describing some of these examples in sufficient detail could be enough to lose perishable advantage over an adversary.

I don’t know what the answer is or agree with mass export controls, but I also see the problem of dual use technology transfer to adversaries as much harder today than the Cold War of yesterday.