Anatoli Bugorski stuck his head inside a particle accelerator (2020)
amusingplanet.com
amusingplanet.com
I'd love to know why a safety mechanism like this had an off switch, and under what circumstances that off switch is to be used. I feel like safety mechanisms should be always on, since they exist to prevent us from making mistakes when we forget things?
The one in Nesvizh:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/4712/the-radiological-acci...
The one in San Salvador:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/3718/the-radiological-acci...
The one in Soreq:
https://www.iaea.org/publications/3798/the-radiological-acci...
In each case the facility operator entered the irradiation chamber after switching off safety mechanisms (such as alarms or mechanisms placing the radiation source in a safe position, inside a pit) in order to unblock the conveyor system from packages that had become lodged in the mechanism. These facilities usually have a conveyor system that takes packages of products like food or medicine around a radiocative source to be sterilised. The packages seem to have a tendency to get stuck in the conveyor mechanism's parts often at which point proper procedure is to power everything down before someone can enter the facility to service the mechanism. Obviously that causes severe delays to production and obviously people simply override this procedure, that is in place to protect them. They go into the facility, they find the source in an active position and become irradiated.
My favourite of the bunch above is the one in Nesvizh, where the irradiation facility was built like a miniature maze from D&D, lacking only the guardian minotaurs with double axes (or Ogres, I guess). The radiation chamber was an actual maze, like a square spiral of concrete. The way to the source at the center of the maze was littered with pressure sensors that triggered alarms and there was even a moving hatch at the entrance that exposed a pit too deep and long to jump over. IAEA's investigation never found out how the operator managed to cross the pit, navigate the maze and get to the center of the chamber without triggering any alarms that would have normally stored the source to its safe position inside a dry pit, but he sure did it, then realised suddendly that the source was in the active position and ran back out. He died later of radiation poisoning before having the chance to tell anyone how he managed the feat.
It seems this procedure took too long so the operator only turned the key to "off" in the main control panel, then crossed the pit at the maze entrance on his own.
In my comment above I say they don't know exactly how he crossed this pit with the mechanical hatch, but I seem to have misremembered. The motor that moved the hatch was inside the pit and he could have stepped on it and jumped over to the far side. What the IAEA doesn't know is how he managed to cross a pressure plate after the pit that would have normally stored the source to its safe position.
What a crazy story, thanks for sharing it and the sources!
Edit: to expand on the pressure plate, maybe the logical fault was assuming the plate couldn't be accessed without the mantrap covered, requiring the key removed from panel.
Thanks for the pointer to the NTSB reports. I didn't realise they're all there!
Did you read the NTSB report on El Faro?
then you are in for a treat - just read how Chernobyl happened.
Especially when you hit something. Much, much faster.
If you were given N lightbulbs at the beginning of the year and all of them went "pop" or were "taken home", you won't have more until next year, no matter what. And by "you" here I mean support person, responsible for putting spare lightbulbs into sockets.
The scientist's performance assessment on the other hand is not tied to support supply chain troubles. He must continue with experiments and must use "hidden reserves" (disable safety system) if necessary.
There should be.
Site... amusingplanet.com
I've seen 'tract' and 'track' confused so often that I wonder if the latter is taking over as standard use, and me shaking my gnarled fist at the skies. cf. "Phenomena" instead of "phenomenon", "bias" instead of "biased", etc etc
totally agree with gastrointestinal track being wrong though, that's a definite error!
EDIT: I searched google and the first result for phenomena was (under "People Also Ask") "What is an example of a phenomena" which is probably the kind of nonsense you are referring to..
This form is called "participle" if you are curious:
called "What happens if you put your head in a particle accelerator?"
Hopefully he managed to get social welfare payments since then.
A funny coincidence?
Soviet doctrine solved the problem of maintaining fast advance with fragile men and equipment by subjecting individual units to intense, but very short, engagements. Specifically, a field army would have "echelons", where divisions of the first echelon would fight an extremely intense battle to achieve a breakthrough. Once that breakthrough was achieved (or failed), entire divisions would be rotated out, allowing fresh second-echelon divisions to take up the battle.
This meant that if your tank could only do a combat-week's worth of driving before needing to go back to a depot for refit, that was fine; your armored division would send its tanks to the maintenance depot all at once while the troops were recovering from their week in hell.
For more on how this would work in practice, see this NATO write-up of Soviet doctrine (specifically starting at around page 2-5 in their weird page-numbering scheme): https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf
Quality and reliability weren't controlled for in USSR. Only sheer numbers.
That's a very strong statement. Could you elaborate on that a bit more please?
No incentives for quality.
Is that so? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_quality_mark_of_the_USSR: "Obtaining the sign allowed the enterprises to increase the state controlled price for the goods by ten percent." Arguably this was abused, as explained later, but the original statement that quality control was absent in USSR is not entirely correct. There were penalties for "doing things deliberately wrong" and quite severe from what I recall. Then again I might have warped perception as I grew up in a city with several "black box factories".
Edit: typo
Everything made in USSR was shit, unless manufactured on recently imported equipment.
Say you had 4 decade veterans/experts in a particular field, a couple die from cholera or TB or something. How is that doctrine a net positive for the state?
Smart people opposed (unrealistic) party goals. so their death was net positive for Communist state.
For details see multiple waves of intelligentsia cleansing during 1920-40.