So, the message "sold to zerodium, mid 2017" is there, but may not be true -- it might very well be deliberate misdirection.
So, the message "sold to zerodium, mid 2017" is there, but may not be true -- it might very well be deliberate misdirection.
The vulnerability that is of interest is the one that allowed these commits to be injected. That is what I figure was sold years ago, and was burned recently.
Of course, it could appear in the server logs (or be detailed on a file dumped on the filesystem) - but it seems PHP have just decided to move to Github, and may not actually care about this, so it may not see the light of day.
And PHP does seem to care about the real exploit, the one in their infrastructure, which is why they're moving to Github.
Mind expanding on your above comment to help me understand?
Yes, it will be evident that the commits appeared in the git history, but not necessarily how they got there. If the git repo on disk suddenly has that commit, and no other usual indicators of compromise, that doesn't really give you anywhere to start looking for, what we agree is, the interesting vulnerability. All you have is "we know this box/service was definitely rooted, so look at all our infrastructure end-to-end".
They care about the exploit enough to move - of course. But do they care enough to investigate and find the actual exploit? Or hand over the server image to someone who does? Unless they've wrapped it in some PHP, it's probably not their core competency. I don't follow the PHP project, so I don't know the answer to that.
Are you sure about that? If anyone wanted to demonstrate their access/power, they would probably leave some way to identify themself as the author - with a half-hearted concealment like this, anyone could claim to have been the hacker.
The only way this discovery would help the hacker, is if they intended to force a security audit of the karma system and/or the move to GitHub.
I agree. Of course I can't be sure of anything here, but to me this commit seems suggestive that there's other injected code somewhere since mid 2017.
You also make a good point on attribution. I had considered that too and if not wanting to take credit could tell us anything about the author.
For example say you were an intelligence agency that knew about this access and knew it was being used by an enemy. Perhaps you couldn't let php know about the vulnerability without exposing that you had access to other data allowing you to know about it. Creating this commit could be a way to share knowledge without it being known where/how it was found.
Of course that's all wild speculation.