When constitutions took over the world
newyorker.com
newyorker.com
In the Republic of Ireland we have a relatively good constitution, fairly active, that has a vast hole in the first paragraph of Article 45:
ARTICLE 45
The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles in the making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution.
This obviously both deliberate and insane. We should remove it. It is the biggest institutional flaw in our constitution. But Bunreacht na hEireann is worth so much more than the paper its printed on, or the jurisdiction of the courts it defines. It is the code of the country, the will of the people, enacted, modified and attained. It is the source of our of our law, our shared hope, and our sense of gathered self. We are our constitution, we are free.
"The judicial power of government of those courts includes the power to review the compatibility of statutes with the Constitution and to judicially review subordinate legislation, decisions or actions of the Government or State bodies with a view to determining their legality and compatability with the Constitution, and principles deriving from the Constitution such as due process" [0]
I don't understand how Article 45 is interpreted but it's clearly not seen as a loophole where the Oireachtas can be the final arbiter over whether its laws are constitutional.
[0] http://www.supremecourt.ie/supremecourt/sclibrary3.nsf/pagec...
If so, this is not uncommon in constitutions, the term in the italian legal system is "autodichia" (something like "self-justice").
If you didn't have this then the law would be decided by unelected officials.
If you don't want a part of the constitution to be enforced, why should it even be there?
2 The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:–
i That the citizens (all of whom, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood) may through their occupations find the means of making reasonable provision for their domestic needs.
ii That the ownership and control of the material resources of the community may be so distributed amongst private individuals and the various classes as best to subserve the common good.
iii That, especially, the operation of free competition shall not be allowed so to develop as to result in the concentration of the ownership or control of essential commodities in a few individuals to the common detriment.
iv That in what pertains to the control of credit the constant and predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole.
v That there may be established on the land in economic security as many families as in the circumstances shall be practicable.
3 1° The State shall favour and, where necessary, supplement private initiative in industry and commerce.
2° The State shall endeavour to secure that private enterprise shall be so conducted as to ensure reasonable efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and as to protect the public against unjust exploitation.
4 1° The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the community, and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the aged.
2° The State shall endeavour to ensure that the strength and health of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children shall not be abused and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength.
Of course, an institution won't survive a certain percentage of its members being malign. The stronger the institution, the larger that number is.
To give some ideas of the mechanisms that make this possible, internal reviews are one of the most powerful forces for making sure that rules established yesterday are still respected by people who join tomorrow, even at the very top.
The actual structures of power have changed quite dramatically roughly every 70 years in the US, from getting rid of the idea of states as sovereign with the Civil War to gutting the interstate commerce clause of all meaning under FDR or there President arrogating all war making powers to himself against the quite explicit provisions in the constitution. Most recent huge change would be either the administrative state after WW2 or getting rid of freedom of association.
There are plenty of countries that have the same nominal separation of powers, guaranteed by a constitution and a Supreme Court, but where the nominal separation of powers matters little in the face of political games. Hungary and Poland are relatively well known recent examples of countries that have subverted strong constitutional guarantees by inventing exceptions or finding reasons to oust people who are opposing political will for institutional reasons. In more corrupt states it can happen more egregiously.
A big problem, especially in young states, is the natural tendency to dislike red tape. Institutional power is all about red tape, though - doing something through the proper channels, with the proper oversight, even if it takes 3 times as long and costs twice as much as it should. This is the biggest hurdle that a young democracy has to overcome - learning to trust the apparent inefficiency of complex institutions (and knowing how to reform institutions that really don't work).
And I doubt either of us have done a survey of dictators; a lot of them probably do just ignore the local constitution.
It is important to remember that people who think we should follow the intent of a 100 year old law (or even a 10 year old law) are a tiny minority group. The majority of humans are here-and-now, what-looks-like-a-good-idea-today?, what-do-I-see-in-front-of-me people.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1936_Constitution_of_the_Sovie...
People:
> Rule #3: Institutions will not save you.
* Masha Gessen, "Autocracy: Rules for Survival", https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/11/10/trump-election-auto...
> There are no institutions, only people.
> It took him some time, but at Justice, at CoS, at OMB, at USTR, at NEC, at Treasury, at NSC, and now at ODNI Trump has found people broken enough to serve him as he demands to be served.
* https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/1231219728619835395 (Feb 22, 2020)
> A good reminder that Trump choose people as the heads of institutions with the expectations that they would destroy those institutions.
* https://twitter.com/RadioFreeTom/status/1374186031289880577 (Mar 22, 2021)
As for the US, the longer gaps in amending the constitution: 1804-1865, 1870-1913, 1971-present (yes the 27th was adopted in 1992 but proposed in 1789) correspond within a few years with periods of little to no conscription. This doesn't bode well for prospects of further amendment, by the way.
I wonder if constitutions really did anything or it was just all technology's doing.
Maybe, unsurprising to HN, but I believe more in technology's impact than anything else. I can get onboard with the printing press having an impact, the same way social media is having one today. Technology enabled the wars, and probably similarly ended them.
So, I agree that technology has likely ended large scale wars for our lifetime but I think we will see evolving forms of conflict. To fight is human. We are still animals after all.
Needed to fact-check this claim.
Wars [1] since the first and last nuclear weapons used in war - the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 - roughly ordered by death toll:
Bangladesh Liberation War, 3M
Second Congo War, 2.5M..5.4M
Vietnam War, 2.4M..4.3M
Korean War, 1.5M..4.5M
War in Afghanistan, 1.2M..2M
Second Sudanese Civil War, 1M..2M
Nigerian Civil War, 1M..3M
Rwandan genocide, 0.8M
Soviet–Afghan War, 0.6M..2M
Angolan Civil War, 0.5M
Ethiopian Civil War, 0.5M..1.5M
First Sudanese Civil War, 0.5M
Iraq War, 0.4M..0.7M
Algerian War, 0.4M..1.5M
First Indochina War, 0.4M
Syrian Civil War, 0.4M..0.6M
War in Darfur, 0.3M
Burundian Civil War, 0.3M
Somali Civil War, 0.3M..0.5M
Iran–Iraq War, 0.3M..1.1M
War on Terror, 0.3M..1.3M
First Congo War, 0.3M..0.8M
plus some 4M combined from wars smaller than 250K
TOTAL 23M .. 41M
For comparison, over 100M people died in warefare in the middle ages.
Checks out.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_by_death_toll#Mod...
Technology is a facilitator for better and more impactful wars. Has always been historically.
>Technology enabled the wars, and probably similarly ended them.
The loss of the role of Europe after WWII (when they couldn't hold the colonies anymore or fight between them for global control) that ended them.
Plus tons of national barriers have been established by then (the break-up of empires and the unification of feudal arrangmenets into countries having brought many wars between populations wanthing their own state and fighting for its borders with neighbors).
The US, on the other hand, which picked up the "top dog" role after WWII, got into countless wars during the Cold War, but it was between them the USSR and their proxies - Europe did not need to apply anymore.
And the US got into all those wars despite the US having the most advanced technology of that era. It wasn't the technology that started/stopped the wars, it was the opportunity they offered (or lack thereof in Europe).
In the next economic vacuum/opportunity we'll see a revamp. We already see it with the current trade wars...
(May be behind a paywall.)
Contains a rebuttal to the book's central thesis that wars beget constitutions:
"It’s not hard to demonstrate that war in this period, swelling monstrously in its global extent, army numbers and killing power, could shake existing states and empires to their foundations. The cost of modern conflict – the enormous human mobilisations, the new battle fleets – emptied treasuries and laid crushing burdens of taxation on populations. The relentless search for recruits brought grief and often violence to every village. Disruption led to discontent, sometimes to revolt. But there’s no simple and direct link between warfare – and the social turmoil it provokes – and constitution-writing. Colley shows, shrewdly enough, how rulers desperate for cannon-fodder devised a connection between soldiering and the new idea of citizenship. Join the army, and you will be entitled to a vote and to the protection of new-fangled constitutional rights, all set down in writing. (This condition effectively kept women out of political life.) In that sense, warfare did sponsor some constitutions. But was it more than a single powerful factor in a bundle of upheavals, class conflicts and royal or plebeian ambitions, any combination of which could move somebody with a pen to design a new order? It would have helped to be given at least one detailed example of the way the pressures of a specific war led to a constitution. Colley cites America’s 1787 constitution, which, she argues, was not intended primarily as ‘a blueprint of a liberal democratic society’ but was a ‘grimly necessary plan for a more effective and defendable union’ in the face of military threats from Britain, Spain and even Russia. Perhaps. On the other hand, Britain in 1815 emerged emaciated and simmering with unrest after three huge wars in a generation, but developed no written constitution. The best that can be said is that people start scribbling most frequently in stormy times, when the existing state of governance no longer carries conviction with subjects, rulers or both."
This sounds like Starship Troopers. Can you quote a constitution where being a soldier gives you rights to vote, and where the chance of being killed (and generally brutalised) was taken up widespreadly by the general public? It's my impression that for several hundred years when even the idea of voting became widespread, most people were not going to put their lives on the line for it.