To profit from this exploitive behavior, he created a token that would trick sandwich traders into thinking a large trade was coming, but would keep their money when they tried to exit their position after the front run.
To profit from this exploitive behavior, he created a token that would trick sandwich traders into thinking a large trade was coming, but would keep their money when they tried to exit their position after the front run.
Somehow the real details of the transaction must be machine readable and parseable if they bother.
I suppose simulating what the call would do using a trial run would also work?
If so, then yeah, sometimes judges do throw out deceptive contracts based on "gotcha" clauses with non-obvious implications the counterparty couldn't have reasonably expected. But here, it would be like if the signer had continuous access to a resource that would instantly answer any implication about any scenario they had in mind, and the signer refused to test it for even one scenario they were planning to use the contract for. I image judges being a lot less sympathetic to that kind of mistake.
I understand it works like this:
V = victim/sandwich bot, S = Salmonella guy, X = asset (Salmonella token?).
S -- purchase intent -> X ($5)
V detects the intent, purchases X for $5, X price increases to $6
Now it was expected that S would still buy X at $6 (would have this normally be done automatically without confirming the increased price?). But S never pays money for X, so the ETH is now in the hands of the original Salmonella token owner (S) and the attacker is stuck with a worthless token?
This is quite interesting. I need to read up more!
The token doesn’t do anything intelligent like this. It just divides the send amount by 10 for anybody but him.