and the companies that know better should be fined and sanctioned, particular the ones that are demanding SMS based OTP so they can also add your phone number to their social graph
The problem is purely with how some companies are applying SMS as an auth factor. In cases where SMS us being used as a recovery factor, it should not be allow for immediate recovery. Instead the user should be notified via other channels (email, phone notifications) about the recovery attempt, be given the opportunity to reject it, and for the recovery to only succeed if it is not denied after e.g. 3 days.
Same, especially since I don't have a smartphone.
Often times I'll go a week without looking at my phone and by then it has lost its charge so if an app requires a OTP to do something I often need to wait a while before it's charged enough to receive a text.
I do have a Google Voice number but I've mistakenly used my real number for a few services that frequently require SMS confirmations.
and I really don't call them second factor, that conflates the whole issue of where they are stored, how they are synced and used. people should be able to recover access to their one time passcode seed and there is little excuse for this.
While if I lose my SIM card, I'll walk to one of my operator's shops (there's probably one within 1km), show them my ID, and they'll replace the SIM. It's the only digital identifier that I could bootstrap from if I lost access to everything in one go.
If I claim to have forgotten my password, the first idea it has is that I should prove I still have my Security Key
Then it suggests it could send codes to my GMail (which might actually be useful if I have another device signed into that) or to another email address it knows about (it deliberately redacts part of each address in case I am not me)
Then it resorts to suggesting I try passwords I remember using on this account. I don't know what happens if I give it a password I haven't used for a few years, 'pass' means I keep a complete git history of Google passwords but I am reluctant to mess with this
Then it says too bad, it cannot authenticate me.
I can't say what it does currently but it used to say something along the lines of "you haven't used that password in a while. try something else."
(Actually, it doesn't send a code to your phone. It either sends a prompt to your phone, OR you can open a buried menu in some app to GET a - essentially TOTP - code.)
When I confirm the phone number, it sends a 6 digit SMS code prefixed with G-, like G-123456 The input box on page has already a read only G- text, & then a box for 6 digit code. After I confirm code from SMS, it gives the option to reset password.
Most of the forgot password ways to reset password is Tap on other Device prompt OR get a code from Google App.
Sample Google SMS to reset code with fictional number.
```G-007007 is your Google verification code.```
After I removed the phone number, now if i click Other Ways enough times, it simply says, give us the information about last time logged, creation date, some address I email frequently, & some other stuff, & sats it will take few days for them to get back to me.
I assume the number of account recovery options diminish with increasing levels of protection.
Turned out that the text box for entering the new password allowed a different number of characters than the one for logging in.
Something better would be great. She's probably an extreme example, but I think we techy people tend to have a warped view of how comfortable "normal people" are with effective password management.
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6361026
I.e. use smartphone prompts as the first factor (without causing password resets), while the password is just a backup when the phone is not available.
I also do that everywhere. As a matter of principle, I have decided to not remember any passwords in my life. I call it "login by email".
No. Send me an email, let me upload my ID, anything but SMS. SMS is completely insecure. Not only can it be passively sniffed along the way, not only can malicious actors intercept it without access, not only can pretty much any employee at my telco access it, not only can pretty much any employee at my telco get tricked into intercepting it, but by default (and therefore for the vast majority of users), it'll show up while the phone is locked!
The numerous emails I get when I log in from a new device serve me pretty well, all things considered
If you have multiple accounts, services, etc, then backing up your 2FA codes, or registering two devices/phones at the same time should be on your radar.
We've already successfully gotten people to start using some level of 2FA in the form of SMS-based identity validation along with their password.
That's a pretty impressive step forward, and sufficient for most non-specifically targeted users' usage.
You can fool carrier customer service with no training.
edit: everyone has a threat matrix they have to deal with.
A substantial number of services don't support this, which is a serious impediment to using 2FA both safely and securely.
Feels like the industry needs to push for a dedicated, universal, probably physical, tool for 2FA.
This is not the case in my experience. Many apps that once used Authenticator-based TOTP now use app-based push alerts (Steam Authenticator, Blizzard Authenticator, Google->GMail App, etc.), but I haven't noticed a trend toward actual SMS.
Are there major orgs that switched to SMS 2FA and disabled authenticator apps? If so, I'd be interested in learning why, also.
Simplicity: nearly everybody understands how texting works.
Just like any other password or data, 2fa strings also need to be backed up, like in a password database (separate from the usual one).
Unfortunately most people have only one phone, so that didn’t work until options came along where you could add more than one token/device instead as backup.
If you have that seed phrase, & any device with correct time can calculate the TOTP code, even a simple local javascript app.
Obviously that phrase leaked would mean hacker can also generate codes. So that's why those phrases should be kept extra safe, away from normal passwords.
and how do you do estate planning? I'd like to give my family access to all of my private keys for everything when I pass.
Register multiple/duplicate keys.
As for estate planning, set up a spare key that you can keep at a relative’s place, or add others’ accounts to your “Family” in Google/Microsoft/Apple/etc. Either they have their own keys and the company is aware of the handover or they have a copy of yours — such as you logging in on their device or keeping a FIDO2 key at their house and they can pretend to be you. A service like 1Password Family could also be of use here.
This is perhaps why FIDO2 works best when combined with single-sign-on systems, such as those promoted by large email providers, etc. Fewer accounts to have to manage 2FA devices for, and a greater chance that you've already signed in and authenticated your devices with all of them.
Personally, though, I use a password manager, and have some (but not all) sites tagged as 2FA in the password manager. So if and when it's time to add another key, I can just go down the list. Not as convenient as SSO-based 2FA, but sometimes you really don't want to sign in with Facebook, say. :)
This is also why they won't let you set up a good 2 factor authentication system (like a Yubikey) they'll force you to first set up a SMS 2 factor. It's very important to remember to delete that SMS second factor after setting up your good second factor or social engineers will use it to steal your account.