The US IPO cartel
blogs.reuters.com
blogs.reuters.com
In a monopolistic situation there's almost always incentive for those "outside" the monopoly to weaken or disband the monopoly's stronghold; if enough individuals join together and engage in cartel behavior independently from the monopoly, the market at least turns into a duopoly. However, in a cartel situation where there's no threat of duopoly or oligopoly, there's more incentive to join the cartel than there is to attempt to disband the central monopoly that's essentially controlling the cartel. It's almost like high-level blackmail because it makes the monopoly stronger while weakening the incentive to compete "outside" the monopoly.
For example -- my favorite soapbox issue: the National Association of Realtors. They could be likened to a cartel of people unified in their incentive to keep their "spread" around 6.x percent. These IPO financiers are likely in the same boat: they all know and silently agree that they're better of keeping their spread at 6.x or 7.x percent than they would be going off on their own or using their "little" money to compete with the "big" money of IPOs.
Is what it is. The law of unintended consequences tells me that should the govt try to mingle with this practice, the outcome will likely be that bigger/more desirable companies get preferred treatment (like Google attempted to do) at say 6-7% while the relatively smaller companies pay a liquidity/desirability premium to make up for it. Same thing happened to credit card rates, which are now at all time highs...
Also, if your observation above is in fact correct and investment banks continue basing their pricing on what they've done for the last 20 years, then I wouldn't worry about the government coming in and messing with their business - reliance on logic like "it's how we've always done things" is sure to bring about obsolescence first.
I understand what you're trying to get at - giving investment banks an incentive etc. - but the high degree of conformity doesn't make sense. Even large slices of small pies won't interest banks much, and similarly only a small slice of a huge pie ought to interest them plenty.
To be frank, price competition exists in banking but most companies dont care about it. There are a lot of IPO's that take place and you'd be amazed how many of them "fail". You just dont hear about them because they are so small and underwritten by smaller banks. Big/successful companies dont care about the arbing the 100-150 basis points and risk jeopardizing the success of their IPO by picking someone other than Goldman.
The scary thing is this probably speaks volumes about the insidious effect of the banking industry on the US economy. (BTW - I am a brit and living on the UK but I care because if the US economy goes I'm pretty sure it'll drag the UK and most of western europe down with it.
I'm getting more and more worried about the US.
But I question if there is always a cartel whenever service fees lump together. If you collected the percentage of dinner checks paid as a tip, you'd see an enormous concentration right around 15-18%. Are all the waiters colluding? Even the ones where tip is not included?
Of course, where the market is closed/protected, then the only way to change it is to lobby politically. And good luck with that in the banking domain.
Can't comment on other locations, might be different.
Oh, found an article from 2004, so things have been changing for a little longer than I thought, but I think it makes clear that 6% was not always a myth. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109364276315603265.html
I'm sorry, but this is obviously not true; there are clusters on exactly 3, 4, 5, and (faintly) 6 percent in the European market. And given that forcing to arbitrary whole numbers _happens_, it suddenly seems very possible that in a (larger) market like the US the forcing acts even stronger.
In other words, we need _evidence of collusion_ to determine for sure if there is a cartel, not just evidence that it is the same.
That said, however, the difference between actual collusion and accidental collusion isn't that thin.