If - on the other hand - the government would also like to mass surveil all its citizens, then that is a use case that Taler explicitly and intentionally does not support.
With anonymity for consumer how would transactions like exchanges and returns work?
But not of fighting money laundering. If all income is anonymous, it'd be relatively easy to set up a fake digital-only product and buy yourself lots of it.
It could eventually ease money laundering between countries where laws are different. For example, sell drugs from Netherland, receive Taller coins, buy virtual things from your company in France to move it there. But in fact you can already do that, buy a coffee shop in Amsterdam, and transfer your income after taxes to your bank account in France. Great your are a drug baron living from France now.
What it will prevent is for a country to block their citizen from buying something illegal from another where it is legal, as it is done with card payment and drugs bought online.
Realtime mass surveillance of every party who receives money is isomorphic to realtime mass surveillance of everyone.
Every person who sends funds received them previously and is sending them to someone who is receiving them.
Taler's surveilling is continuous, unaccountable, and operates without any due process what so ever: No court is required to authorize surveilling your records, nor can you even detect it to fight the intrusion.
The claim that the mass surveillance is required to enable taxation is outright untrue and inconsistent with longstanding practice. Taxation, including sales taxes, existed for a long time before low privacy electronic payment networks existed.
I don't believe it is.
For instance, imagine a closed system of three people: Alice, Bob, and Carol. Initially we start off with seeding both Alice and Bob $100 via Taler. We can see that because it is public. Then, we see that Carol receives $5. That is also public. Who gave Carol the $5?
If surveillance of money received is isometric to full surveillance, you should be able to answer this question, but clearly there is insufficient information, so clearly they are not isometric. There may be special cases where sufficiently large transactions can only have come from a small pool of wealthy transactors, but I bet this would be essentially meaningless in practice, and is absolutely not the same as equating the system to full surveillance of every participant.