Comment by samhuk | Hacker News Reader

Comment by samhuk | Hacker News Reader

This was a very interesting read. I have seen many of these arguments posted before, even on HN, but I have never seen so many of them combined into one piece before.

I have seen the claims about Boeing upper-level being "taken-over" by Mcdonnell Douglas upper-level many times before in many places, yet I haven't ever actually seen any evidence for it. Even in the linked article, there is none. Is it myth or fact? Genuinely curios. I think that that deserves it's own story to be honest, since it seems to be quite the straight line between grubby MD upper-levels -> Boeing "take-over" -> SLS + other marred projects.

Regardless, for me the article instills a strong sense of helplessness by it's account of a virtually invincible cabal of senators and lobbyists. It makes me think "If Jim Bridenstein had to back down from cancelling it, how else are we able to?"

As one of the comments say, I really do hope that this gets retweeted by Scott Manley, Tim Dodd, or Elon, in ascending order of preference.

RE McDonnelDougalas takeover - I found this to be a pretty well written article going over the basics of what happened. I'm sure there's a book or in depth article floating around somewhere...or maybe not, people tend to be closemouthed about those things.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing...

Good read. Thanks. I agree about the careful nature of things written about this. The blurry yet straight lines that seem to be able to be drawn from boeing upper-level to the political upper-level and even the president I think make this a rather dangerous subject to dabble in as a journalist.

I wouldn't be surprised if you never got a promotion after writing something like this because your boss' boss got a "call".

I've written about this before, in relation to the 737 MAX, I'll just post it verbatim:

---

In 1997, Boeing merged with McDonnel Douglas. This led to some changes in management, and as a result, culture[1, 8:20]. McDonnel Douglas CEO, Harry Stonecipher, became the COO of Boeing. Stonecipher brought with him a cost-cutting sensibility, which was at odds with the engineering culture at the company [1, 9:00].

The culture change is best conveyed through two actions made by Boeing top management:

• Pierson being told ”The military isn’t a profit making organization” by Program Manager Scott Campbell after raising the point that the conditions at the Renton factory would not be acceptable in the military [2]

• Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg calling Donald Trump, the president of the United States, two days after the second crash to assure him that the plane is safe, apparently trying to persuade him to pull some strings

Here is a longer timeline of disruptive events, bad fortune, and questionable behavior:

• In 1998, Boeing committed corporate espionage against Lockheed Martin

• Relocation of Boeing headquarters from Seattle to Chicago in 2001

• Multiple canceled projects: e.g. The Sonic Cruiser

• Boeing lost its market leader position to Airbus in 2003

• An espionage/insider agent scandal in 2003 caused CEO Phil Condit to resign. Harry Stonecipher stepped in as CEO

• Stonecipher was soon forced to resign due to a relationship with another executive

• In the 2010’s, thousands of highly skilled workers were laid off

• At the same time, the company started outsourcing its production

Both relocations and mergers are big turnover events, as are layoffs, obviously. Too much turnover usually leads to changes in company culture and possibly loss of knowledge. The ethical issues uncovered during this time also indicate a culture of profit at any cost.

In particular, analysts cite a ”disruption in the communication between engineers and top management” as a cause of the deterioration [1, 5:10]. I have no doubt that the distance from the new headquarters in Chicago to the production facilities exacerbated this disruption.

[1] Bloomberg News, “How Boeing Lost Its Way.” Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EESYomdoeCs.

[2] Edward F. Pierson, “Statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.” Available at: https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Pierson%20Tes...

Rereading the sources, I think Pierson's statement tells the story of current conditions the best.

Pierson tried to stop production at a 737 facility due to safety concerns, he was shut down hard by top management. Here's some highlights from the document:

Discussion with Campbell:

"To address the worsening factory conditions, I recommended that Boeing “[s]hut down the production line to allow our team time to regroup so we can safely finish the planes.” In response, Mr. Campbell assured me that “safety and quality is number one and schedule come [sic] after that,” but he did not acknowledge, let alone act on, my recommendation that Boeing shut down the line to allow workers time to safely address the production backlog.

Over the following weeks, factory conditions worsened. In early July, I requested an in-person meeting with Mr. Campbell to further discuss my concerns. When we met on July 18, I gave multiple examples of process breakdowns, explained the numerous metrics indicating a decline in quality, and reiterated my recommendation that Boeing shut down the line to address product and worker-safety risks. In response, Mr. Campbell told me, “We can’t do that. I can’t do that.” I pushed back, explaining that I had seen operations in the military shut down over less substantial safety issues, and those organizations had national security responsibilities. Mr. Campbell responded tersely, “The military isn’t a profit-making organization.”"

Discussion with Luttig:

"On January 21, I again spoke with Mr. Luttig about my concerns. Mr. Luttig said that all the 737s in service had received thorough post-manufacturing inspections and that Boeing had not seen any issues with the other planes in the 737 fleet. Mr. Luttig then asked what I would do to investigate my concerns. I recommended that Boeing establish a cross-functional team of subject matter experts who could review data for potential quality and engineering risks and interview employees on the ground about the health of the Renton factory. In response to this proposal, Mr. Luttig recommended that they add Assistant General Counsel Padraic Fennelly to the conversation.

The following day, I spoke with Mr. Luttig and Mr. Fennelly over the phone and once again reiterated my concerns and recommendations. Shortly after the call began, however, I came to believe Mr. Luttig and Mr. Fennelly were more interested in placating me than seriously investigating the factory conditions. Disappointed with the call, I promptly documented my core recommendation by email: “Forming a cross functional [Non-Advocate Review] team to conduct an objective, comprehensive assessment of what occurred last year and the current state of the program . . . . This assessment would need to include the analysis of production related data (e.g., quality data) and talking with employees.” See Exhibit 5 (emails exchanged with general counsel). I stressed that investigating the Renton factory conditions was “obviously an ongoing urgent matter—it was urgent last summer [and] made even more urgent this fall.” Id.

Two weeks later, having heard nothing further, I sent another email to Mr. Luttig and Mr. Fennelly, setting out in painstaking detail the concerns I had been raising since June 2018: employee fatigue and schedule pressure, aggressive leadership communication, mounting quality defects (including numerous functional test and Electrical Wiring Interconnect System problems), staffing constraints, process deviations, communications breakdowns, and others. I emphasized that “the sheer volume of these issues highlights the considerable & unnecessary risk the company was (is still?) taking to meet ever increasing airplane production rates and delivery schedules” and that “production mistakes may have been made with this airplane and potentially others.” Id. I also felt Boeing had misled the public about the state of 737 production: “Record numbers of airplanes delivered makes for good headlines, but they can belie the reality of production health.” Id.

On February 14, Mr. Fennelly responded that Boeing had considered my information but had “seen nothing from any of [its data] sources that would suggest the existence of embedded quality or safety issues.” Id."

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