Prediction Markets: Tales from the Election
vitalik.ca
vitalik.ca
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market#Legality
I always thought the the problem with prediction markets is you have the incentive to make the prediction come true. And that gets ugly fast. But hell, I guess that's what all this is at the end of the day.
This is ridiculous, regulate prediction markets like any other financial market (in particular, your identity should be traceable) and then all your clever plan does is get your funds frozen pending a very thorough investigation.
Would this cause Tesla stock to rise or fall?
See https://www.bankrate.com/insurance/life-insurance/dead-peasa... for an overview of current regulations that resulted from that.
No, Walmart was doing it since they thought the policies would be tax deductible. They ended up losing money and eventually ended up bringing up a case against their insurance companies:
>...Discount retailing giant WalMart cannot sue its insurers just because it gambled and lost $1.3 billion on getting a tax break from thousands of insurance policies it took out on employees, according to a brief filed by the insurers in the Delaware Supreme Court.
>WalMart is contending in an appeal that it was entitled to rely on its expert insurance brokers to warn the company of the inherent dangers of buying COLI policies. WalMart has asked the high court to revive its bad-faith and breach-of-duty claims against its insurers, which the Delaware Chancery Court had dismissed.
>Such policies lost their attraction for corporations long ago but disputes over liability for the tax consequences continue for companies in a position similar to WalMart’s.
As to your case, Walmart thought that it could deduct the premiums. It turns out that it could not. Walmart also thought that it could create and collect them under Georgia law. It turns out that it could not. Walmart also has been forced to pay families of workers some of the payouts. None of which it expected.
All of these things affect how profitable the policy is for Walmart. But they don't change the fact that once the policies are taken out, Walmart has a financial incentive to treat workers poorly. Which is why many states had banned the practice. And is why federal law currently only allows companies to take out life insurance on approximately their most highly paid third of employees. (Who also have to consent to it.)
Back to the suit. Walmart sued its insurers in 2002 for fraud for failing to explain these risks. The brief quoted in Snopes is as filed by the insurers in 2005. They lost that judgement, but the case continued on. As of 2009, per http://www.contingentfeeblog.com/2009/05/articles/corporate-..., the Delaware Supreme Court ruled for Walmart a 3rd time. I don't know the final outcome of the case. But it certainly wasn't as open and shut as the insurer's brief made it sound.
>...Concrete example, Walmart took out life insurance on its employees because they were betting that their horrible working conditions made people more likely to die than the insurance companies thought.
I have seen no evidence that is why Walmart instituted the corporate policy of buying life insurance on their employees. If any evidence of that sort had come out in the various law suits, it would have made headlines all around the world.
Even today many companies buy life insurance on their key employees - that doesn't mean their plan is to treat their key employees so poorly that they have an earlier death.
Insurance is a regular payment in return for a large payment upon catastrophe. The insurer sets the price such that they expect to make money. That means that it should be a money losing proposition for the insured. The insured is willing to pay for insurance either because it is required by law (for example car insurance), or because they cannot afford the risk of catastrophic losses.
It therefore makes sense for companies to take out insurance on valuable assets that they can't easily replace as a risk mitigation strategy. Valuable assets, including key employees. But if everything is priced correctly, insurance is still a money-losing proposition for companies. And therefore anything that companies can cover by keeping sufficient cash reserves and credit lines, they should. In particular for low-level employees, death is merely a minor contribution to normal turnover, and companies should find that they save themselves money by self-covering that cost without using insurance. And furthermore companies should only seek necessary insurance for real risks. Which means that valuable assets, including key employees, should only be insured for the company's expected loss.
There is one major exception to this pricing rule. And that exception is when the entity (person or company) seeking insurance believes that they have more knowledge than the insurer. Then they may buy insurance as a bet against the insurer. The history of insurance is filled with examples. And there is a constant cat and mouse game where insurers try to protect themselves against this risk, while still providing insurance at a competitive price.
One famous example is that unscrupulous ship-owners used to buy ships in bad condition, overload them with a valuable cargo, insure it to the hilt, then set them off into the sunset knowing full well that the ship was likely to sink with all hands on board. The fabled insurer Lloyds of London got was the first insurer to solve this problem. They would draw the "water line" around a ship that was loaded and quoted insurance rates based on where that line was. Which meant that they didn't sell insurance to unscrupulous ship-owners, and could offer much better rates to scrupulous ones.
Another example is that people really do buy insurance on a spouse, then try to kill said spouse for the insurance. Therefore insurance companies have convinced governments to pass "slayer rules" that allow them to not pay out life insurance if there is any hint that it might have been murder.
Now back to dead peasant policies. Whatever the details of the tax breaks that made Walmart think it could be profitable, if insurers have correctly priced the insurance policies, then Walmart is virtually guaranteed to lose money on those policies. The reason why is that insurance is a zero sum game, and insurers are in it to generate a profit for themselves. While the loss of low-level workers is a tragedy, Walmart has the reserves to cover its own financial risks. And certainly should not have an incentive to over-insure those workers to the tune of a decade of full-time pay. (And then maintain said insurance after the workers had stopped working for Walmart and there was no possible loss to Walmart from their death.)
Therefore the only logical reason for Walmart to buy all of those policies is that Walmart believes that it has more information than the insurers on the likelihood that its workers will die. And therefore the only logical reason to buy that insurance is as a bet that insurers are systemically mispricing those policies. If they don't have that information, why else would they spend billions on what is supposed to be a money-losing proposition? Insurers knew this, and that is EXACTLY the gamble that insurers were describing in their brief.
The various laws against dead peasant policies were passed on this theory. They exist for the same reason that slayer rules exist. Because insurers convinced politicians that it is a bad idea to give people a financial incentive to see other people die. And politicians agreed that this made sense.
The lawsuit that Walmart filed was not because Walmart disagrees with this characterization of its behavior. It is because Walmart was not informed by the insurers of tax laws that meant that it went from a straight bet about who better knew the statistics on Walmart's workers, to a guaranteed money-losing proposition for Walmart. (Because whether or not Walmart won the bet, it wasn't going to win to the tune of how much it had to pay in taxes.)
>...Therefore the only logical reason for Walmart to buy all of those policies is that Walmart believes that it has more information than the insurers on the likelihood that its workers will die.
No, as I stated before, all the evidence indicates this was mostly done due to perceived favorable tax treatment:
>…Under a typical arrangement, buyers of the insurance pay a fraction of the premium up front and borrow the rest from the insurer. The insurer profits because the interest rate on the loan is higher than the rate of return credited to the buyer on the policy’s cash value. The buying company profits by deducting the interest payments from its taxable income (if eligible to do so under the 2006 law) and because life insurance proceeds are not taxable. Left holding the bag for those profits is Uncle Sam.
https://www.cfo.com/tax/2014/01/dead-peasant-insurance-still...
Of course this could be profitable for a corporation with a large number of workers if it was allowed. Little up-front money, deduct the interest costs and no tax on the death benefit at a time when corporate tax rates were about 35%. The IRS went after these insurance policies and congress also changed the law.
The cases against Walmart have been tried about this use of insurance in many jurisdictions and you haven't shown any evidence of Walmart making a business decision based on a calculation that "...their horrible working conditions made people more likely to die than the insurance companies thought".
Opening a market on when they will die that goes to the person who is closest to the right date, now any would-be assassin can place their bet and try to win. And the target may know that people are hunting for them, but won't be forewarned of when.
Plus this ignores risks outside the market, like the risk the would be assassin gets caught and sent to prison.
So if I want Donald Trump dead and am willing to pay a million dollars, I start the market and put a million dollars in for tomorrow. Eventually he dies and someone collects. Almost certainly not me, and not necessarily an assassin.
But any would-be assassin who wants can place a bet and now has a million dollars riding on whether they succeed.
This is not novel, the idea has been around for a quarter century. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_market for more.
Disclosure: I work for one.
If players in the market have ways outside the market to significantly affect the outcome that the market is betting on, then it isn't a prediction market. The whole point of a prediction market is that there is no such feedback mechanism.
For example, the article discusses prediction market bets on Trump winning the election. The underlying assumption of such markets is that no player has more than one vote in the actual election, out of some 150 million or so votes, so each individual player's ability to affect the outcome is negligible.
But this is not necessarily true. In the extreme case, a bettor could be one of nine Supreme Court justices. Or a participant in some sort of fantasy vote-rigging conspiracy. Or even a political insider tanking their candidate's own chances and betting against themselves. There's a pretty wide range of people who could plausibly (or not-so-plausibly in the conspiracy example) have more than a one-vote influence over the result of the election.
This is even more relevant outside of the US. In the US vote rigging conspiracies are impossible for some inexplicable reason, perhaps related to magical soil, but outside of the US they are a real concern.
Ah, that makes sense. They would require evidence to believe something. So for example, in an election where there was no evidence of fraud, they would not believe there was fraud. Such as the one which occurred in 2020 in the U.S.
But if the evidence is not available, then there is no good reason to believe it. You have to explain why people claiming it have enough evidence to believe it, but the courts don’t have enough evidence for it to be even claimed in the courts, if you want to claim that the reason is that courts don’t have access to the evidence.
Based on this statement, I am guessing you are an American, and are therefore accustomed to all relevant hard evidence always being available. What you may not know is that in the rest of the world, sometimes some hard evidence is not available, so those people have adapted other mechanisms for forming beliefs about what is true. One such mechanism is the use of reason to draw inferences from other relevant facts.
For instance, in those countries, if a man who has professed a strong desire for wealth is tasked with guarding a large pile of money, and the money disappears, people in those countries will infer that the man likely took the money, even if no one saw him take it and the money is not later found in his possession.
The “other relevant facts” are called “evidence”. An observation is evidence for a proposition when the posterior probability for the proposition, after updating on the observation, is greater than the prior probability of the proposition, before the observation.
Ok, so I guess you are saying that the evidence is not __legally considered__ evidence, or isn’t “evidence” in the legal sense of the term, and that that is why it wasn’t presented it court?
I have to admit that I’m not particularly clear on what kinds of evidence are and aren’t considered “evidence” in the legal sense admissible in court. Are you familiar with the criteria that make the distinction?
I was talking about hard evidence specifically -- think a smoking gun with the suspect's fingerprints on it. According to what I have been lead to believe, if election fraud happened in the US, sufficient evidence of said fraud would be discovered and presented to American courts, though that is not the case in other countries.
Therefore if I have not been mislead, when a person considers whether there was election fraud in the US, they should only consider whether sufficient evidence has been presented to courts or to the media, not whether there exist other lesser forms of evidence.
No, they aren't, which is why our most recent ex-President (who also was notorious for inventing fantastical vote-rigging conspiracies out of no evidence in the same election) is currently at the center of a criminal investigation for one based on fairly hard evidence, and his political party is trying to change the Georgia State Constitution to derail the investigation.
There's a difference between “That vote-rigging conspiracy is an unsubstantiated fantasy” and “Vote-rigging conspiracies are impossible.” Pretty much no one in the US has ever argued the latter.
Have I been mislead? If it is possible to carry out election rigging conspiracies in the US, then how can we be so confident that no such conspiracies were carried out by people that viciously hate the former president? Surely if it is possible for conspirators to get away with it in other countries, and there is no magical means of preventing it here, then it's possible for them to get away with it here as well. They have courts and investigations and evidence in other countries as well, and that has seemingly not prevented election rigging there.
Some motivated people have spent a lot of time and money trying to find proof of those creatures, and come up with nothing but some blurry pictures (including some known to be intentional fakes) and conjecture. So there's not much reason to take them seriously.
And also kinda like how Kim Jong Un might be the preferred candidate of 100% of North Koreans, and we'll never really know for sure, but most people conclude that he is almost certainly not.
As usual these arguments never really end, but thanks to prediction markets, this time the people who believed the possible-but-highly-unlikely outcome, "Trump actually won", ended up donating lots of their money to the people who believed the much more simple and plausible scenario: "No, he didn't".
No, that's not what happened. People who believed the odds of the courts ruling in favor of Trump made the payout worth it gave their money to people who believed the odds of that not happening made the payout for that scenario worth it.
Of course, courts only have access to the evidence which is given to them by either side, so really we only know that the evidence Trump's legal team was able to get its hands on on short notice was not sufficient to convince the court to take the very significant step of overturning election results. We do not know who "actually" got more legitimate votes.
I'm not convinced that it is. Sure, election rigging happens, but that's not the “getting away with it” that would be at issue. Either people who get away with it undetected in the very short term are so good that they manage to suppress all evidence completely and it never comes out (which seems an implausible binodality in outcomes), or it usually is quite evident in even the very short-term, and either fails to do enough to change results, does enough to change results but is corrected by institutional processes, or it does enough to change results and is allowed to stand by corrupt institutions despite being widely decried.
There's not a whole lot of modern cases where election fraud is discovered only long-after the event rather than virtually in real-time.
Is vote rigging and conspiracy to rig votes possible in the modern world? Yes. Is it ever both significant and not immediately evident? It's not impossible, but it doesn't seem to be the case. If it were, you'd expect there to be examples of cases undetectable in the short-run but later discovered.
Why do you think that's implausible? What evidence of election fraud would you expect to be left behind that would be difficult to dispose of?
>is allowed to stand by corrupt institutions despite being widely decried.
By whom?
>If it were, you'd expect there to be examples of cases undetectable in the short-run but later discovered.
Why would that be expected? Many crimes are much harder to prove if the perpetrator is not caught in the act. Why would you not expect election fraud to be among them?
It involves thousands of people directly and an extreme amount of information collecting and statistics analysis.
Happens only in the ghettos tbh
This is about the likelihood of something occurring with no evidence left behind.
It’s not Impossible I’ve murdered someone, doesn’t mean I should be presumed a murderer.
1. https://voterprotectionprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/0...
"Furthermore, in an election conducted in the midst of a pandemic, each of the 159 counties was required to balance the close presence of poll watchers to election workers against the requirements for social distancing essential for the protection of public health."
"As Trump-appointed federal district court Judge Grimberg found, there is no legal “authority providing for a right to unrestrained observation or monitoring of vote counting, recounting, or auditing.”
"Second, there is no right under federal or state law for observers to stand at a particular distance or have a particular view of ballots. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have rejected such claims. As the Third Circuit noted: “The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Election Code requires only that poll watchers be in the room, not that they be within any specific distance of the ballots.” Id. (citing In re Canvassing Observation, No. 30 EAP 2020, 2020 WL 6737895, at *8-9 (Pa. Nov. 17, 2020)). Similarly, there is no federal right protecting the location or view of observers. Id. (noting that the Campaign “cites no federal authority regulating poll watchers or notice and cure.”). As long as observers were allowed in the room, which they were, complaints about minor deviations in the location and view of observers are legally insufficient.66"
In other words, the restrictions that were placed on observers were consistent with the law, and that is what the courts have ruled. I am willing to accept for the sake of argument that the restrictions were legal, but that's not the point. The point is that no one disputes that there were such restrictions. Nor do I see anyone disputing that the restrictions would have made it harder or impossible for election observers to detect fraud. The defense they put up is just that no fraud was detected, and that the restrictions were legal.
See: "The Trump Campaign and its surrogates have tried, unsuccessfully, to equate an alleged lack of observer access with fraudulent results. There has been no credible evidence of significant voter fraud presented in any form. The suggestion that the Trump Campaign and its surrogates were prevented from detecting fraud, and that is tantamount to evidence that there must have been fraud, is absurd."
I don't think that suggestion is absurd at all, and neither do tens of millions of other Americans. Members of the Democrat party viciously, bitterly hate Trump, and everyone knows it. Why would we not suspect them of cheating, if they made it difficult or impossible for anyone to tell?
Because they've been propagandized to think that way by a president with a conflicted interest. The number of people who hold an opinion has no bearing on whether it is factual.
Again, all you've done is to reiterate the same conspiracy theory without any evidence.
That's their claim (which is already suspicious considering their obvious motivations), but it's not the objective truth. And even if it were, it's certainly not actually evidence of fraud.
I'm genuinely surprised to hear someone claim this. The election centers handed out papers to observers telling them what the restrictions were. There were livestreams from various facilities during the process where workers were clearly seen handling election materials far away from where the observers were. There are pictures where observers are sitting impotently behind a line, watching 5+ election workers each from far enough away that they would never be able to read what's written on the materials that the workers are handling. The claims that restrictions were placed on observers which did not exist in past cycles and which would make it more difficult or impossible for observers to detect fraud were never denied in court. Instead, the defendants claimed that those restrictions did not prevent observers from being anywhere or seeing anything that they had a legal right to be or see.
>it's certainly not actually evidence of fraud
In combination with the undisputed hatred of democrats for Trump, it provides good reason for a person to believe that there was election fraud in those areas. Therefore it is evidence of fraud. It is not conclusive evidence, of course, but it is evidence.
The fat goalkeeper ate a pasty whilst sitting on the bench, and was promptly banned for a couple of months even without any evidence of financial gain for "intentionally influencing a betting market"
The host got wind of it and, for fun, changed ties at least five times throughout the evening.
https://twitter.com/sportsbetcomau/status/749219697359396864
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/federal-election-201...
You could manipulate the dogcatcher election (or, more profitably, a bond initiative) but a presidential election is probably too hard, especially in this case (amount of money you'd need to spend is much larger than the amount you could make on these markets).
>blockchain-based markets are highly niche
Not sure if he means if the whole of blockchain is highly niche or blockchain-based prediction markets are highly niche, but if it's the latter, I definitely agree.
The conclusion is disheartening "It shows a lot about how market efficiency actually works in practice, what are the limits of it and what could be done to improve it." Yes at a small scale, but at the current rate of adoption of crypto it will not go well if it is still treated as a playground.
If wisdom of the crowd worked then casinos would be out of business. There's an entire industry on the other side.
That does not follow. In prediction markets or sports betting, the gamblers aren't betting against the casino. They're betting against each other, and the casino (PredictIt, BetFair, etc) is skimming off the top, just like Duke & Duke in Trading Places. Most forms of gambling where players do bet directly against the house are games of pure chance where no amount of wisdom will help you beat the odds -- odds which are naturally always stacked in the house's favor.
Not to say that I think these betting markets are good at predicting future outcomes. They're clearly very bad at it! But I do think in concept they could be at least as good as any other method, since the existence of a betting market essentially sets a bounty for beating that market.
What is limiting them is a mix of: obscurity, bet size limits, bet participant count limits, counterparty risk of shady betting sites, cost of fees/taxes making many bets not worth taking. Some prediction markets eliminate parts of that equation but amplify others, like the crypto markets not having the bet size limitations but also being much more obscure and shady.
Furthermore, I don't even think those are problems that should be solved, because if none of those problems existed you'd see big traders like investment companies playing in prediction markets with billions of dollars, and then you'd have way bigger problems with insider trading and the market affecting the outcome. Things as mundane as surprise resignations and as shocking as assassinations.
People already joke about stuff like that happening on PredictIt, with its $850 investment cap. No way to prove that it did, but it would be very easy for certain employees to do and get away with it. For example, in the 2020 election there was a market for when the GSA would ascertain the winner (releasing funds to the transition team). That was a decision made by one government employee. The market started on Nov 18th and had brackets like "Nov 23 or earlier", "Nov 24-Nov 30", "Dec 1-Dec 7", and so on. By the afternoon of Nov 23, with no news, the "Nov 23 or earlier" bracket was trading at 1c. Then the ascertainment happened and it settled.
Now, that could have been a coincidence. It probably was a coincidence. But if you were the GSA administrator you could've made around $70k taking those 1c shares on the 23rd, and nobody would have to know.
Are you saying the crowd has an edge over the house? Sports betting platforms, poker sites, they are in the business of profiting off people who think they have an edge (aka ppl believe in the non-zero sum nature of these markets)
Even when the "wisdom of crowds" holds true, the crowd is made up of thousands of individual winners and losers. The house just extracts a cut (fee, commission, vig, juice, take) from the winners' profits. They stay profitable no matter how "wise" the odds settled on by the crowd ended up being.
Edit: concrete example. If you want to bet on Andrew Yang winning election for NYC Mayor, right now you'd pay 47c for a share on PredictIt. If he does win the election, you get a dollar. Where does the dollar come from? Well, you didn't really buy your "Yes" share from PredictIt. You bought it from somebody else on PredictIt, who's placed a standing offer to pay 53c for a "No" share. You accepted their offer when you bought your share taking the opposite end of their bet. Your 47c plus their 53c makes the dollar, and whoever wins gets the whole dollar. Except not quite, because PredictIt takes 10% of profits, so if you're right, you actually get your .47 back + (0.9 * .53) = $0.95, PredictIt gets the $0.05, and the loser gets zero.
It's good to be the bookie.
No, the crowd is paying the house to bet against each other.
> Sports betting platforms, poker sites, they are in the business of profiting off people who think they have an edge
In that that's a big part of what motivates people to gamble, yes, but parimutuel gambling—which, in effect, includes prediction markets—the house isn't taking a side against the gambler, it's taking a cut off the top from all the gamblers on all sides, then the winners split the remainder. (Or splitting among winners first and charging a fee to the winners, which amounts to the same thing.)
It's comical because I made like 30 percent in the span of a few months by betting against well known biases in IEM -- the investment stakes are too low for informed participants to move the market meaningfully.
But it's too low stakes to bother automating arbitrage strategies that would remove some of the bias of the public market.
Hard disagree.
Gambling is set up with the principal aims of a) making money off the spread and b) getting participants as "gamified" as possible with exciting events and the ability to bet lots of money.
Prediction markets are set up with the principal aim of crowdsourcing intelligence from a diverse set of minds. They can be set up by academia, think tanks, research labs, etc. And while (arguably) necessarily tied to real money, they also often limit participants and the size of bets through various mechanisms for a host of reasons (one being to make corruption non-viable as you mention).
Gambling is more often related to entertaining events like sports and national politics; prediction markets are often focused more on niche or technical outcomes though they also often expand into national politics to garner participation and scale.
Obviously any market in practice can lie somewhere in the middle. But that doesn't make the distinction any less important. They're not just the same thing.
I recommend that you open each platform mentioned in the article and apply your definition.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market
Clearly there's nothing theoretical about it.
2 months is more than enough for the price to double or halve and people want to be able to exit to fiat at a moment's notice when they think things are heading south.
Betfair is a British gambling firm, and isn't a research project, when Betfair's "Did Donald Trump win the US presidential election?" and "Did Joe Biden win the US presidential election?" closed it had hundreds of millions of pounds of bets across those two questions.
I got paid, as in I put cash in and a couple of weeks later more cash was paid out to my bank account when BetFair closed it, for knowing that Donald Trump did not win that election in December.
It was even possible (though of course risky) to buy the lows and sell the highs as MAGA rallied when they thought the Kraken had been released, or when Rudy was going to prove everyone wrong, or whatever other nonsense.
I was actually underwater for more than 50% of the two weeks between placing my "bet" and the cash returned, because MAGA were bidding up the "Donald Trump won" position even as it became increasingly obvious that they'd lose everything.
The Texas v. Pennsylvania case getting swatted down by SCOTUS was probably the last of the cheap shares where it was worth depositing money just to play, but if you already had some money in your account it was worth taking the obvious bets all the way to the end.
edit: went back and checked one of the markets to refresh my memory. Yep, check the 90-day chart. Dec 6 "NO" on a Republican win was only 84c!
https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/2721/Which-party-wi...
edit2: here's another hilarious one.
https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/5554/Will-Donald-Tr...
Yep, "Will Trump win the popular vote" closed on Nov 24th while still trading at 8 cents. The popular vote. Jesus Christ. For reference he lost the popular vote by 7 million.
I'd actually be curious to know if there was a crypto-market equivalent to that one, because I want to believe most of that pricing was due to PI's limits. For example, one Trump bettor maxing out his $850 limit of 7c shares, requires 14 Biden bettors maxing out $850 of 93c bets to be his counterparty. With a 5,000 trader limit that means that there might be just a handful of Trump-won-landslide bettors vs a few thousand No-he-didn't bettors with a lot more invested, all maxed out and unable to move the price further. But I don't know if that shook out differently in the crypto space with no limits.
Also on the topic of stability, Rai launched this week so we now have non-pegged stable assets backed by eth -> https://www.reflexer.finance/
I think it'll be interesting to see how crypto based betting markets evolve and if regulations will strike them or not. I don't really know what to think about people simply full on gambling on whatever world event, is that a good thing?
So, that's the specific reason I haven't gotten in on it. Get past that barrier and yeah I would've been buying NTRUMP for sure.
There's literally a market for whether Donald Trump will be president on March 31st of 2021 with offers available at 98 cents, so presumably I can make a 2% return in a month right?
Okay well I signed up, I had to buy USDC and that cost me 8%. In the future I should use Coinbase to cut that down to 0.50%, but for now my motivation is just to see if this thing is for real.
After a fairly smooth sign up process that took about 10 minutes, involved confirming my e-mail address, an SMS and then verifying a credit card transaction, I got the 230 USDC sent to me and immediately used it to buy NO on Trump being president.
I wont lie, this was easier than I expected, the whole process took about 10-15 minutes tops and as far as I can tell I do legitimately have this position.
I guess the only concern left is whether there's some loophole that will cause this market not to resolve at all/become invalid.
I will do a few more transactions later today since the site is literally displaying some fairly significant arbitrage opportunities. I will do it with just a couple hundred dollars at a time as a proof of concept, and if this works out then perhaps I go a little deeper, use Coinbase Pro to buy and sell the USDC.
Steps I had to follow to bet:
1. Send USDC to polymarket address
2. 'Claim' USDC when it arrives in Polymarket, but due to ETH gas fees, this function didn't work. It only works when they top up the relayer with ETH, so you can wait (as I did but it was emptied before I clicked), or pay more ETH yourself to self fund this conversion.
3. Place your bet
4. Wait for the bet to complete (to be fair, the team quickly resolved the market)
5. Withdraw the cash, this worked, although I got several errors throughout.
The best part here over other crypto based prediction markets is the resolution is quick (unlike the weeks/months augur can take), but that's due to the resolution being a centralised process, at which point, why am I bothered about using crypto at all? What's wrong with a traditional betting exchange like Betfair?
Regardless of the author (I don't bother to google every author) the content is as stated. It's a crypto-ad and not much else.
I wouldn't compare it to GME and WSB though. It's still stupid.
It Me hehe
I feel my only motivation is fomo, but I'm actually not interested in putting in the effort and time with associated stress, my job already delivers on a lifestyle I'm happy with, so the potential additional money isn't enough to push me to act.
If I wanted to bet on the election, I would first have to realize my short term capital gains.
If the value of the ETH collateral that you deposited drops to less than 150% the value of the DAI you withdrew, anyone can come in and "liquidate" the vault, forcibly selling the ETH to buy back the DAI and charging you a high penalty. Hence, it's a good idea to have a high collateralization ratio in case of sudden price movements; I had over $3 worth of ETH in my CDP for every $1 that I withdrew.
Hilariously, on PredictIt you could see the market inefficiency in action as the site has a cap of $850 risked per bet, but after the election you could make essentially the same bet a dozen different ways. Which party will win? Which candidate will win? Will the winning candidate also win the popular vote? What will be the electoral college margin of victory? Will a woman be elected VP in 2020?
Of all those different ways to make the Trump/Biden bet, the most straightforward ones like "which party wins the 2020 election" had the highest Trump prices, while the less prominent markets like "Will the SC Dem Primary winner win the general election?" had lower Trump prices.
Now, why would I and other gamblers not sell my bets from the expensive 88c "SC Dem Primary Winner" market, and move the money into the cheaper 84c "Which party wins" market? Why would the prices not equalize since they are, at this point, bets on the same outcome? Because I'm already at the $850 cap in the "Which party wins" market. I can't put more in. Or, if I wasn't betting on that before the election, I might not even be able to because PredictIt also caps each market at 5,000 total traders.
In other words, the more obvious markets filled up to their limits earlier in the process and had their price influenced more by people who thought Trump would win, and had less price movement after that due to the distribution of traders already locked into the market. The obscure markets were low-volume before the election, but filled up after-the-fact with people like me eager to find "free money" bets, so the price on the Biden side ended up a few cents higher.
Was hunting this week for real-world use cases for blockchains, this is one to add to the list I feel.
Which leaves the question: why? Technology as a whole is centre-left, so there's something else going on.
One common theme seems to a loss of trust in any institutions, and democracy itself: "the FED is just a private bank" isn't far away from "the mainstream media is lying", and even the latter is an opinion more common among the crypto bubble as far as I can tell.
Or are crytocurrencies of interest primarily to people interested in "getting rich, fast" and therefore liable to glorify a self-annoited master of making money with little work?
And the most obvious reason why not enough unbiased cryptoenthusiasts were tempted to place massive bets on something already decided to correct the odds was suspicion that the oracles might be too biased in favour of Trump being the real president for them to be sure of the easy profit the odds implied
Crypto was always about freedom, you're liberated from the dependence on your country, bank, or whatever else it may be. Your fate is in your own hands, your wallet, your funds.
You got that backwards: The left is advocating for freedom more than the right (freedom from gun violence, freedom from hate speech, freedom from preventable/treatable medical conditions).
the gun issue is a city vs rural thing. you don't want them in a city, but you might in the rural context.
> freedom from hate speech
but reframing censorship as freedom is blatantly Orwellian. also, the left is not a monolith.
the liberal left advocates for free speech and liberty. aligned with freedom.
the illiberal left advocates for censorship and control. the opposite of freedom.
Why? People largely agree that things like false advertising and fraud regulations increase freedom, despite being literally censorship.
I don't think that's quite clear cut. The right politically makes more hay about freedoms these days, but they have equally strong positions that are anti-freedom (pro-life, voting restrictions, immigration policies, drug policies, religion) and the left has pretty strong advocacy areas for freedom (religion, drug policies, "gay marriage" ) etc.
Crypto has always been about a number of things.
immigration, religious tolerance, lgbt rights.
Not being forbidden from practicing ones religion is also a freedom to do something.
Being free from being discriminated against on the basis of religion is a different kind of freedom, I think.
There is a similar way to split the third kind.
I suppose the boundary between “the freedom to do x” and “freedom from being treated badly for doing x” is kind of fuzzy. It would be absurd to say that “we have freedom of immigration, it’s just that basically anyone who comes in we happen to shoot.”, in such a situation, people are clearly being forbidden from immigrating.
But if someone is endlessly harassed by people, and treated with extra suspicion by the police, in response to their practicing their religion, yeah, that is kind of going against freedom of religion kind of in the first sense, or perhaps somewhere between the two senses, even if officially by law there is nothing forbidding it, and another law says that no law can be made which does forbid it.
But, even if things like this show that the distinction between the two senses is kind of fuzzy, I still think that the distinction is still somewhat relevant and somewhat reasonable.
A self-consistent rightist could very well support nearly-open borders, and legal protection of the practice of other religions, and oppose attempts to criminalize or otherwise legislate against LGBT things, on the basis of freedom, while at the same time also being somewhat discriminatory on a personal level against one or more of those groups.
They probably could. The large bulk of right wing legislators and media personalities aren't like this, though.
or maybe it just isn't and crypto is a counter example? not sure why it has to be an axiom that tech is "Centre-left" especially considering the historical relativity of terms like right and left
It's still very strange to me that the prices were so irrational.
Working on something that turns out to be total crap or a fraud is actually very demoralizing, not to mention not great for your resume.
In the distributed systems space, I've interviewed a lot of burnt out engineers who thought they were getting in on the next big blockchain company that turned out to be a couple founders use blockchain as a get rich quick scheme.
For every story we hear about people getting lucky by timing something blockchain-related just right, there are many more people who got the timing wrong and lost out when the hype collapsed.
Be careful out there.
Too bad most people here have worked on startups that failed then.
Namely, the author names one sort of bias that led 'Very Smart People' to give an outsized likelihood of Trump winning:
>I remember thinking at the time that this particular opinion of his was over-confident, perhaps even a result of over-internalizing the heuristic that if a viewpoint seems clever and contrarian then it is likely to be correct.
Doesn't this explain crypto-user's pro-Trump bias? Someone who uses crypto as a way to play on a prediction market is necessarily going to be contrarian, to some degree (remember we're being constantly bombarded by claims of how all crypto is "just speculation"). In the same way, believing Trump actually has a case for overturning the election results is a highly contrarian view.
This was not solely, or even primarily, a crypto thing.
* Maximum of $1000 being able to be invested on the platform
* A small fee being taken by PredictIt out of every bet.
Occam's razor suggests that when two different sites correlate so closely, their reasons are likely not so completely different.
It does. But I was never surprised that there were people willing to bet for Trump. I was surprised by the lack of people taking the opportunity that was sitting there for over a month to bet against them.
My main takeaway from this whole election cycle was that the betting markets were not that great at predicting the outcome. As the article points out, and I agree with, a big reason is just that these markets are underdeveloped. You have to really be interested in politics or gambling to get involved and the transactions costs are high. Because of this you end up with a mix of die-hard partisans and gamblers looking for an edge. No normal people are participating on these sites. In fact the markets on predictit were sometimes comically wrong because of partisan money. As the author mentions there were contracts trading at 15 cents for Trump to win states after he had already lost them. I bought the NO contracts for 85 cents and made good money on that. For quite a while on predictit there was a persistent pro Trump bias to almost every state level contract. It persisted even after the count was over!
The second reason is that the betting markets themselves were just a reflection of polling data. I'm sure some sophisticated people were using other sources to make bets but most of the predictit discussions were just about polling and how to weight certain polls. There didn't seem to be some big insight that analysts like Nate Silver had missed that the prediction market sniffed out.
In the interest of full disclosure I fall into both the partisan and gambling camps. I wanted Biden to win but knowing that I avoided contracts that were political since I knew I would bias myself. I went instead for proxy contracts where pricing was out of whack. I settled on the total vote count: https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/6882 Each bracket has a 3 million vote range and about a month out from the election I saw that the higher range contracts were underpriced. For some reason the predictit market had concentrated the betting around the 2016 vote total which made no sense to me. I knew this was going to be a big turnout (even more partisan than 2016 and everyone was at home with covid). At the very least it was going to be more than 2016. The prices were so low on the contracts I just bought all of them above the 2016 numbers with a bias to the upside and it worked out quite well.
It was a fun game but I didn't think it gave me much more insight into the final result.
Doesn't this fact pervert the underlying market? Now there are two components at play: the actual underlying odds of the election result, and the price fluctuation inherent in DAI/ETH.
Another way to frame this bet is as a high interest loan with some probability of not needing to be paid back. They are borrowing $0.85 worth of DAI/ETH now and may need to repay it in the future.
That being said, I could be misunderstanding how this all is working. The system seems complicated.
A lot of people recognized this for what it was, but chose not to play because of how finicky PredictIt and other prediction markets were around the rules of the game. In most previous elections they would have already closed the markets.
Personally, I made off with a nice chunk of change buying No-Trump on WI, MI, GA, and AZ after the election, but I only played with what I could afford to lose.
I was basically printing money last year.
There may be a broader message there about representation too: if you are sitting in a meeting and 8 people think something is going to happen, but you disagree, and they are all upper class men (for example), and you’re a lower class woman, you probably have a better than 1 in 9 chance of being right, if it’s an issue that affects the public generally. People don’t realize their views are non representative if they live in an echo chamber.