Finally, a Private Stock Exchange
henrysward.medium.com
henrysward.medium.com
For example you still need an S-1 or you'd be committing the most obvious of securities violations under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
That limits the cost of raising capital for the companies listed as they don’t have the same regulatory requirements for publishing financials.
The problem is that most private companies are terrible or they are on track to becoming public. The companies that aren’t terrible and start out on here will likely go public at some point and outgrow this.
If you are an accredited investor and want pre-public secondaries this will be a way to do it.
You usually go public to raise money. Going public also costs money and changes your focus and gives away information to competitors.
This also limits their downside.
I also want to enable something similar in my local market (Switzerland) with my startup. Here, we have various regulatory advantages, for example, there is no 2000-shareholder rule. [1] This enables us to explore stock markets for small and medium sized businesses much more freely. Just like Carta, the first thing we did is creating a market for our own shares, [2] making use of a new law that came into force on Monday and that enables the creation of digital shares without financial intermediaries.
[1] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/2000-investor-limit.asp....
It's been interesting to watch as Carta's been derailed from their initial ambition of unseating Computershare/Broadridge for the business of stock transfer agency. It's his company, but if you actually read the SeriesA decks that he's quoting from, Ward's representation that they raised initial financing on the vision of "the Nasdaq for private markets" is quite an imaginative retelling of history. The plan was clearly to "climb the food chain" up to Computershare. [0]
Their first derailment was getting into the business of stock options in the US, and the associated revenues from 409(a) valuations (still substantially all their revenue, I think). This made sense because they were in the startup world, and had a lot of startup clients issuing employee options.
They tried to stick with the TA market by buying Philadelphia Stock Transfer in 2018, and launching their entry into the public company business with great fanfare [1]. However, the guy they hired to do it left in a year [2], and PST is still running on the laughably archaic system TranStar [3], when Carta could make a better system than TranStar with a team of two in their sleep.
I'm pretty sure it's basically that their ambitions (and those of their VCs) are just too big, and being "the next Computershare" isn't a big enough business, despite Computershare's $8B market cap. Companies are staying private longer and longer, and being a service provider to public companies just isn't that cool anymore.
It's a shame because I actually think having better public company services would make it a lot easier for startups to go public earlier. But pretty much every transfer agent, including Computershare and AST, seems to think bigger private markets are the future.
[0] https://www.slideshare.net/razinmustafiz/eshares-series-a-pi...
[1] https://carta.com/blog/meet-carta-for-public-companies/
Also, I'd agree, many folks have never run their own WACC to understand what they sign on to perform in these rounds.
All joking aside, this is the obvious logical conclusion of Carta, and one of those ideas I really wish I was smart enough to have had a decade ago and then, you know, actually build.
This is an awesome development, if it can also be used to push for more standard, employee-friendly shareholder agreement terms.
Or in cases where the employee cant change the shareholder to the trust, a trust is formed for doing an escrow transaction of the cash behind the scenes.
In practice it pushes down both liquidity and price.
It becomes this strange meta-game of having to guess what the likelihood of whether you're buying something. And, you lose out on any materially positive change that manifests in that time window. Indeed, the decision can be made even on the basis of insider information...
It will also function as a better pricing function for private companies instead of using the valuation of the company at the last funding round.
Could you please ELI2 that? Thanks!
If you joined [random company] early at got 1000 shares that are worth 10x much after a round or two of funding, it may have turned into house downpayment-sized dollars in the meantime. Further, most employees don't know if their company is raising until it's a done deal. Therefore, they can't predict, plan, or act when the time is right.
Regular, predictable liquidity windows is compelling and gives employees more choices, even if they never take them.
We're currently in a prolonged startup bull market, with tons of liquidity. I'm sure many VCs, either as a way to buy more or to get in on a hit deal, will use secondaries to increase their position. I wonder what the appetite for companies to allow this behavior in a tighter startup market.
And a manager that doesn't get that, and would retaliate/discriminate, is the kind of manager that probably has other, worse faults, and already engages in much worse anti-employee behavior.
Big-brain managers would use the information to ask the employee why they don't believe in the company anymore and use it as a feedback mechanism.
Galaxy-brain managers would take the signal from many different employees to find out if their assessment is correct or not, and figure out if it is time to cash out or to go long, just like every C-level executive does.
I would take the risk of manager discrimination (which I consider very low) in order to get better liquidity and avoid being illiquid for 8+ years or however long it takes a company to go public.
If employees sell most of their shares you gain zero insight from knowing their individual position vs looking at what the chart says about the entire stock unless, as rglullis said, you want feedback from those employees.
A manager that retaliates against employees basically ruins all three value propositions. Investors don't get their shares. Employees don't get their paycheck. You also don't get feedback. It's negative sum thinking.
A manager would only do it because they consider discrimination an end goal.
o P2P Stock Exchange
o P2P Insurance
o P2P Financial Contracts (Tradeable)
o P2P Commercial Paper Exchange
etc., etc.
They seem to have originally been built for religious community-support purposes, and then grandfathered into the regulatory framework. Their present appeal is that they're cheaper than real insurance, assuming that you aren't deluged with sob stories to cover unexpected costs, and can discriminate in ways that real insurance can't (I recall that the one I looked at a few years ago would charge more if you were fat, and obviously the reproductive-control services were nonexistent)
problem: let's break down this problem of shareholder illiquidity generally.
- hiring: it's hard for private companies to hire against FAANG because the latter offers liquid stock comp. we created a calculator that shows the impact of this https://sacra.com/research/startup-recurring-liquidity-calcu...
- retention: employees bear the financial burden of illiquid stock because they often have greater liquidity needs than early investors and founders (who are able to take some off the table earlier). employees are the last to get liquidity because they're farthest from the money. check out our report on this https://sacra.com/research/tender-offer-pricing-data/
- admin: i've talked with CFOs who have to deal with one-off requests for secondary sales and it's an admin pain.
solution: companies have taken to running tender offers, often bundled into the latest round of financing. you could say that the tender offer is the incumbent in the 'liquidity solution' space that cartaX is trying to dethrone (though to be clear, carta has its own tender offer product).
what's different about cartaX? 2 things: (1) it has a market dynamic with competitive pricing and (2) T+0 settlement because carta has write access to the cap table.
there are a few important players in the 'liquidity solution' space otherwise that are big players as well:
- angellist recurring transfers: https://angellist.com/blog/recurring-transfers
it doesn't have competitive pricing, but angellist has made it a quick and simple process which puts 1 line item on your cap table (angellist)
- nasdaq private markets: https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-private-market
companies like asana and coinbase ran auctions via npm. they have market-driven pricing but they do not have T+0 settlement. also, they mainly use npm as a feeder into listing on nasdaq, so they are less incentivized to promote the growth of the private markets generally (contra angellist and carta).
- forge: https://forgeglobal.com/solutions/companies/forge-company-so...
taking more of a services oriented approach as a liquidity solution by working with companies.
for more on this stuff, read https://sacra.com/research/the-privately-traded-company-seco...
the upshot: cartaX is a liquidity solution for private companies, but because the solution comes through a competitive pricing in an auction, it creates this additional risk around not being able to know and control the price. this giving up control is hard for private companies who are used to controlling their cap table, price, scarcity of their stock, etc.