Probably as many as review their grocery store receipts, I'd guess. Which is to say, practically none.
Probably as many as review their grocery store receipts, I'd guess. Which is to say, practically none.
Because according to what I saw presented in hearings, the reading machines actually read the QR code made by ballot-marking-device, not the human readable portion of the ballot.
If true, that seems an obvious design flaw (to be nice) right there.
But regardless of the above -- the design change to include printed ballots was a big improvement in security and voter confidence in the election.
The QR code could mis-match the printed ballot on say 5% of the ballots and nobody would notice a thing.
Need a recount? Ok, just run em through again, and they'll read the same (wrong) votes again, no problem.
Only a hand count of the paper ballots would catch the mis-match.
Did that actually happen? I don't know. But if the machines are truly reading a QR code, that seems a glaring flaw regardless.