Internet disrupted in Russia amid opposition protests
netblocks.org
netblocks.org
In the heat of the moment, when protests are organized and coordinated over the internet, internet censorship can be very effective, and countries have become adept at controlling it.
John Gilmour's quip about the internet interpreting censorship as damage and routing around is far from true for mainstream internet users, if it ever was.
Did protests not exist and revolutions not occur before the Internet? If anything, the Internet appears to have tilted the table in favour of rulers.
... although the pro-censorship crowd have an exploit for that as well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jx3svMxAIas
Remember, cable is actually way more physically resistant to adversary interference in comparison to radio, satellite, or microwave towers.
You need to destroy cables, and equipment physically, unlike anything of above, and you can repair it quickly using omnipresent, off the shelf hardware. In other words, you can expend a great amount of resources sending goons to wreck thousands of DCs, and exchanges to little effect.
Physically denying regime's access to network exchanges will work.
Same with cell networks. Easy to jam locally, but even a big city is practically impossible without massive expense to physically take down cell towers. Idlib in Syria is a good example how a cutoff segment of cell network managed to stay online for a remarkable amount of time under military aggression.
I’m not sure this works with Russia. The police there don’t mess around, are very violent and have been practicing their tactics for at least a century.
> The police there don’t mess around, are very violent
Of course! That's rather obvious. You will not be able to resist any much bigger force than just police with puny handguns you can buy on the black market, but that's the point!
Have that militarised special police busy! Have them expending resources, have them running armour around cities at a great material cost. Not to say disruption of everyday life, and seeing armour on the streets will contribute greatly to galvanising the population, and demoralising the ordinary police.
Simple math tells that 1 million men strong police force will quickly exhaust itself being either split on 100+ major cities, or being constantly relocated from one city, to another.
The ratio of military age men, to police force in Russia is 21 to 1, and you very much expect that a bigger portion of population has to be counted, and not all mancount of police, and 3 letter services account for military like units.
If you define it in the same way that it was when that quote was originally stated, then protestors can still just as easily interconnect networks as they could back then. It might even be easier than back then if you consider using mesh wireless technology.
Smartphones aren't the internet. They're regulated endpoints within a restricted network which is itself connected to the internet. Just because these extremely limited little devices we carry in our pockets had their access cut off, and just because a lot of home users can't just open a browser and start browsing without talking to their neighbors, doesn't mean the internet can't successfully route around it. It just takes time and effort.
I still believe the quote to be true.
It's peer2peer in the truest sense, it can connect to other peers via Bluetooth or WiFi. It also uses Tor when it goes over the internet.
The fact the info spreads like corona when in person, means it takes a while for the info to spread, but once it explodes it goes big, and is hard to stop.
My favorite anti-censorship app.
Terrestrial wired and wireless telecom is out; government can order them to turn off.
Broadcast RF is hard, because jamming and locating the source are relatively simple. And taking actions to stop jammers is probably more illegal than the protest.
Line of sight optical signaling is probably easy to locate the source of, but could work; otoh, easy to disrupt with smoke, etc.
If you can do something with peer to peer radio, that could work, but wifi or bluetooth frequencies are jammable.
Not to mention that Jan 6th and the current situation in Russia have approximately 0 things in common.
Either way, still should be possible to catch those in denser areas by wardriving, I think.
Although, now, thinking about the costs I feel that maybe I was wrong in that assumption, and flying drones is cheap enough for this purpose.
a) the present starlink architecture is bent pipe from each satellite. meaning that a satellite (for uninterrupted service, two or more satellites at the same time), in its moving LEO orbit needs to be simultaneously in view of the customer premises small terminal, and also a starlink earth station which is a link into terrestrial fiber networks. spacex is working on satellite-to-satellite trunk link connectivity but to the best of everyone's knowledge outside of the company, none of those have launched yet. because of that, you can't presently have a starlink terminal for an ordinary customer without a spacex-operated earth station geographically located in the same region.
b) an adversarial high tech nation like russia (or iran, whatever) would have absolutely no problems with operating portable spectrum analyzers on the ground to identify and confiscate starlink terminals. it needs to be on a roof or other place with a clear view of the sky, isn't very small, and it needs to transmit. if it transmits in known bands, from the ground towards space, it can be identified from the ground and confiscated. training relatively unskilled law enforcement to use a portable spectrum analyzer and a ku band horn antenna would be at most a one day, eight hour training course. see what happens if you try to operate an unauthorized two-way VSAT link, 1.2 to 2.4m dish size, in the C or Ku bands in Ethiopia today, for example. Men with a pickup truck and firearms will show up to take your equipment and arrest you.
all of that said, I think that there is still a lot of possibilities for circumvention of government censorship and filtering, even in an aggressive environment such as behind the great firewall of china. I highly encourage any interested persons with linux/networking software development expertise, and network engineering expertise to put some thought into how they might assist open source projects related to censorship, obfuscation/stego, and traffic-blockage circumvention. Except in an environment where the government literally orders EVERYTHING to be shut off (Kashmir, recently!), there will likely always remain some paths for traffic, because a country can only cripple its own internet for so long without causing significant economic impacts domestically.
(short of threatening to shoot down satellites, which would normally be a viable threat, but honestly now SpaceX can launch a StarLink satellite for less than it costs to shoot one down)
Obviously they're a bit bulky for now, but I suspect they will shrink considerably over time.
(I'm aware of Radio Free Europe role's as soft power, but skeptical of today's sitcoms providing a strong critique against these regimes.)
If I recall correctly, Musk himself said that he will respect countries laws.
Navalny produced this 1h52m Russian-language video that was published on Youtube 4-5 days ago, just after he returned to Russia and was arrested:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipAnwilMncI (it has English subtitles)
Putin's palace. History of world's largest bribe
It's very well produced. I saw all of it and it helped me understand a lot of the history of how the current gang of eh.. er, about how Putin got to where he is today. I really recommend watching it.
After these 4-5 days, it has 74M views. The view count is at the moment still growing at ~0.7M views per hour - I just had to edit that view count. 70% of those views are from russian IPs, as per the Navalny people. Makes sense to me.
Russia has a population of 144M people.
I think it's only a matter of time until Putin/Russia bans Youtube.
Edit: And when Putin does shut down access to Youtube, I bet he'll reference how US tech companies shut down "hostiles" after the Capitol Building incident. And it will seem like he has a has a reason for shutting down Youtube in Russia, to his dwindling group of supporters.
US companies deplatformed certain users and groups insead of shutting down the service. That alone was a controversial move which drew comments from other heads of state.
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/subtitles-player-t... (I have not checked yet)
Especially since your brand new account plugged some particular startup 30 minutes ago using your account.
Look, I get it, you feel you have to "hustle". In this case using your brand new throwaway HN account. I do feel pretty strongly that this thread is not the thread for that though.
It's a rather elaborate scheme that you're accusing me of: make a HN account, spend hours writing 20 posts, all to plug my startup in some comment that nobody will read. Think through the plausibility of that one.
Not saying it's likely, I don't know enough about the tech and infrastructure to evaluate that. Just asking the question in case somebody on HN does know.
The article only says this:
"Purposeful internet outages generally have a distinct network pattern used by NetBlocks to determine and attribute the root cause of an outage, a process known as attribution which follows detection and classification stages."
To me they just drop some silly terms and fail to actually explain anything.
Today's load is probably less than a pre-pandemic football game and definitely less than new year, and our networks handle that just fine.
See https://ground.news/article/7bdfdb69-fbf5-4fb5-be1b-43c8d8b3... for articles related to the protest from different news media with various biases.
Arguably, the internet ends at the network level (TCP). Everything above it is just the payload. Application layer disruptions are not internet disruptions.
web services != internet: Nobody was pulling a lever and blanket shutting down WhatsApp.
government != private: You touch on this, but it' a significant difference that there was no abuse of political power at play; you simply had independent entities coming to the same conclusion, and acting within their rights.
tactical != strategic: The revocation of service by various American web services was not time sensitive, calculated to disrupt an ongoing protest; it was a refusal to continue providing service after the heat had died down.
You don't need to if you can intervene at the specific application and user level. Which is what happened with Twitter and Facebook, Youtube and Parler.
> there was no abuse of political power at play; you simply had independent entities
Which happen to be companies from the same nation, after the political entity their actions are directed against has lost the elections and is well on its way out and its opponents are coming in. Russia doesn't have the luxury of having its own Facebook and Youtube.
> The revocation of service by various American web services was not time sensitive, calculated to disrupt an ongoing protest;
Yet it was motivated with the danger of further incitements- which means that the heat had not died down at all- the actions were explicitly aimed at preventing more protest.
(... not sure if the headline fits any style guide)