Plus as far as I know neither ownCloud nor nextCloud went through a security audit and they are big piles of PHP with a lot more complexity than Seafile. So it's very likely that there are more bugs in phpCloud than in XiFile.
If you want some real security buy a DropBox/GoogleDrive/MSOneDrive subscription, hm?
This is inaccurate. Nextcloud does receive security audits and is in fact also used by quite some security-conscious organizations (to name a few: German Government, Siemens, ...)
There's also a bug bounty program that pays pretty decently considering the company size: https://hackerone.com/nextcloud. (Remote Code Execution = 10k, Auth Bypass = 4k - compare that to rewards that the FAANG pays and you'll see it's not that bad)
> and they are big piles of PHP with a lot more complexity than Seafile
I did a small audit of Seafile years ago and I don't think that argument flies.
For example, they copied https://github.com/django/django/blob/23c612199a8aaef52c3c7e... to https://github.com/haiwen/seahub/blob/b6f8935c0f355cc70145f9... and removed some security-critical checks. They removed the check for the password hasht here. (https://github.com/django/django/blob/23c612199a8aaef52c3c7e...)
Furthermore, the Django secret key was generated as shown at https://github.com/haiwen/seahub/blob/b6f8935c0f355cc70145f9....
``` def random_string(): """ Generate a random string (currently a random number as a string) """ return str(random.randint(0,100000)) ```
That's not really secure and copy-pasting Django core code and then removing security checks ... is shady at best.
Disclaimer: I wrote a significant part of the ownCloud code (https://github.com/owncloud/core/graphs/contributors), then forked it into Nextcloud. After some years I moved to Facebook to do application security there :-)
The bug bounty is very reassuring!
Thanks for this comment, and your work on {own/Next}Cloud!
It is often the case that software developed outside of China, for devices produced in China is alright, but on the other hand many companies like Honeywell simply contract all of their software development there as well, and it painfully shows. I shouldn't be able to buy a product in 2020 that has a linux kernel from 2012 and multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities just from public CVEs, but the Honeywell Tuxido security system managed it with ease.