Google's issue with China has never really been human rights. Google's issue with China is that it insists on access to data and algorithms, and while Google does not care about your privacy, Google cares a great deal about it's own privacy.
Blind google hate is just as bad as blind google fanboyism. Google does plenty for internet privacy, especially in the parts that don't affect its underlying business model, which is a big part of the privacy space.
Considering that the cost of getting CT was the removal of RFC 7469 HTTP-based PKP "dynamic pins" (aka HPKP), I am not sure if there was a net benefit to privacy - without hate or love for Google.
I can't fail to notice that intent to removal was to also remove "static pins" (i.e. pins harcoded into the browser) after CT requirement for all certificates was implemented [0], Chrome started checking CT for new certificates [1] and CA Forum has limited the maximum validity of certificates issued to 39 months (2016) -> 825 days (2018) -> 398 days (2020) [2] (which means pretty much all certs from 2017 would have been reissued by now!), yet static pins for certain "favoured" organisations remain in the Chromium code [3].
That list of favoured orgs? Google, Tor project, Twitter, Dropbox, Facebook, Spideroak, Yahoo and Swehack.
CT is great for transparency and tracking rogue certs - but privacy could have used a stronger model than current blind trust in the CAs (and only acting afterwards if the trust proves misplaced).
[0] https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/he9tr...
[1] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/...
[2] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-...
[3] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/chromium/chromium/master/n...
They had a chance to go forward and implement HPKP protocol in parallel with CT, they didn't. They had a chance to go with other proposals - e.g. checking the CAA records (a proposal they themselves have made in the deprecation post, especially as CA certs are also well-known and pinned), they didn't. They chose an option that works best for Google (and by extension: Facebook, Dropbox, etc), but not so much for everyone else.
This means is there is no way to spot a mis-issued certificate before it has been used - and you need to trust that the specific CA that issues it both adheres to transparency (pinky promise!) and obeys CAA (also, pinky promise - LetsEncrypt got in hot water when it didn't). That is: unless you are Google or Dropbox or Twitter - then your browser will actually save you from connecting to any counterfeit site, as that is what was important for Google.
End result? Privacy is enhanced if you are lucky enough to be on the list of statically pinned sites (see my parent comment, and see the Mozilla version as well), everyone else only gets more transparency, but not stronger privacy.
[0] https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/file/tip/security/man...
Furthermore, Google's been utilizing that stewardship of Chrome to set up a situation where they dictate terms to the entire PKI industry, including their ability to unilaterally terminate certificate authorities... while conveniently setting up their own root CA as well.
Which is to say, yes, TLS is just another strategy Google has to take over complete control of the Internet from formerly decentralized approaches, and it should be considered a direct threat to everyone.